John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Faculty Research Working Papers Series

Designing Reforms: Problems,
Solutions, and Politics

Merilee Grindle

November 2000

RWP01-020

Designing Reforms:
Problems, Solutions, and Politics

Merilee S. Grindle
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
November 2000

Few would dispute the assertion that the process of policy and institutional reform

in developing countries is a political one. Stimulated by the extensive changes

introduced in the period after 1980, a large literature has demonstrated that the success or

failure of reform is profoundly influenced by power relationships among affected

interests, executives and legislatures, leaders and party elites, and national governments

and international institutions.[1] Initially, the focus of this research was the political

conflicts surrounding important changes in economic policy. Increasingly, though,

analysts have also considered the political fate of efforts to change health, education, and

social security systems, to redesign responsibility and accountability systems in

government, and to find new means for carrying out such public sector tasks as collecting

taxes, protecting the environment, and administering justice.

Looking at this reform experience across countries and policy areas, there are

striking similarities in how reform proposals emerge. Most studies attest that proposals

for policy or institutional change are generated by the executive rather than by

legislatures, political parties, interest groups, or think tanks.[2] In many cases, executive-

based "change teams" shepherd reforms from definition through political turmoil to

adoption and implementation.[3] Indeed, in developing countries, alternative sources of

reform design are difficult to find—in many countries, political parties, legislatures, and

interest groups lack staff to study and design proposals for change and the development of policy think tanks is incipient. Moreover, in many countries, executives dominate legislatures and enjoy long traditions of leadership in policy development.

Despite the evidence that reformers within government generate most proposals for new policies and institutions, their importance to the political economy of reform remains understudied and underappreciated.[4] Instead, most political economy analyses focus on the high drama of events related to whether or not reformist initiatives are successfully introduced and sustained—the motivations of political leaders, issues contested in electoral campaigns and party deliberations, clashes among interest groups, the power of international financial institutions, the public face of opposition and support for change, for example. As a consequence, current research generally tells us more about the correlation of factors or events that surround policy introduction or defeat and about the behavior of winners and losers than it does about how the contents of reform initiatives are hammered out and taken up by national decision makers.

In this paper, I consider three decentralization initiatives that provide insight into how public problems become defined and solutions posed for national political agendas. In these cases, political leaders became concerned about the legitimacy and functioning of democratic institutions in their countries. They responded to these concerns by appointing groups—design teams—to study the problems and develop recommendations about what should be done. The reforms eventually adopted by the political leadership were crafted in detail by the design teams, often through a process of institutional

engineering in which principal-agent problems were identified and resolved by creating new mechanisms of responsibility and control. The teams were aware that their solutions empowered some interests and disempowered others. They did not abjure such political considerations, but addressed them in their deliberations. Their work also included activities to smooth the political path toward reform by countering opposition to change. Only after the design work had been accomplished did the drama of public politics take center stage and affect the destiny of the reforms.

In these cases, the work of the design teams was critical to explaining how and why the reforms took the shape they did and what conflicts they evoked when they were introduced by political leaders. This paper indicates that who is appointed to design teams, what tasks they are asked to take on, and how they carry out these tasks are important determinants of the contents of reform initiatives and the kinds of conflicts that will surround the introduction of new policies and institutions.

On the Origin of Policy Reforms

The task of policy and institutional reform has been an important activity of the majority of governments in the developing world since the early 1980s and, thus, a topic of lively interest to researchers. In a burgeoning literature on the political economy of reform, exploring how reform initiatives are initially formulated has been of much less importance than the effort to assess the distributive consequences of change and to

explore determinants of the destiny of reform proposals. Where researchers have asked about the origin of reform proposals, however, they have come to divergent conclusions.

Often, of course, the contents of reformist initiatives are simply taken as given.[5] In such cases, policy solutions are assumed to be technically necessary or appropriate responses to particular (usually pressing) problems. Describing the problem—an overvalued exchange rate, high inflation, the fiscal burden of state-owned enterprises, low achievement in schools, etc—substitutes for explaining the origin of particular proposals. While research may acknowledge those who put policy proposals together, their role is viewed as the application of technical expertise to particular problems of public policy. This work is enhanced to the extent that political leaders insulate design teams from political pressure and allow them to focus on their analytic tasks.

In other work, however, the contents of reform proposals are treated as more problematic. One critical view of the work of design teams links policy formulations to ideological orientations. In the considerable literature on the role of neoliberal technocrats in market-oriented reforms, for example, the academic training and professional experience of reformers is cited to explain their belief in the superiority of the market and their skepticism about the role of the state in development; the "Chicago Boys" of Chile are the quintessential example of this ideological orientation.[6] While this explanation has most often been applied to economic policy and state reforms, changes in education, health, and pension systems have also been accounted for by neoliberal ideas about how to make social services more efficient and effective.[7] In this view, then, the

ideology of design teams explains where they look to find solutions, and the degree of team cohesiveness and insulation from political pressures explain how successful they are in crafting solutions to public problems. In most cases, once reforms are designed, the task of introducing and implementing reform is turned over to their political masters. At times, however, members of the design team become part of larger change teams that promote the adoption of reforms in the midst of political contention.

In a broader analysis of the orientation of design teams, reform proposals represent an imperative of market-driven globalization, generally in the guise of international financial institutions that impose their perspectives on governments and act as purveyors of ideas about appropriate policies for development.[8] At times, the imposition of new policies and institutions occurs because international technocrats invade domestic policy making arenas—directly or through domestic acolytes who share their world view and language—and introduce powerful ideologies and conditionalities in support of change. Similarly, international actors also find domestic allies among internationally-oriented economic elites who seek to take advantage of new opportunities in international trade, financial intermediation, and technological innovation. In this case, design teams reiterate the preferences of powerful international institutions, either because they have been trained to see the world in similar ways or because they see no alternatives to the conditionalities laid down by these institutions.

Other scholars explain reform proposals to be a reflection of demands by mobilized interests in society. Those who support this view frequently point to evidence

that particular interests benefit from new policies or institutions and assume that they have prevailed in political conflicts to acquire these benefits. Reforms are generated when specific proposals are pressed upon government through a process that involves bargaining, conflict, and negotiation as various interests become engaged in supporting and opposing change.[9] Contents are hammered out in electoral or legislative arenas and include efforts to create coalitions and mobilize a preponderance of power. Even when it is clear that reforms have been designed by small groups within the executive, team behavior is understood to be either a response to external pressures on government or evidence of bureaucratic interests that, like extra-governmental interests, cultivate allies, adopt strategies to neutralize or defeat opponents, and negotiate details to gain acceptance of proposals that serve their interests.

In still other cases, reform contents are assumed to represent the electoral calculations of politicians. A dominant theme in many studies of reform experiences is the way in which changes create material winners and losers.[10] Electorally sensitive politicians assess the relative power of winners and losers that will be created through specific reform initiatives and of those that bolster their chances of winning elections or of their parties remaining in power. Alternatively, they reject or postpone reforms that threaten their political opportunities until unusual situations—major economic crises, carrots and sticks brandished by international financial institutions—rob them of options. In this case, design teams either generate proposals for the disposition of politicians or craft solutions that respond specifically to the electoral concerns of those politicians.

Three cases of reform in Latin America suggest a different path toward policy definition and the role of design teams.[11] In these cases, the solutions to public problems could not be taken as given. At the outset of the reform processes, neither political leaders nor the teams they appointed could clearly articulate what the problem was, let alone find a solution to it. Thus, the design teams devoted time to defining the problem before they invented solutions to it. Then, they generated options and made choices that could not be clearly linked to pressures or preferences of either domestic or international interest groups nor directly to the electoral calculations of politicians. Indeed, there was little mobilization of public or international demand for reform and the political gains they promised to politicians were often ambiguous. Nevertheless, the design teams were not politically neutral or insulated. They sought consultations and negotiations, although they set the terms of these consultations and at times sought them only to put finishing touches on proposals that had already taken shape. To a significant degree, the proposals reflected the composition of the teams and their concerns about political feasibility.

These experiences confirm what many other studies have described—executive-led reform initiatives. They also suggest the extent to which the reforms were elite projects, generated by small groups that shared similar concerns about problems of governance in their countries. Their mandates derived from political leaders but the teams recognized few constraints on their activities to develop solutions to problems. When their recommendations were appropriated by political leaders, the design teams had already determined the allocation of winners and losers in reform. Although consulted as part of the design process, interest groups and political parties were reactive

7

rather than proactive in the process of defining changes. The relation of the reforms to

the electoral calculations of politicians was often opaque, although the power of the

design teams was certainly circumscribed by the readiness with which political leaders

became advocates of change and were willing to manage the public politics of reform.

Overall, the cases suggest that the design teams were an important locus of power in

setting the reform agenda, determining the content of reform initiatives, and setting up

the kinds of conflicts that would meet proposals for change.

Three Cases of Reform

In 1989, in the aftermath of legislative changes affecting the distribution of power

among levels of government and rules surrounding the election of public officials,

Venezuelans went to the polls to elect governors and mayors for the first time in the

country's 179-year history. Citizens were able to vote for these officials by name rather

than simply marking a closed list ballot as they had since the democratic regime was

introduced in 1958. States and municipalities were not only provided with elected

leadership, they also gained significant new responsibilities and resources for carrying

out the tasks of regional and local development.

Shortly after new institutions were introduced in Venezuela, the Bolivian

congress passed, without much debate, a radical restructuring of the national territory into

311 municipalities that would have the capacity to elect their own leadership and to

manage 20 percent of national income for local development activities. The new Law for

Popular Participation put in the hands of citizens, including a large and marginalized

indigenous population, the capacity to respond to local needs and local concerns. In

doing so, it by-passed powerful economic elites in regional capitals who pressed hard for

decentralization to the departmental (state) rather than local level.

Almost simultaneously, a significant constitutional reform was introduced in

Argentina in which, among many other innovations, citizens of the capital city, Buenos

Aires, were enabled to elect their own mayor and legislative body. With the emergence

of a new institution of governance in the country, a potential new source of competition

for national political leaders was created. The popularly elected mayor of the capital city

would necessarily be viewed as a potential political rival to the president and would

create the possibility of empowering a new source of party competition.[12]

These decentralization initiatives share some similar characteristics. They were

each introduced in centralized political systems in which party politics was organized

through clientelistic linkages that enhanced the power of central political leaders,

especially presidents. They each reversed historic trajectories toward greater

centralization of power. They robbed national leaders of valuable patronage and control

over politically useful resources. They devolved power downward in the political

systems and provided citizens with the potential to have greater voice in national and

local decisions. They also mirrored or prefigured similar kinds of political

decentralizations occurring in many other countries in the world. All such reforms could

be expected to elicit conflicts about the distribution of power in national societies. How

did these changes find a place on national policy agendas? Answers to this question are also similar: they each owe their existence to the deliberations and actions of design teams.

Reform in Venezuela

On December 17, 1984, Venezuela's President Jaime Lusinchi formally established a national task force, the Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State, to study problems being experienced by the country and to make recommendations to the president about what should be done about them. As specified in the decree setting up the commission, or COPRE, as it soon became known, it was to "carry out the studies necessary for determining the objectives, policies, and actions that have to be followed for the establishment of a modern state that is responsive to the needs and requirements of Venezuelan society."[13] The commission was to develop a plan for an "integrated" reform of the state, propose appropriate measures to the president, and work with him to carry out activities in pursuit of the reform. The president named 35 well-known individuals from the private sector, the church, the armed forces, the labor unions, the parties, and intellectual circles to be part of COPRE.[14]

The creation of COPRE was not a response by the president to direct public pressure, although there was certainly widespread disenchantment with politics and government in the country at the time. Nor was reforming the state an important part of the president's agenda or that of his party, *Acci∴n Democr<tica* (AD).[15] COPRE was

instead the brainchild of the then Minister of the Presidency, Simón Alberto Consalvi, and a few others who managed to convince a reluctant Lusinchi that an effort needed to be made to bring elites together to discuss problems of governance and outline recommendations for policy and action.

Neither the president nor COPRE members had a clear understanding of the problem they were to address. They were aware, however, of concerns that had percolated among intellectuals and observers of Venezuelan politics, as well as among some of the more thoughtful politicians and public officials, since the mid-1970s.[16] Intellectuals, some reformist politicians, and others had begun to believe that the political system was in crisis, that the party system was boss-driven and centralized, and that political decision making did not represent the large majority of Venezuelans. They pointed to increasingly large abstention rates in national elections as proof of their concerns. Similarly, some were convinced that inefficiency and ineffectiveness in delivering services and managing routine functions of government created a serious challenge for the government. Many were suspicious that government was not effectively managing the economy and that the statist model of development had reached "exhaustion" and had to be altered. They shared the view that the state in Venezuela was "broad, but weak; large, but flabby; omnipresent, but useless."[17] In addition, many were agreed that the country's political parties were far removed from being effective mediators between state and society because of their high degree of centralization and their control of organizations in civil society. At the same time, new organizations of civil society, such as independent unions and neighborhood associations, were not

incorporated into the party system. These conditions demonstrated, some observers

asserted, that the political system was no longer relevant to a diverse, urban, and

mobilized society.

Despite some elite attention to these issues, it was not the case that they were

broadly debated in politics, nor were they the basis around which social conflict was

organized. Complaints about government inefficiency, yes; complaints about declining

wages and standards of living, yes; complaints about the centralization of the parties and

the rule of the bosses, yes; but widespread social mobilization or public conflict over

these issues were not important factors in the creation of COPRE. While the commission

also gave voice and focus to some incipient independent organizations of civil society,

decentralization did not emerge as a response to clear societal demand. According to one

close observer of the process, "[Political] decentralization was the idea of five or six

people without an audience before 1989."[18]

The team leading COPRE, most significantly its executive director, Carlos

Blanco—an academic with ties to the left—determined the strategy for the commission.

They decided on three major foci of activity and set up committees to study and discuss

each one. One group would focus on the broad outlines of the reform of the state,

another would focus on the reform of public administration, and the third would be

concerned with the most pressing immediate problems of government in the country.

Full-time technical teams were responsible for research on the various issues and nine

working groups of commission members set out to explore a long list of governance

concerns. Blanco encouraged broad consultation and a focus on specific, practical issues of governance that could realistically be resolved. He also encouraged commission members to consider issues as individuals concerned about the future of Venezuela, not as representatives of distinct interest groups.

As the work of the commission advanced, the most committed members assumed more responsibility and specific reform projects often responded to their particular interests. They took this work seriously. According to Carlos Blanco, "In the end...what we managed to create was a vigorous intellectual environment, the only place in the country where real thinking and grappling with problems was going on. It was a place for real reflection...".[19] As part of their activities, they invited a wide range of individuals and groups to present their views on particular issues of concern to the working groups. At the end of its first full year of activities, COPRE reported having held ninety formal meetings and 250 consultations with organized groups and 700 individuals.[20]

On April 10, 1986, the commission approved and then presented to the president a set of proposals for political reforms. Among these were the direct election of governors, primary elections for party candidates, changes in political party financing, and a modification of the proportional representation system that would weaken the control of the parties. The reformers also recommended that the executive and legislative branches be separated in municipal government, creating the position of mayor, to be popularly elected by the citizens.

Widely discussed in the news media at the time, these recommendations were not welcomed by President Lusinchi. Moreover, official statements by leaders of AD indicated that the reforms were "too advanced" and that the party needed time to study them more fully.[21] For the leadership team in COPRE, the approach of the 1988 national elections offered renewed hope that their proposals might find a political champion. As early as 1986, some opposition parties began to attack the president for his lack of interest in reform. By 1987, neighborhood associations and other organizations were actively raising public awareness of the need for municipal reform.[22] In addition, Carlos Andrés Pérez, a member of AD like Lusinchi, but one who had begun to break with the traditional leadership of the party, began to look seriously at the COPRE proposals. After discussions with the commision's leaders, Pérez and political rival Eduardo Fernandez of the COPEI party each announced commitment to the direct election of governors. COPRE's leaders invited all presidential candidates to their offices and, in a public event on January 27, 1988, a pact that commited them to the political reforms was signed. Faced with this action, President Lusinchi then called for interparty discussions of the reform recommendations, placing the issue of political decentralization firmly on the national political agenda. Opposition from entrenched party leaders resulted in passage of a toothless version of the reforms in late 1988; following major political upheavals in the early days of the Pθrez administration, however, political decentralization became a reality in time for December 1989 elections.

The direct election of governors and mayors in Venezuela emerged from a five-year discussion among intellectuals and political, economic, and social elites in the

country. In the process of discussion, centered in COPRE, intellectuals in leadership roles set the strategy for generating recommendations and persuaded commission members that the reforms were important for shoring up the legitimacy of the political system. The team consulted widely and was very concerned about generating consensus for change, but the discussions within COPRE were not the focus of much public attention nor were the reforms hotly contested. Elite networks, broad consultation among opinion leaders in the country, and institutional design appear to have been key inputs of the COPRE experience. The recommendations were picked up by presidential candidates, but because all were committed to the same reforms, they meant little in terms of electoral competition. The reforms eventually passed by congress closely resembled the contents of the recommendations of the presidential commission.

What is interesting in the Venezuelan reforms is the extent to which they were the outcome of the work of a small group grappling with problems of public sector performance and political system legitimacy. COPRE members focused great attention to the ways in which citizens could participate more effectively in the system, how they could have more information on who their elected officials were and what they were up to, and how mechanisms would work to ensure that citizens could hold public officials accountable for their behavior. They addressed fiscal relationships between the center and the periphery and the linkages between elected officials and public servants. They considered how public services could be delivered more efficiently and equitably. The institutional designs they generated can easily be understood as responses to transaction costs that citizens encounter when dealing with government, the efficiency costs of

administering public programs through alternative institutional arrangements, or the

principal-agent problems that bedevil the management of public affairs and the

relationship between public officials and citizens. Empirically, these factors seemed to

have been more important than the extent to which COPRE was an arena in which

conflicts among groups and interests were played out. Technical discussion, problem-

solving, and the search for "workability" dominated its activities more than the clash of

interests or the mediation of group positions on issues.

Reform in Bolivia

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, candidate of the *Movimiento Nacional

Revolucionario* (MNR) in Bolivia, lost his bid for the presidency in 1989.[23] Deeply

disturbed by this loss, he turned to a think tank he and several associates had founded in

the late 1980s. He wanted help in considering the economic, social, and political

situation of the country and in developing a vision of "what ought to be" as he considered

a second presidential bid in 1993. An important product the think tank, *Fundaci∴n

Milenio*, was the *Plan de Todos*, an electoral platform that outlined the central problems

of the country. Among a number of other innovations, the plan called for popular

participation of communities in their own development planning as a way of localizing

the benefits of development investments. With this broad set of promises in hand,

Sánchez de Lozada went on to win election to the presidency. He took office on August

6, 1993, with a majority coalition in both houses of congress.

In the wake of his victory, Sánchez de Lozada moved quickly to set up

commissions to flesh out the general ideas outlined in the *Plan de Todos*. To consider the

idea of popular participation, Sánchez de Lozada selected a number of close advisors as

well as leaders of two of the parties that had formed an alliance with the MNR. In

addition, he called on a young academic, Carlos Hugo Molina, who had participated in

the *Fundación Milenio* and had encouraged its team to consider municipalization as a

form of political decentralization.[24] A leader of a small political party, the *Movimiento

Bolivia Libre* (MBL), which represented democratizing leftist intellectuals, and the leader

of the indigenist *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberaci∴n* (MRTKL)

also participated in discussions, bringing with them considerable knowledge of the

indigenous forms of organization and local self-government, as well as knowledge of a

tradition of peasant and ethnic claims for local autonomy. This committee drafted an

incipient version of a popular participation law and then turned over its activities to a

technical team headed by Carlos Hugo Molina.

In September 1993, the team began meeting daily to delve into the details of how

popular participation would work. The president was often in attendance, dedicating 300

hours of his time to this working group over the next several months.[25] The composition

of the design team, particularly the presence of Carlos Hugo Molina, was important in

moving the group toward serious consideration of municipalization, a form of

decentralization that was not widely considered. In fact, as one member of the team

acknowledged, Molina had been "a voice in the wilderness--no one was listening."[26]

Instead, a number of intellectuals were engaged in a lively discussion of indigenous and

rural forms of local level governance and some organizations had actively pressured for government recognition of traditional community problem solving, conflict resolution, and social control systems. At the same time, economically powerful groups were arguing for decentralization to regional levels of government. Under Molina's leadership, the president, initially favoring direct decentralization to the level of small communities, was persuaded by the municipal alternative.[27]

As they studied the alternatives, the president and the team members became convinced that municipalization promised to solve at least three problems of the political system. The first was nationalist legitimacy. The historic problem of a weak state, which in the past had been approached by successive efforts to centralize, was given a new twist—municipalization with significant support from the central government offered a way of penetrating the national territory more fully and giving the national state an important role as the lifeline that would make local development possible. Second, they saw popular participation as a way of dealing with the extensive corruption that characterized government in Bolivia. Stripping the central government of most of its control over development investment, the plan for municipalization would eventually result in more responsive and less corrupt government.

Third, municipalization would be a way to counteract centrifugal tendencies that came from the departmental capitals. For almost two decades, politicians and economic elite groups in several of the nine departmental capitals had been pressing for decentralization. But for the popular participation working group, decentralization to

regional levels threatened not only a serious divide between the prosperous eastern part of the country and the much more backward western region, it also placed tremendous power in the hands of regional economic elites. According to one participant in the design team, "If we had gone in the direction of federalism, which is what the regional oligarchical elites wanted, the country would have been destroyed" and one of their principal goals, governability, could not be achieved.[28] Reformers at the national level were thus proposing a never-before-attempted alliance with local governments and communities against centralist political elites in national government and federalist economic elites in the departments.

In contrast to the commission in Venezuela, the design team met, deliberated, planned, and drafted detailed legislation in isolation from public debate. The leadership of the MNR was not involved in the working group and drafts of the law were kept strictly confidential. Bolivia's unions, which were often powerful in local communities, were also kept outside the discussion. Even ministers were denied access to the draft plans. Late in the process, the team consulted with a few party and union leaders, with a few elites in various regions, and with a few representatives of organized interests in the country. These meetings proceeded, however, largely without more general public discussion, and after the main ingredients of the plan had been determined.

On February 21, 1994 the president sent the law to congress, along with a letter introducing it as "the most important redistribution of political and economic power in the republic since the Revolution of 1952."[29] After that, the design team coordinated an

intense process to discuss the initiative with organized groups throughout the country. In technocratic fashion, it produced a matrix of the features of the program and the reactions of each of the groups it polled. This allowed the team to consider adjustments in the legislation that would gain support or at least tolerance from various groups.[30] Consultation also provided information that would help in devising a communications strategy for winning support for the plan.

Once it had been introduced in congress, there was considerable opposition to the Popular Participation Law. The peak labor organization dubbed the reform one of the "three damned laws" of the S<nchez de Lozada administration.[31] To allay union fears that their local organizations would not be considered eligible to participate in the functioning of the municipalities, an accord promising inclusion was signed. Regional economic elites were adamantly opposed to a plan that would by-pass the departments in favor of more local government. They decried the "secret process" through which the government was undoing movement toward departmental decentralization and they scorned the capacity for local government in a country as poor and underdeveloped as Bolivia. In the end, however, Popular Participation included major changes that they opposed—municipalization, elected mayors, fiscal grants based on population.[32]

Despite considerable public opposition, debate in congress about the Popular Participation Law was minimal due to the existence of a firm governing coalition. Debate lasted less than a day and the law was passed on April 20, 1994. In its wake, an implementation unit and then a new National Secretariat for Popular Participation were

established, and Carlos Hugo Molina was given responsibility for the rapid implementation of the plan. Among his initial tasks was managing the widespread skepticism and lack of understanding of the new law. Even advocates of the reform admitted that its initiation was neither popular nor participatory.

The work of a design team—first in the *Fundación Milenio* and then in a working group called together to put flesh on the bones of an idea—are important for understanding what solution got proposed to a series of governance problems in Bolivia. Alternatives to municipalization existed—decentralization to the regional level the most obvious among them but there were also proposals for community level institutions modeled on indigenous forms of social organization. The alternative that was selected, was not an obvious one if a compass of political pressures is used. The study and deliberations of the team, and the presence of its leader, were central in developing the new approach and rejecting the alternatives. Moreover, as in the Venezuela case, issues of the transaction costs involved in getting government business done and principal-agent asymmetries that resulted in corruption and lack of accountability were squarely on the table in the design meetings.

Not only was the composition of the design team important in determining the contents of the reform, the municipalization "solution" could not be clearly linked to concerns about electoral advantage. S<nchez de Lozada could not be reelected and Popular Participation was in any event of ambiguous advantage to him or his party in the short or even medium term. In a rapidly urbanizing country, the rural support base of the

MNR was becoming less important and this support was eroding through the expansion of populist and indigenist parties. The party was not a participant in the critical design phase of the new law and one of the concerns of its creators was to ensure that societal groups had more control in the municipalities than the parties.

Nor did the municipalization idea emerge out of the conflict of group interests or bargaining among them. Groups became involved in the discussion of the reform, and conflict emerged over the proposal, but these occurred after the proposal had been well defined and the president had committed himself to it. The option most pressed upon the designers by groups in society was that of decentralization to departmental levels, and it was this alternative that was most clearly rejected. The design team consulted various interests, but only with the idea of adjusting their detailed solution so that it would become more palatable, not as a way of assessing the viability of other options. As in the case of COPRE in Venezuela, then, the Bolivian team was decisive in crafting an innovative solution to an initially ill-defined problem.

Reform in Argentina

On December 24, 1985, shortly after mid-term elections confirmed a congressional majority for his Radical Party, President Alfonsín of Argentina announced the creation of a Council for the Consolidation of Democracy. The president established this council of public and academic luminaries to provide advice on institutional reforms to strengthen democracy and modernize government in the country. Its members, who

were to have the rank of secretaries of state, were instructed to carry out studies and organize meetings to explore institutional changes that required broad social consensus if they were to be accepted.[33] The council would convene subgroups to explore general areas of concern to the future of the country and would be supported by a full time technical team. Included among possible subjects for the council was assessing the need for a reform of the Constitution of 1853. The council members were to "contribute to the development of a transformative project...focused on the modernization of cultural, scientific, educational, productive, and governmental structures of Argentine society...".[34]

Carlos Nino, a legal scholar of note and a Radical, chaired the council. Its eighteen members included distinguished political, academic, cultural, and legal figures, among whom were prominent leaders of the main political parties, the Radicals and Peronists, as well as those from several smaller parties.[35] Throughout its deliberations, the council emphasized the importance of a broad social consensus on constitutional change that would provide a basis for accepting the legitimacy of a reformed national charter. The council was concerned primarily with institutional reforms that would alter the relationships among the three branches of government and make government itself function more fluidly.

The commission met frequently during 1986 and 1987. It generated many recommendations—the creation of the office of prime minister, second round presidential elections, changes in the judicial system, the direct election of the mayor of Buenos Aires, and other reforms. These proposals were strongly supported by the Alfonsín

administration, but the ability of the Radical Party to carry through on them was severely curtailed by the returns of 1987 elections, in which the party lost its absolute majority in congress and remained in control of only two governorships, while the Peronists captured sixteen governorships and made significant gains in congress and in provincial legislatures. After the elections, Alfonsín had to cobble together transitory alliances and respond piecemeal to escalating economic and political problems.

The elections reinforced the sense among those who had been involved in the council's discussions between 1985 and 1987 that a constitutional reform could only be carried further through some kind of pact between the two major parties. Thus, in 1987, Alfonsín's advisors opened discussions with advisors of the newly elected Peronist governor of Buenos Aires province and Peronist Party president, Antonio Cafiero, who was at the time the most likely candidate for president in 1989. In late 1987, Cafiero announced his readiness to negotiate a reform of the constitution. A series of party statements and exchanges with the ministry of the interior produced declarations of support and initial plans to set up interparty technical groups to further the proposals for reform.[36] Carlos Menem rather than Cafiero captured the nomination of the Peronist Party, but both Peronists and Radicals affirmed the need for constitutional reform in their party platforms for the presidential elections of 1989.[37]

However, between 1989 and the early 1990s, the constitutional reform project took a back seat to more pressing economic and political problems. Then in 1992, President Carlos Menem reopened the question of reform, largely as a way to gain

constitutional approval for his reelection. Alfonsín's close advisors began a series of

meetings with a team of Menem's advisors to explore possible sources of consensus on

how to encourage the reform. Those who met to discuss moving ahead with

constitutional reform had been involved in earlier discussions and several had been

considering the reform since the days of the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy.

These officials were also close to and trusted by the respective leaders of their parties.

As such, they had considerable room to set the agenda of reform, as long as each of the

leaders was able to achieve his central goals. According to one of the chief architects of

the constitutional reform project.

> There was much room for negotiation here and there was also a long history of
>
> relationships among us personally, Peronists and Radicals, that helped us
>
> negotiate and draft with a great deal of trust and sharing of views. We often held
>
> similar views and were engaged in a real dialogue about institutional design that
>
> went far beyond the basic core interests of the presidents and their advisors. In
>
> this process, we were thinking much beyond the timeframe of the leaders and
>
> were given considerable scope for considering how institutions could bring longer
>
> term democratization to the country. Behind…the constitutional convention was
>
> almost a decade of discussion [among us].[38]

As this group reinitiated discussions, they began to understand their job as

defining a "nucleus of basic agreements" that could be subscribed to by both leaders. If

they could define these issues and get the leaders and party officials to agree to them,

then the constitutional convention could move forward quickly and the reform would be

protected from the kind of gridlock and opposition that often accompanied the interaction

of Peronists and Radicals. Their idea was that the nucleus of basic agreements would not

be debated at a general level and the convention could focus on defining more precisely

the terms in which these issues were stated. The basic issues around which there was

agreement included the principal objectives of Menem and Alfonsín, of course, but also a

series of principles about democratic governance that these advisors had discussed over

the years and that many of them believed strongly. A number of the issues that they

defined related primarily to how to increase the degree of democracy in the country, how

to engineer a better balance among the branches of government, and how judicial

independence could be achieved.

This group of advisors drew up the terms of the agreement in an intense series of

meetings in November 1993. These, in fact, were the principal negotiations for the

constitutional reform, rather than those that took place during the constitutional

convention of the following year. In determining the list of changes for the basic

agreement, both parties made trade-offs. The Peronists accepted the prime ministership

and the direct election of the mayor, as well as allowing for a third senator from each

province, selected from the minority party, in return for the reelection of the president.

The Radicals accepted reelection, believing they were getting a broad range of assurances

that in the future, the power of the president would be more fully constrained.

On November 14, Menem and Alfonsín signed the *Pacto de Olivos*, committing both parties to a major constitutional reform that would redesign several of the key institutions of Argentina's democracy. On the first of December, the negotiators presented a more detailed draft of their "Nucleus of Basic Agreements," that was to be presented to the two major parties. On December 13, Menem and Alfonsín signed this agreement. Then, the chamber of deputies on December 22, 1993, and the senate on December 29, approved a law calling for a constitutional convention.[39] On April 10, 1994, representatives to the constitutional convention were elected. The debates at the convention were not negligible, but, with the nucleus of basic agreement subscribed to by the two principal parties, they concerned the fine print of the reforms. The new constitution, still carried along by the agreement of Olivos, was dutifully ratified by two thirds of the members of congress on August 24, 1994.

Throughout this process, Menem made no secret of his interest in reelection nor did Alfonsín or the Radicals hide the fact that they were in a difficult position because of successive electoral defeats.[40] There are, however, issues of relevance in this case that go beyond the immediate political gains and losses of the principals. While simple power maximizing explains much about the timing of change, it does not fully explain the content of the agreement. The agreement that was cobbled together reflected the work of legal scholars, constitutional experts, and political officials who had worked in concert since 1985 and who had their own ideas about how a constitution should be constructed and how Argentine political institutions should be structured and should function. Initially, they were given considerable room to address such a large issue when brought

together in the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy. The ideas that emerged

from the council reflected a wide range of innovations, many of which were of little

direct interest to the political leadership. Much of the council's discussion centered

around the impact of incentive structures on the behavior of public officials. Those who

designed the recommendations were very much aware that winners and losers would be

created through new institutional structures and they explicitly sought trade-offs among

proposals in order to generate an overall consensus on the package of reforms. Their role

in setting the constitutional reform agenda was significant and was responsible for a

broader range of proposals than probably would have been the case had only Menem and

AlfonsPn been consulted.

Conclusions

The case studies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina tell a consistent story about

reform. In each country, a small group was charged with making recommendations about

how political institutions could be made to work more effectively. The political leaders

who appointed these groups did not articulate clear problems that required solutions.

Rather, they asked the groups to define both the problem and the solution. In Venezuela

and Argentina, the process of design was begun and at least initially pursued within

presidentially appointed commissions that were given broad scope to explore ideas for

political reform and build consensus around them. In Bolivia, the design team was

initially put together by a politician interested in hearing a range of proposals about how

the country could be made to function better. These reform teams took their

responsibilities seriously and acknowledged few constraints on the range of ideas they considered.

In their work, the design teams considered the transaction costs involved in getting public business done and a variety of principal-agent problems of transparency, accountability, and performance. They also considered how the reforms would affect various political and economic interests, but in none of the cases was there clear evidence that a principal dynamic of the design teams was the reflection of group conflict. Instead, those appointed to these teams appeared to be well-known to each other, to be committed to developing consensus around their proposals, and to develop good working relationships with each other to avoid overt conflict and promote consensus, negotiation, and compromise.

More evidence of conflict over institutional change emerged after ideas were developed within the largely consensual environment of the design teams. When it emerged, the teams and the politicians who advocated change attempted to negotiate away some of the conflict without at the same time undermining the impact that reform would have on the political system. In Venezuela, the team initially experienced failure when President Lusinchi and the AD leadership refused to support COPRE's proposals. Its ideas had to wait for the appearance of more sympathetic leaders before the recommendations were given the high level support they needed. In Argentina, the timing of reform was delayed until the leaders of the two principal parties were ready to move ahead.

In all of the cases, designers helped counter opposition. In Venezuela, COPRE sought to build elite consensus for change. The team in Bolivia made a few alterations in the popular participation plan and signed agreements to reassure its opponents that their interests would not be jeopardized by the reform, but their plan was approved without major changes. In Argentina, the aftermath of the work of the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy involved negotiation and fine-tuning of the change recommendations, but these had more to do with horse-trading among the full package of proposals that would be part of the nucleus of basic agreements than with alterations in specific proposals.

What do these cases add to our understanding of the politics of reform? Clearly, their lessons need to be treated with caution as the cases explore only initiatives for political decentralization. Other kinds of reforms may follow distinct dynamics. In the decentralization cases, for example, international actors were not engaged in generating the proposals for change; studies in economic policy reform and initiatives to alter social sector policies, however, frequently demonstrate their extensive involvement. It is also plausible that design teams concerned about distinct problems might follow distinct strategies about, for example, how open or closed the design process, or how they will organize to study and discuss issues of concern. Further, distinct kinds of political institutions may make a difference in the location of design teams in the executive, the degree of party or interest group engagement with such initiatives, and the ways in which

they are announced. The lessons of the decentralization cases also focus only on the design phase of the policy process.

Despite these limitations, the cases reiterate what has been discovered in large numbers of case studies in different countries and in different policy areas—that small groups located in the executive are the central actors in defining reform initiatives. But the cases go further and demonstrate how design teams also engage in defining the problems that need to be solved and, in their recommended solutions to these problems, prefigure the political conflicts that will surround reform initiatives when they become public. That there are winners and losers in reform initiatives is clear, but exactly who wins and who loses and how much they win or lose can be determined by the decisions of the design teams. The cases suggest, above all, that the work of the design teams is an important part of the political economy of reform.

Thus, it is clear from these studies that reform contents should not be taken as given, as they often are. In the cases in question, design teams concerned themselves centrally with three tasks: defining the problem, devising a solution, and smoothing—or at least assessing—the political path to reform acceptance. They had choices and options as they set about defining the broad nature of the reforms as well as the detailed mechanisms for how the changes would work in practice. The choices made were influenced by the preferences and composition of the design group, suggesting that similar problems might generate distinct solutions depending on who is sitting at the table when reform options are considered.

Moreover, how these teams decided to organize their activities—how open or closed their deliberations, with whom they consulted, what issues they were willing to negotiate, how they announced their recommendations, how they sought the commitment of political leaders—were important in generating political support or dealing with opposition to their plans. Because such teams are so important in defining the problems and the solutions, they also play a role in defining the politics that meet the announcement of reform initiatives. At the same time, the cases demonstrate the extent to which design teams are dependent on the willingness of political leaders to take up their recommendations and commit themselves to gaining legitimacy for them. Political leaders remained in control of the timing of reform initiatives.

The cases cast additional doubt on the view that reforms occur when they are pressed upon decision makers by politically mobilized interests. In some cases they may be, but the preponderance of evidence in the literature is supported by the three decentralization cases—specific proposals for reform are hatched in the executive, often in the absence of mobilized pressure for them. Similarly, only in limited ways can reform contents be understood as the consequence of conflicts among group interests. Important group interests were active in supporting and opposing the reforms considered here, but not until after the design teams had defined the issues around which conflict would revolve. Of course, mobilized interests may be present in other reform cases; but the decentralization cases add to other case study evidence that in many of the reforms

undertaken since 1980, interest group politics are not the primary dynamic responsible for the content of change initiatives.

Additionally, in the deliberations and activities of the design teams, the electoral calculations of politicians appeared to have taken a back seat to concerns about the integrity of the proposals and how they would work in practice. Even when the proposals were picked up and championed by politicians, electoral calculations at best explain only part of their interest in the reforms. This suggests the importance of questioning more carefully assumptions about the motivations of political leaders who support reform initiatives.

At the most general level, the cases suggest that reform initiatives may begin as exercises in problem definition and problem-solving, including problem-solving about political conflict. Because they are at the center of these activities, design teams deserve to be the focus of greater analysis about reform politics, in addition to the attention that is currently given to the conflicts that surround the adoption or rejection of initiatives for change. In considering the role of these teams in reform initiatives, important questions about how initiatives are defined and how they get on national political agendas can be assessed more carefully.

Notes

1. This literature is large and diverse. Among well-known publications are: Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?" *American Economic Review*, Vol. 81 (December 1991); Robert Bates and Anne O. Krueger, eds., *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993); Colin Bradford, Jr., ed., *Redefining the State in Latin America* (Paris: OECD, 1994); Carol Graham, Merilee Grindle, Eduardo Lora, and Jessica Seddon, "Improving the Odds: Political Strategies for Institutional Reform in Latin America" (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1999); Barbara Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Merilee S. Grindle, *Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Merilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas, *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, eds., *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); John Healey and Mark Robinson, *Democracy, Governance, and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1994); Estelle James, *The Politics of Social Security Reform*, in progress (World Bank, 2000); Tony Killick, *Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1998); Joan M. Nelson, ed., *Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction books, 1989); Joan M. Nelson, *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barbara Nunberg, *The State after Communism: Administrative Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999); Dani Rodrik, "The Positive Economics of Policy Reform," *AEA Papers and Proceedings,* Vol. 83, no 2 (May 1993); Hector E. Schamis, "Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America," *World Politics*, Vol. 5, no. 1 (1999); Mariano Tommasi and Andrǔs Velasco, "Where Are We in the Political Economy of Reform?" *Policy Reform*, Vol. 1 (1996); and John Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994).

2. See, for examples, Grindle, *Challenging the State*; Williamson, *The Political Economy of Policy Reform*; Geddes, "The Politics of Economic Liberalization," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 30, no. 2 (1995); John Waterbury, "The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process" in Haggard and Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*; and Alejandra Gonz<lez-Rossetti and Thomas J. Bossert, "Enhancing the Political Feasibility of Health Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico" (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University School of Public Health, 2000); Joe Wallis, "Understanding the Role of Leadership in Economic Policy Reform, *World Development*, Vol. 27, no. 1 (1999). One important exception to this

pattern may be environmental policy.

3. While many have described the activities of reformers within government, the term "change team" is usually credited to John Waterbury, "The Heart of the Matter." Change teams consist of those who design policy and the high level officials who champion their proposals in the political process. In some literature, the term "state reformers" is used to signal the same combination of design teams and political sponsors who push for the adoption of reform. In this paper, I adopt the narrower term, design team, to refer only to the small groups inside government that design policy. See Gonz<lez-Rossetti and Bossert, "Enhancing the Political Feasibility of Health Reform," for a useful discussion of change teams. For case studies that provide details on the activities of these teams, see the two works cited in this note and Ben Ross Schneider, *Politics within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Merilee S. Grindle, *Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); and Miguel Angel Centeno, *Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1994).

4. See, for examples, case studies in Williamson, *The Political Economy of Policy Reform.*

5. See, for examples, Juan Gabriel Vald∂s, *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Catherine M. Conaghan and James M. Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), and Jorge DomPnguez, ed., *Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in the 1980s* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

6. A good example is found in Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1996); see also Carol Graham, *Private Markets for Public Goods* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998).

7. See, for a discussion, Barbara Stallings, "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Staiblization, and Structural Reform," in Haggard and Kaufman, ed., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment.*

8. Political institutions then become critical to determining the power of various interests to pursue their goals through public policy. See, for example, Ellen M. Immergut, "The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy-Making in France, Switzerland, and Sweeden," in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. For other perspectives that stress the power of social groups over policy, see Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988);

Jeffrey Frieden, *Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political economy and Latin America, 1965-1985* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

9. This is a central tenet of neoclassical political economy. For discussions and applications, Schamis , "Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America;" and Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma*.

10. The cases are discussed more broadly in Grindle, *Audacious Reforms.* The research for the studies involved an effort to reconstruct the reform processes from interviews with participants in the processes and informed observers and from documentation and secondary analyses of the initiatives.

11. In fact, the first popularly elected mayor of the city, Fernando de la Rδa, was elected president in 1999.

13. Decree No. 403, *Gaceta Oficial* No.33,127, December 17, 1984.

14. See Janet Kelly, "Reform without Pain: The Commission on State Reform in the Lusinchi Administration" (Paper prepared for the Thirteenth International Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Boston, October 1986); and Luis Gómez Calcaño and Margarita López Maya, *El tejido de Penϑlope: La reforma del estado en Venezuela, 1984-1988.* Caracas: CENDES, APUCV-IPP,1990). See also Eliza Willis, Christopher Da C.B. Garman, and Stephan Haggard, "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 34, no. 1 (1999).

14. In his electoral campaign, Lusinchi had promised to initiate a reform of the state, but the promise contained little about concrete actions or objectives to be pursued.

16. See, for example, Michael Coppedge, *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994) and Gómez Calcaño and López Maya, *El tejido de Penϑlope..*

17. Carlos Blanco, "The Reform of the State in Latin American Perspective," in Joseph S. Tulchin, ed., with Gary Balnd, *Venezuela in the Wake of Radical Reform* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 1993:101).

18. Interview, January 14, 1997, Caracas.

19. Interview, January 23, 1997, Caracas.

20. Kelly, "Reform without Pain, p. 21, citing *El Nacional*, February 16, 1986.

21. Gómez Calcaño and López Maya, *El tejido de Penϑlope,* p.162).

21. In the spring of 1987, the neighborhood associations organized "neighborhood day" and collected ten thousand signatures on a petition for reform.

22. He did, in fact, win the popular vote, with 23.1 percent of the total. However, under a rule in effect at the time, when no candidate wins an absolute majority of the popular vote, Bolivian presidents were elected by congress from the top three winners of the popular vote.[23] In congress, the second and third ranking parties joined forces to elect Jaime Paz Zamora president and to share in executive power and patronage. To avoid this kind of a result, the rule was later changed, giving congress the responsibility to select from among the top two vote-getters.

24. See Carlos Hugo Molina Saucedo, *La decenetralizaci∴n imposible y la alternativa municipal*. 2nd. Edition. (Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia: Ediciones de EL PAIS, 1994, originally published in 1990), which lays out his perspectives on decentralization.

25. Interview, March 7, 1997, La Paz.

26. Interview, La Paz, February 27, 1997.

27. See Fernando Molina Monasterios, *Historia de la particpaci∴n popular* (La Paz: Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, SecretarPa Nacional de la Participaci∴n Popular, 1997).

28. Interview, February 26, 1997, La Paz.

29. The letter is reproduced in Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, *Debate nacional sobre la Ley de Participaci∴n Popular* (La Paz: Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, 1995, pp. 3-4).

30. Interview, February 28, 1997, La Paz.

30. The other two were the proposal to "capitalize" state-owned industries and to reform the education system.

32. Molina Monasterios, *Historia de la particpaci∴n popular*, p. 204.

33. See Raδl Alfonsín, "Conferencia inaugural sobre la reforma de la Constituci∴n Nacional," Ministerio del Interior, *La constituci∴n reformada: Primer seminario sobre la reforma de 1994* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio del Interior, 1996, pp. 13-14).

34. Raδl Alfonsín, *El poder de la democracia* (Buenos Aires, Fundaci∴n Plural, 1987, p. 108).

35. A detailed analysis and many important documents about the process of reform are found in Alberto Manuel García Lema, *La reforma por dentro: La defPcil constucci∴n del consenso constitucional* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1994).

35. Documents reproduced in García Lema, *La reforma por dentro*, pp. 314-330.

37. Documents reproduced in García Lema, *La reforma por dentro*, pp. 331-334.

38. Interview, March 5, 1998, Buenos Aires.

39. This law reiterated the nucleus of basic agreements from the pact.

39. One analysis suggests that the two leaders were engaged in a game of "chicken," each interested in negotiating but each eager to gain as much as possible from such negotiations. They continued down the road of personal ambition toward each other until a near collision led both to the negotiating table. See Carlos H. AcuZa, "Algunas nots sobre los juegos, las gallinas y la l∴gica de los pactos constitucionales (Reflexiones a partir del pacto constitucional en la Argentina),: in Carlos AcuZa, ed., *La nueva matrPz polPtica Argentina.* (Buenos Aires: Nueva Visi∴n, 1995).