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Understanding Brexit: Cultural Resentment versus Economic Grievances


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Understanding Brexit

Cultural Resentment versus Economic Grievances

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Abstract: This study considers the evidence for ‘demand-side’ theories seeking to explain the outcome of the Brexit referendum and subsequent divisions in UK politics. Economic theories suggest that the Leave decision was driven mainly by the ‘left-behinds’ in jobs or wages, such as those living in struggling communities in the North of England, the Midlands, and Wales. By contrast cultural accounts emphasize political attitudes and values, including long-term British suspicion about the European Union project, public disgust with the political class at Westminster, anxiety about the effects of the refugee crisis and migration from other EU countries, and opposition to the government’s austerity cuts. These theories can also be regarded as complimentary rather than rivals, for example if economic deprivation catalyzed resentment about immigrants and the rejection of open borders.

To examine these issues, *Part I* sets out the electoral context and historical background in the run up to Brexit – and its implications for party competition in the UK. Drawing upon a larger book-length study, *Part II* sets out the arguments based on economic and cultural theories about the British electorate. *Part III* describes the evidence from the British Election Study panel surveys, which allows us to examine the factors dividing supporters in the Leave and Remain camps in the 2016 Brexit referendum, as well as those predicting support for UKIP from 2015-17. *Part IV* examines the impact of demographic control factors like age and sex, indicators of economic grievances, and the cultural profile of voters in their authoritarian and populist values, as well as their attitudes towards the Europe Union, immigration, and left-right ideology. The conclusion in *Part V* considers developments since Brexit and their implications for the future of populism in the UK. The main advocate of Brexit, UKIP, succeeded in attaining this goal, but then failed to achieve a decisive break through as a parliamentary party. Yet authoritarian-populism remains alive and well in post-Brexit Britain, absorbed into the bloodstream of the body politic, disrupting and dividing both major parties.

Paper for presentation at the Panel on ‘Populism in Advanced Capitalist Democracies’, Thursday 30 August 4.00-5.30pm at the American Political Science Association’s annual convention, Boston.

The outcome of the Brexit referenda on 23 June 2016 generated international concern about the effects of populist forces, and stunned disbelief that Britain had voted to withdraw from the European Union after more than four decades of membership.¹ Brexit has been widely seen as a watershed signaling an end to the era of faith in the benefits of globalization, open labor markets, and European integration. The development was welcomed by Le Pen and Trump ('so smart in getting out'), foreshadowing the outcome of the 2016 US elections in the fall. The results of the non-binding referendum were extremely tight: 48.1% (16.1m) voted Remain while 51.9% (17.4m) voted Leave, with 72% of registered electors casting a ballot.² Given the immense repercussions, the government could have treated the outcome as indicative but open to negotiation and further public consultations in another contest, as happened earlier following similar referenda in Denmark and Ireland.³ Other countries often require a 'qualified' or super-majority to pass major constitutional referenda.⁴ The majority of MPs backed Remain ('Britain Stronger in Europe') – as did the leaders of the major parties (David Cameron, Nick Clegg, Jeremy Corbyn, and Nichola Sturgeon), distinguished experts as diverse as the Governor of the Bank of England, the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, the head of the IMF, the Russell Group of top universities, the head of NATO, economists, scientists, scholars and businesspersons, and a panoply of world leaders such as Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy, Justin Trudeau, and Shinzo Abe.⁵ A petition to parliament with over 4 million signatories asked for a do-over. Instead, a few weeks later, on 13 July, after Theresa May succeeded David Cameron as Prime Minister and first entered Downing Street, she treated the outcome as definitive. Brexit means Brexit. The people had spoken. "*The campaign was fought, the vote was held, turnout was high, and the public gave their verdict. There must be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it through the back door, and no second referendum. The country voted to leave the European Union, and it is the duty of the Government and of Parliament to make sure we do just that.*"⁶ She sounded a populist tone by declaring on the doorstep of No. 10 that she intended to make Britain a country 'that works for everyone', in the interests of those 'just about managing' rather than 'the privileged few'.

But what does the outcome of the Brexit referendum—in the context of plummeting support for the UK Independence Party just a year later in the 8 June 2017 general election, indicate about the state of populism in the UK? This is another case, like the Netherlands and Sweden, where populist clothes have been stolen by center-right parties. Under David Cameron and Theresa May's leadership, the Conservative government's policies towards Europe and immigration have been profoundly influenced by strategic attempts to placate their own Eurosceptic wing, and to prevent a substantial electoral breakthrough by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Even though UKIP stock has fallen, populism seems alive and well in mainstream UK parties, the tabloid press, and in public opinion.

Multiple 'supply-side' and 'demand-side' factors contributes towards the outcome of Brexit and voting support for UKIP – including competition for power among party leaders, the institutional rules of the game, and public opinion.⁷ After considering these issues, this paper examines survey evidence testing alternative 'demand-side' explanations, focusing on the heated debate about the role of economics and culture in explaining the electorate's decisions over Brexit and their support for UKIP.⁸ Some argue that the Leave-Remain divide, the Brexit outcome, and UKIP's initial rise were driven mainly by economic factors, emphasizing the role of the economically 'left-behinds' who had not experienced the instrumental benefits of EU membership in jobs or wages – observing that Remain votes were strongest among educated professionals, financial managers, and stockbrokers in prosperous metropolitan London. By contrast, the Leave vote was exceptionally strong in the struggling areas of the North of England, the Midlands, and Wales that were historically dependent on mills and mines, as well as in places with poor households, few college graduates, and unemployment.⁹ Others emphasize cultural factors such as the long-term British suspicion about the European Union project, public disgust with the political class at Westminster,¹⁰ anxiety about the effects of the refugee crisis and migration from other EU countries, and opposition to the government's austerity cuts on NHS funding, schools, and public services.¹¹ These theories can also be regarded as complimentary rather than rivals, for example if economic deprivation catalyzed resentment about immigrants and the rejection of open borders.

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I: Background and context

Brexit was born in a speech on 23 January 2013, when the Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised that if the Conservatives won the next general election they would hold an in-out referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union, letting the British people "have their say."¹² This commitment was subsequently included in the 2015 Conservative party election manifesto. After being returned to No 10 Downing Street, Cameron introduced the European Union Referendum Act 2015 to parliament. This passed a year later and received the royal assent in December 2015, triggering the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016. Britain awoke the morning after to discover, shocked, that it had voted to Leave. Cameron immediately resigned as Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister's decision to hold a referenda was not driven by personal convictions, since he campaigned to Remain. It seems to have been influenced by strategic calculations.¹³

One was an attempt to stem rising support for the Euro-skeptic populist UKIP. In 1999 the electoral system that was used to elect UK members to the European Parliament, switching from First-Past-the-Post to regional party list proportional representation. This lower vote threshold allowed the UK Independence Party (UKIP) to enjoy its first real breakthrough by winning 7% of the vote and three seats in the European Parliament on a strongly Eurosceptic platform (see Figure 1). The party doubled its share of the vote in the 2004 European parliamentary elections and maintained this position in 2009, before surging in 2014 to win more than a quarter of the vote and one third of MEPs. This provided a platform and the oxygen of publicity, as well as more party members, so that they were taken more seriously by the news media and rival parties. Previous fringe parties on the extreme right, including the National Front and British National Party, had focused mainly on the xenophobic politics of race and immigration. By emphasizing hostility towards the European Union as their core issue, and pushing for a hardline exit, UKIP presented a more acceptable and moderate profile, even if dog-whistle xenophobia and anti-immigration attitudes were a large part of their electoral appeal.¹⁴

At Westminster, however, under first-past-the-post (single member plurality) elections and higher vote thresholds, UKIP faced similar hurdles to those confronting other minor parties with spatially-dispersed support, like the Green Party and the ultra-nationalist British National Party. In a series of general elections from 1997 to 2010 UKIP modestly increased its share of the vote but failed to gain a single seat. In the 2010 general elections, for example, UKIP won only 3.1% of the vote and lost many candidate deposits. Following this contest, however, under the leadership of Nigel Farage, the party saw its poll ratings rise, in part by winning parliamentary by-elections in August and November 2014 where two rebellious Eurosceptic Conservative MPs resigned (including the aptly named Mr. Reckless) and switched to UKIP. As shown in Figure 2, UKIP's rise in the opinion polls mirrored the Conservative-led government period of mid-term blues. This was exacerbated from 2010 to 2013 by lackluster economic growth, roughly 8% unemployment, and austerity cuts in public spending for schools, healthcare and housing, in an effort to reduce the debt.¹⁵ Moreover, the pro-European Liberal Democrats lost support in the opinion polls, alienating its center-left supporters both through the party's participation as junior partners in the Con-Lib/Dem coalition government and through participating in the austerity programs. The 2015 general election saw a disastrous performance for the Lib-Dems, with their parliamentary party drastically reduced, falling from 57 to just 8 MPs.¹⁶ By contrast, UKIP quadrupled its share of the vote in this contest, surging to 12.6% or almost 4 million ballots, representing a record performance for the party in a general election, although only retaining one of its by-election seats (Clacton).¹⁷ Based on the closeness of major parties in the final polls, the 2015 campaign generated much speculation about a possible

hung parliament, or even a Labour victory under Ed Miliband. Instead, to everyone's surprise, David Cameron was returned for a second term of Conservative government with a narrow overall parliamentary majority (330). By holding a decisive referendum on Britain's EU membership – and winning it – Cameron gambled that in future contests the Conservatives could strengthen their lead and see off the UKIP challenge.

[Figure 1 and 2 about here]

Moreover over successive decades the Conservative party had become increasingly divided over Britain's membership in the European Union. Under Edward Heath's leadership in the early 1970s, the Tories had been the most pro-EU of the two major parties, but party positions gradually switched on this issue among parliamentarians and their supporters.¹⁸ Mrs. Thatcher regarded deeper European integration and the Single European Act as imposing heavy regulatory burdens and limits on the sovereignty of its member states. During the Thatcher era of the 1980s, Euroscepticism became more common among Tory backbenchers. The chorus of criticism of Europe became far louder after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, with the move towards adopting a single currency sparking major backbench rebellions within the Major government.¹⁹ The 6 May 2010 UK general Election saw the return of a minority government with the Conservatives winning the largest number of seats and votes but falling twenty seats short of an overall parliamentary majority. Talks produced a Conservative-Liberal Democrat governing coalition, led by Prime Minister David Cameron, with the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, serving as his Deputy. This coalition caused new tensions, however, as Cameron sought to placate his Eurosceptic backbench rebels while satisfying his pro-EU Liberal Democrat partners. Cameron calculated that holding a referendum on Britain's membership could help silence the euro-skeptic wing within his own party, settling internal battles in a decisive fashion. He blundered by banking on the widespread expectation that the pro-EU forces would win.²⁰ But European problems multiplied, not least by the Eurozone crisis in countries like Spain and Greece, and by the refugee crisis. The 'Vote Leave' campaign emphasized the potential saving to the taxpayer from EU withdrawal which could, supposedly, channel more funds into the NHS, regaining sovereignty over British borders, control of immigration, and the ability of the UK to trade freely with the rest of the world.²¹ The Remain side, 'Britain Stronger in Europe', focused on the economic risks of withdrawal for jobs, prices, trade, businesses, and investments. Campaign coverage in the news media was dominated by the issue of the economy, immigration, and the conduct of the referendum.²² Newspaper endorsements were divided evenly between Ins and Outs, although in terms of mass circulation, 80% of published articles favored Leave. As illustrated in Figure 3, combining all major published national opinion polls, the long campaign from January to June 2016 saw a tight contest without Leave or Remain moving consistently ahead and considerable fluctuations over time. Polls also differed; Remain was projected to have a modest lead in the telephone polls and the betting markets during the May campaign, but online polls showed greater uncertainty.²³

[Figure 3 about here]

On 23 June 2016, the Brexit referendum upended UK politics. The margin of victory was modest, with 51.9 per cent of the electorate voting to leave the European Union. Although strictly consultative, the outcome was treated by parliament as decisive and binding, rather than as catalyzing the sort of re-run referendum held in Ireland in 2008-9 over approval of the Lisbon Treaty.²⁴ Cameron immediately resigned after the result was declared, to be replaced a few weeks later by Theresa May, who promised to lead the withdrawal negotiations on the grounds that "Brexit means Brexit".

The results demonstrated deep divisions between the Leave areas of the UK – economically-disadvantaged communities with many older, less educated, white voters, in the Midlands, the North East, Yorkshire and Humber, and Eastern England – versus the Remain territories of Scotland, metropolitan London, and Northern Ireland.²⁵ Some scholars concluded that the mainstream parties, especially the Labour party under Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Jeremy Corbyn, offered policies that failed to appeal to their base; British political elites shared similar values endorsing social liberalism, multiculturalism, and EU membership, but working-class voters and older social conservatives held values that reflected a more authoritarian, xenophobic, and nativist response to immigration and EU membership.²⁶ But others, challenge this claim, citing evidence that it was

the ‘squeezed middle’ or intermediary class that reported financial decline who voted Leave, not the working class.²⁷

The 8 June 2017 UK general elections

Brexit was followed by a surge in support for the Conservative Party under Theresa May’s leadership (see Figure 1). Leaving the Europe Union was adopted as official Conservative party policy as the new Prime Minister pledged to negotiate Britain’s exit from the EU, with the Home Office implementing stricter control of immigration numbers. The Conservative manifesto promised to cut net migration below 100,000 a year. When the party decided to negotiate a European divorce, UKIP lost ownership of its signature issue, and their support plummeted; thus, UKIP lost 140 councilors in the May 4th 2017 local elections as their voters switched in droves to the Tories. Moreover the Labour party continued to be divided over Europe and they became locked in an internal battle over Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, as he tried to move the party in a more radically-leftwing direction, with support from the grassroots membership but on-again, off-again rebellions from his backbenchers.²⁸

Seeking to capitalize on the Conservative’s comfortable 20-point lead in the opinion polls, in spring 2017 Theresa May decided to go for a snap general election on 8 June 2017.²⁹ The Prime Minister hoped to secure a comfortable overall parliamentary majority, and some even hoped for a landslide, which would thereby strengthen the government’s hand in the lengthy two year negotiations with the EU. But May’s campaign skills came into question. During the campaign, Theresa May repeatedly pledged to provide ‘strong and stable’ leadership, and to be tough with the EU in the Brexit negotiations.³⁰ Since her speech to the Conservative party conference in 2015, as Home Secretary she had advocated stricter limits on asylum seekers and immigration, but polls reported that this was not the most important issue in the campaign. For the Labour party, after being dismissed by many pundits, Jeremy Corbyn mounted what was seen as a surprisingly effective policy-oriented campaign, arguing for more generous government spending on the public sector, especially healthcare.³¹ On the EU, he shillyshallied and vaguely endorsed a ‘soft’ Brexit in negotiations with Europe, remaining strategically ambiguous.³² The ‘Remain’ camp was quiescent and defeated, with talk of a second referendum being seen as a betrayal, with parliamentary dissent portrayed as acting like ‘tyrants to the people.’ Tony Blair reappeared to fly the tattered pro-EU flag, like Marley’s ghost of Christmas past, still shackled by the chains of Iraq. The Liberal Democrats remained pro-Brussels in a rear-guard action but they failed to regain their popularity, dogged by the long shadow of the Cameron-Clegg coalition. UKIP battled on under the leadership of Paul Nuttall, with candidates in around half of all constituencies, but they had lost their key issue of EU withdrawal and received little coverage in the news media, their membership fell to around 39,000, and they organized a poor grassroots campaign.³³

The June 2017 general election registered a disastrous performance by the UK Independence Party; on election night, UKIP lost their only seat, and their share of the vote plummeted to just 1.8%, down from 12.6% in the 2015 general election. The Conservative gained votes in ‘Leave’ constituencies, such as Clacton, Doncaster Central, and Don Valley, and where the UKIP vote plummeted most sharply.³⁴ Election day polls suggest that only around one fifth of UKIP 2015 voters remained faithful, while the majority (57%) switched to the Conservatives, with around one fifth returning to Labour.³⁵ Many Leave voters in the referendum appear to have switched back to the Conservatives in the general election, generating the collapse in UKIP support.³⁶ Nevertheless, the risky bet Theresa May placed on securing a comfortable parliamentary majority failed to pay off; instead the Conservatives lost seats and while they remained the largest party with 317 MPs, they lost their majority, resulting in a hung parliament. Labour treated defeat like victory, given their unexpected surge in the polls under Corbyn, confounding his critics.³⁷ The aftermath saw much chatter about the resignation of the Prime Minister but she clung on. In late-June 2017, a deal was struck with the hardline Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), who promised their support for key parliamentary votes, allowing May to form a minority Conservative government, which started negotiations for a messy divorce from the EU.

II: Theories of economic or cultural grievances

Like the US 2016 elections, the key debate in the UK case concerns whether the Leave camp in Brexit in June 2016, and voting for UKIP in the 2015 and 2017 General Elections, were motivated primarily by economic

grievances among the least well off, because jobs and wages had been stagnant in the most economically depressed areas of Britain, or whether cultural values played a bigger role, including mistrust of Westminster, attitudes towards Europe, and immigration.

The economic thesis dominated the early popular commentary, based on scrutinizing the geography of the Leave vote. The outcome of Brexit was widely regarded in popular commentary as a consequence of the 'left behind', or 'economic-have-nots', delivering a protest against Westminster. Rational choice theories of political economy argue that voters calculated the instrumental benefits and costs arising from EU membership or withdrawal. On the one hand, the middle class professionals, managers and executives in the service sector, typically university educated, affluent and mobile, seem to have benefitted from EU membership through the lower costs of imported goods, and the broader access to trade and investment opportunities, while taking advantage of opportunities for international travel and broader educational and professional possibilities within a borderless Europe.³⁸ By contrast, however, those with low-paid, low-skill jobs, without college degrees, found themselves competing with migrant workers from Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, while competing with companies employing cheaper labor in China and India. Economic globalization has been blamed for a trade 'shock' hitting the profitability of manufacturing, jobs, and the domestic costs of labor.³⁹ These developments have been linked with the growing proportion of low-wage, unskilled immigrant workers, drawn from within and outside the EU, and outsourcing as companies moved jobs abroad. The cumulative impact of these economic shifts were held to be responsible for working class support for UKIP in the 2015 UK general election and the unexpected Brexit Leave outcome.⁴⁰

But studies by other scholars find that some of these claims were not supported by individual level survey evidence. The impact of social class on the voting preferences of the British electorate, including for or against Brexit, which had been the predominant cleavage in the post-war period, gradually dwindled over successive elections to become insignificant in recent years. The most comprehensive recent analysis of class politics in Britain, by Evans and Tilley, found that the class cleavage had diminished or even reversed itself by the time of the 2015 general election: in this contest, some middle class professional groups were more likely to vote for Labour than the working class.⁴¹ This study attributed these developments to 'top' down changes in the supply-side of party competition, including the growth of the college-educated middle classes in the social composition of parliament and the development of catch-all party appeals, weakening class-based campaigns. These factors might have contributed to the erosion of the class cleavage in British elections, but it seems implausible to attribute this development wholly to supply-side factors, like Labor party campaign strategies, as we have observed that this phenomenon is not sui generis but applies to many established democracies.

With greatly weakened class and economic appeals to the less well-off, feelings of identity and cultural grievances may come to the fore, with the Leave vote being driven by a populist protest directed 'upwards' against the establishment like party leaders, journalists, economists, scientists eurocrats, bankers and world leaders telling 'us' what to think, and by authoritarian antipathy towards perceived threats from 'Them' (whether Polish shopkeepers, Syrian refugees, or second-generation Bangladeshi). Even after including multiple controls, evidence suggests that negative attitudes towards immigration were significant predictors of authoritarian and populist values in the pooled European Social Survey.⁴² This linkage was confirmed in many West European and Scandinavian societies that had attracted a high proportion of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers – although not in many Eastern and Central European nations which had seen a net loss. Many other studies have reported that immigration attitudes are strongly linked with voting for radical right parties.⁴³

The British case is also suitable to examine this phenomenon within the context of a plural multicultural Western democracy. Major cities in England and Wales have long attracted waves of migrants, often from Commonwealth countries in South East Asia and the Caribbean, as well from states like Uganda and Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa. The OECD estimates that today, around one in seven British residents is foreign-born – not including the second-generation of British-born citizens with parents who immigrated from such countries as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Caribbean from the 1950s onwards.⁴⁴ Britain has long been an attractive destination for migrants, as a prosperous English-speaking society with a cultural ties to Commonwealth countries, an open labor market, a university system aggressively recruiting international students, and a comprehensive welfare state. Today cities such as London, Manchester, Birmingham, Leicester,

Leeds and Coventry have become diverse multiethnic and multicultural societies. Based on official statistics, the Institute for Race Relations estimates that in terms of ethnicity, in 2014 around 87% of the total UK resident population are White British. This proportion drops to 80% in England and Wales and only 45% in cosmopolitan London.⁴⁵

It would be mistaken to see the complex issue of immigration in Britain purely through the lens of the politics of racism or Islamophobia. The UK has one of the highest levels of inward migration within the EU, attracting almost nine million migrants as of 2017, more than any other EU state except Germany (see Figure 6.2).⁴⁶ Many migrants are high-skilled professionals, such as doctors in the NHS, financial managers in the city, and entrepreneurs in the retail sector. The right for European citizens to live and work anywhere within the European Union, and the removal of restrictions on open access to labor markets for citizens from Central and Eastern European accession states, attracted many high-educated migrants. It is estimated that by the time of Brexit, around one million Poles lived and worked in Britain, while around 400,000 French expats lived in London alone, a number equal to France's sixth largest city.⁴⁷ Others are unskilled and less-educated workers, often second-generation from the Afro-Caribbean, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities. Only a minority come from the influx of more recent refugees and asylum seekers fleeing developing countries with weak states, conflict and poverty. Compared with other West European countries such as Germany, Britain has one of the least generous policies for supporting asylum seekers with financial aid, housing, and benefits.⁴⁸

III: Evidence and data

Many factors on the 'demand-side' of the equation may have contributed towards the Brexit Leave vote - - as well as support for UKIP. If the economic grievance thesis is correct, then voting for Leave and UKIP in the electorate should be stronger among low-income households, unskilled manual workers, the unemployed, those with subjective feelings of economic insecurity, as well as those with left-wing economic attitudes and values. On the other hand, populist attitudes of political distrust, and authoritarian values, were strong predictors of support for Authoritarian Populist parties across Europe.⁴⁹ If the cultural grievance thesis holds for the British case, then voting for UKIP and for Leave should be predicted by authoritarian and populist values. The literature suggests that many other cultural values may also matter, including attitudes towards immigration, and towards European integration.

The British Election Study multi-wave panel data provides rich opportunities to test these relationships in more depth, throughout the period from 2014-2017 which includes the 2015 and 2017 general elections as well as the 2016 Brexit referendum. If similar patterns are observed over time, this increases confidence in the reliability of the results. The UK case study also allows us to explore the dynamics of support for authoritarian-populism in terms of both issues (Brexit) and parties (UKIP) by comparing voting behavior and public opinion over time, including the 7th May 2015 British general election, the 23rd June 2016 non-binding referendum on Britain's membership of the EU (Brexit), and the 8th June 2017 British general election. For evidence at individual level, we draw on the British Election Study panel survey, a large study of 31,196 people conducted by YouGov over thirteen waves from February 2014, from the first wave in advance of the May 2015 general election until the final wave immediately after the June 2017 general election.⁵⁰ For constituency-level analysis over successive elections, we can also use the British General Election Constituency Results 2010-2017, which also includes the estimated Brexit vote by seat.⁵¹

In the British Election Study panel survey, three scale measures of values are particularly useful for analysis in this study, measuring libertarian/authoritarian, left-right economic values, and populist attitudes.

The first concerns the **libertarian/authoritarian** cleavage, which we have demonstrated elsewhere is a strong influence on voting behavior for more authoritarian-populist parties in many European societies.⁵² The BES libertarian-authoritarian scale is calculated from responses to the following statements in the panel survey: "(1) Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values; (2) People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences; (3) For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence; (4) Schools should teach children to obey authority; (5) The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong; (6) Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards." The battery taps similar values to those in the Schwartz values scales used elsewhere.⁵³ The scale is also strongly correlated with the classic childrearing right-wing authoritarian value scale monitoring

obedience and social conformity.⁵⁴ The BES scale is summed across all six items. Those classified as most ‘authoritarian’ are amongst the one-fifth with the highest scores (ie scoring 8 or more on the 10-point scale), while those categories as ‘libertarian’ are in the one-fifth lowest scores (i.e. 2 or less). Similar batteries have been used in successive surveys since 1992 in the British Social Attitudes and the British Election Study.⁵⁵ The BES scale also taps broad social values without any reference to policy issues debated during the Brexit and general election campaigns, avoiding problems of circularity and endogeneity. In a ‘funnel of causality’ model, values can be understood as further from the voting decision than attitudes towards immigration, European integration, party identification, or support for party leaders. If this value cleavage has become more important in the UK, as the cultural backlash thesis argues, this should be a strong predictor of both UKIP and Leave support.

For comparison, we can also measure **left-right economic attitudes**, reflecting the classic cleavage over state socialism versus free markets. If the economic grievance thesis is correct, then this should also predict UKIP and Brexit voting, with the ‘left=behind’ sectors supporting redistribution of wealth and income. These values are monitored using similar procedure to the libertarian-authoritarian scale in the BES based on 5-point agreement or disagreement responses to the following Likert-style items: “(1) *Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off*; (2) *Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers*; (3) *Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth*; (4) *There is one law for the rich and one for the poor*; (5) *Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance*.” The left-right scale is constructed by summing the five items and standardizing the scale. Again these items are designed to monitor broad values and do not tap the core campaign issues debated during Brexit. These batteries of questions were included in successive BES and BSA surveys and have been widely tested in the research literature.⁵⁶ If economic considerations continue to shape patterns of party competition and voting behavior, then this cleavage should be a strong predictor of both party choices in recent general elections as well as the Brexit Leave/Remain vote.

Elsewhere, using the ESS survey data, we have relied upon indirect measures of the core concept of **populism**, such as feelings of mistrust of political parties, politicians and parliaments.⁵⁷ This has limitations, since these measures only capture the anti-establishment dimension, but not the ‘power to the people’ aspect of this concept. New survey instruments are emerging to examine the latter dimension, not just dissatisfaction with the political establishment but also whether the public endorses the principle of popular sovereignty.⁵⁸ Analyzing evidence from nine European countries with these items suggests that populist attitudes do serve to shape support for populist parties and also moderate the impact of policy issues.⁵⁹ To explore this issue we will analyze a specially designed battery of items in the BES panel which is closer to the notion of populism. Some of these questions were first used in a pioneering study developed by Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove which was tested in a small Dutch survey designed to establish public attitudes towards populism.⁶⁰ Accordingly, we constructed a Populist standardized scale as a summary (Z-score) measured in BES (Waves 7 and 10) from the following 5 Likert-style agree/disagree items: “(1) *The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the people*; (2) *The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions*; (3) *I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician*; (4) *Elected officials talk too much and take too little action*; (5) *What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles*.” In factor analysis and reliability tests, these items generate consistent scales in a single dimension.⁶¹ Similar procedures were followed to classify the most and least populist categories.

Table 1 presents the results of logistic regression models where the dependent variable is the vote to Leave (1) or Remain (0) in the European Union in Wave 9 (24 June-4 July 2016), from the post-Brexit wave of the BES survey. Descriptive statistics are used to compare the typical profile of the Brexit Leave vote with patterns of voting for UKIP in 2015, 2016 and 2017. The models in Table 1 control for several demographic factors expected to prove important in predicting support for UKIP as a party, as well as Leave as an issue, with items matched to the closed wave of the panel prior to Brexit, including the effects of birth cohort, social background (using having children and marital status as proxies for life-cycle effects), as well as gender, education and ethnicity (White British or not). Economic indicators in Model 2 include occupational class (a five-fold schema based on the occupational status of the head of household), feelings of economic inequality (subjective economic security from the perceived risks of low savings and unemployment), and experience of

unemployment.⁶² The left-right economic values scale is also included. Gross household income was also compared descriptively but dropped from the multivariate model to avoid problems of multicollinearity. Cultural scales in Model 3 include those for the core values of authoritarianism and populism, at the heart of our theory, while Model 4 adds attitudes towards immigration, European integration, and like/dislike of UKIP.

[Table 1 about here]

III: Analyzing the results

Generation gaps

The results of the first model in Table 1 confirms that there was a major generational cleavage dividing the Leave-Remain camps. In keeping with many other studies, we find that Millennials were far less likely to vote Leave than their parents' Interwar generation.⁶³ And according to the British Election Study, the generation gap has widened over successive elections in the UK (as in the U.S.). Thus in general elections held from 1970 to 2010, the Conservatives consistently held a modest advantage among the older generations when compared with the support they attracted among younger cohorts. But the gap among birth cohorts has expanded in recent contests. Thus younger people were significantly less likely to cast a Brexit ballot but when they did so, according to the BES, around 38% of the youngest (Millennial) cohort voted to leave the EU in contrast to almost two thirds of the Interwar cohort (65%) (see Figure 4). Moreover strikingly similar generation gaps were found in the proportion of the electorate voting for UKIP in the 2015 and 2017 in British general elections (and saying that they would vote for UKIP in 2016) (see Figure 5). There isn't much difference between the Interwar and Boomer birth cohorts, but voting for UKIP drops a lot among the Gen X and Millennials. In the 2015 general election, while 8.4% of the Interwar generation reported voting UKIP, only 2% of the Millennials did so.

[Figure 4 and 5 about here]

As well as birth cohorts, Model 1 in Table 1 also includes a range of social and demographic background factors; none are significant except for education. This finding has been widely noted in previous studies of Brexit as well as in classic studies of authoritarianism.⁶⁴ College education is consistently one of the strongest predictors of socially-liberal and socially-conservative values – and of support for authoritarian-populist parties and leaders. The linkage between education and libertarian views seems to arise from socialization effects.⁶⁵ College graduates were likely to vote Remain because tolerance towards diversity is fostered by the values, knowledge, and cognitive skills acquired through formal schooling.⁶⁶ More awareness and information about other peoples and places tends to foster greater trust.⁶⁷ But, surprisingly, ethnicity (being White British) did not predict whether someone voted to Remain or Leave. Support for the European Union and attitudes towards immigration are so more complicated than a simple racial or ethnic divide might suggest.

Economic grievances and the have-nots

To test the economic grievance thesis, Model 2 adds several economic indicators – including occupational class—which remains statistically insignificant across all models in predicting the Leave vote. There is a significant difference between the middle and working class categories in the Leave vote (as illustrated in Figure 6) – but support for Leave was not significantly greatest among the unskilled manual working class households with the lowest levels of pay, occupational status, and job security. Social class was insignificant when one controls for education and birth cohort. The least well-off are often assumed to be the most Eurosceptic, based on the characteristics of the constituencies that voted to Leave. But, as with the US's vote for Trump, the have-not's (or have-least's) did not predict the Brexit vote-- as other survey-based studies have also observed.⁶⁸ And, despite extensive discussion about the importance of economic deprivation due to the decline of British factories in global markets, individual-level unemployment was also not a significant predictor of how someone voted in Brexit. The only economic indicator in model 2 that was associated with Leave voting tapped subjective feelings of economic insecurity. In other words, those who *felt* more vulnerable to the risks of unemployment or inadequate income were more likely to vote Leave – although the coefficients were not consistently significant across all models and this item is subject to problems of endogeneity. In the US, for example, Pew surveys report that subjective evaluations of the state of the American economy by Republicans

shifted dramatically following Trump's inauguration, despite little or no change in the underlying objective economic indicators.⁶⁹ Moreover the left-right economic value scale is insignificant in the models-- a further indication that these attitudes were not important in explaining the Brexit vote.

[Figure 6 and 7 about here]

Cultural values

What are the effect of cultural values? To test then, Model 3 adds the authoritarian/libertarian BES scale and the populism scale. In keeping with our theory and European findings presented elsewhere, both of these proved strong and significantly associated with Leave voting in Brexit.⁷⁰ As Figure 7 illustrates, 60% or more of those who were most authoritarian (scoring above 8 on the 10 point scale) voted to Leave. By contrast, among those who were most libertarian (scoring below 2 points on the scale) only 10% voted to Leave-- a massive gap. Moreover this is not a simple one-off; instead it is apparent from the figure that this was not simply confined to Brexit; instead similar linear patterns can be observed (at lower levels) for reported UKIP voting in the 2015 and 2017 general elections, and intentions to vote for UKIP in 2016. When UKIP support surged in the 2015 general election, almost none of the support came from the most libertarian voters—but UKIP picked up the support of over one fifth of the most authoritarian voters. It is worth emphasizing that authoritarian-libertarian values were measured one year before the general election, and policy debates during the campaign didn't focus on any of the items in the authoritarianism scale, so this finding does not seem to be attributable to endogeneity. This increases our confidence that these core values drive subsequent voting choices, and reduces the risk that pre-existing party preferences and voting choices shape core authoritarian values.

[Figure 8 about here]

The measure of populism used in the BES scale is designed to tap orientations towards the role of elected representatives versus the will of the people-- the heart of the populism concept. The results of the BES scale presented in model 3 in Table 1 confirms that populism is indeed statistically significant as a predictor of voting Leave and supporting UKIP, as hypothesized. Figure 8 illustrates the remarkable strength of the relationship. Among those scoring lowest in populism (12 or below) around 15% voted Leave. In stark contrast, among those scoring highest in populism (23 or above on the 25 point scale) around 70% voted Leave. A similar profile is found for those supporting UKIP in the 2015 and 2017 general elections – and expressing voting intentions for UKIP in 2016. This party campaigned almost solely on the issue of withdrawing Britain from the European Union. But beyond this issue, supporters were strongly attracted by the deeper populist appeal that a vote for UKIP and for Brexit reflected a way to restore popular sovereignty to the people – or at least that it delivered a well-aimed kick at 'Them' -- the elected representatives at Westminster and European officials in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Finally, Model 4 adds the Left-right economic value scale, and whether respondents favored more or fewer immigrants. After controlling for the other characteristics of voters, neither of these were statistically significant. Further examination suggests that without any controls, attitudes towards immigration were indeed directly correlated with the vote to Leave, as expected. But the effect of attitudes towards immigration on Leave voting disappeared once authoritarian-populist values were added to the model. Not surprisingly, attitudes towards immigration are consistently linked with authoritarian-populism. In this regard, we concur with a study based on the British Social Attitudes that concluded: "The [Brexit] result reflected the concerns of older, more 'authoritarian' or social conservative voters who were particularly worried about immigration."⁷¹ The BSA time-series surveys since 2002 suggests that in fact British society as a whole has become slightly more tolerant over time in views towards the effects of immigration. Growing acceptance of multiculturalism in British society seem to have triggered an authoritarian backlash among the minority of racist and xenophobic sectors of society who endorse these values as a form of collective security to protect 'Us' from 'Them'.

Two other cultural items were very strongly linked to Leave voting in Model 4, namely being for or against further European Integration and whether respondents liked or disliked UKIP. These linkages are highly predictable, indeed almost tautological. They do not help much, in themselves, to enrich our understanding of

why people favored or opposed European Union membership or why they support UKIP. In the final model, the addition of these items wiped out the effects of nearly all other factors but the authoritarian/libertarian and populism scales and feelings of economic insecurity. It is especially noteworthy that neither the authoritarian nor the populism scales make any explicit references to Europe – yet they are powerful predictors of voting to Leave and supporting the UKIP.

[Figure 9 and 10 about here]

How do these patterns relate to Britain's electoral cleavages? No one party has a monopoly on appealing to authoritarian-populism. Figure 9 compares the position of voters for all the main British parties (excluding Northern Ireland) in terms of where they stood in endorsing authoritarian and populist values, and whether they voted Leave or Remain. As the scatterplot shows, authoritarian and populist values formed a cleavage dividing Leave from Remain supporters in all parties. The Leave voters from each party are located in the top right quadrant, expressing the highest support for authoritarian-populism. Of these UKIP voters are the most populist -- but they are located near the Leave supporters from the other parties. By contrast, the Remain supporters from all the parties except UKIP are clustered in the bottom left quadrant, with the Conservative Remainers more authoritarian, and the Liberal Democrats the least populist. The distribution confirms the importance of the cultural cleavage around these values and the way that this divided supporters *within* each party into Leave and Remain camps.

And how do the median positions of party supporters vary *across* these cultural scales and are these positions reasonably stable or do we find major changes over successive elections? Figure 10 shows the median position of party voters on these issues scales in the 2015 and 2017 general elections. It is evident that voters for UKIP are consistently the most authoritarian-populist in their values – in the top right quadrant located at some distance from all the other parties except the ultra-fringe British National Party in the 2015 election, which was even more extreme in its racist, anti-immigrant, and xenophobic appeal. The Conservative party voters are the closest to UKIP voters – but located nearer the center of the political spectrum. Moreover compared with 2015, Conservative party voters become slightly more populist and authoritarian in 2017, tacking closer to UKIP under Theresa's May's hardline policies towards Europe and immigration. The supporters of the other main British parties cluster in the bottom-right quadrant with less populist and more libertarian values – where they compete with each other for votes. Labour voters are relatively centrist, located near the median voter, while Green voters are most libertarian in their values, and the Liberal Democrats supporters are least populist and most favorable to pluralist democracy. Subsequent research builds on these findings to consider the consequences of authoritarian-populism for party competition – and the policy agenda.

V: Conclusions

The Brexit decision to leave the EU shocked Britain's image of itself – and sent reverberations around Europe and the world. Until recently, a broad consensus about the liberal international order abroad and the importance of liberal democratic governance at home was widely shared on both sides of the aisle at Westminster. This consensus also reflected the views of many European heads of state, central bankers, top corporate executives, Silicon Valley leaders, media commentators, academic experts, and the global elites who gathered at Davos. The accord reflected a cosmopolitan vision, convinced of the benefits of access to global markets, open border, and international cooperation. In Europe, this was seen as a 'permissive consensus' in which Brussels Eurocrats pursued a common vision of deepening and enlarging the European Union, without giving a voice to the European public on the matter-- even though this goal was increasingly rejected by many of their own citizens.⁷²

At home, as well, the political leadership in all major UK parties differed on many economic and social policies but seemed to share wide agreement about the values of pluralism, tolerance, and respect for diversity, the protection of minority rights, and the rejection of racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia. In practice, there were always important social tensions and challenges to the tradition of live-and-let-live tolerance – exemplified by regular expressions of xenophobia, Islamophobia, sexism and racism in the tabloid press. But the worst extremist politics of hate, exemplified by the National Front and the British National Party, were largely confined to the far fringe and quarantined from mainstream British electoral politics. The elite consensus was buttressed by deeply-entrenched political norms endorsing the importance of parliamentary democracy,

devolved assemblies in the UK regions, a long tradition of free speech supported by a pluralistic and lively free press and an active civil society, rule of law through an independent judiciary, professionalism in the public sector, and strong and stable majoritarian governments counterbalanced by the protection of minority rights. In Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture*, the predominant norms and values in Britain were seen as a model for other democracies. The rise of UKIP, and the Brexit decision and its deeply divisive consequences in its aftermath have shaken faith in the traditional tolerance of British society, raised challenges to the liberal consensus concerning the principles of democratic governance, and even threatened the stability and unity of the United Kingdom.

The story behind Britain's momentous decision to withdraw from the European Union, after more than forty years of membership, and the historical role of UKIP in this process, rests ultimately on 'supply-side' factors in Westminster politics --including the critical impact of contingent historical events and key decisions made by leading politicians. David Cameron chose for strategic reasons, not personal convictions, to hold a referendum on EU membership-- hoping to secure his authority over his recalcitrant backbenchers and to see off UKIP.⁷³ Yet rather than proving a major threat to the electoral fortunes of the Conservative party, like many related fringe parties, UKIP has remained a marginal force in British politics. It lost its *raison d'être* once the Conservative party pledged to Leave but also, like many fringe parties, it could have also been unable to overcome the many logistical, financial and organizational obstacles facing small parties contesting seats in majoritarian electoral systems. The leaders of Leave – Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, were motivated recklessly by their own leadership aspirations to take over from Cameron more than any deep rooted Euroscepticism or even belief that they would actually win.⁷⁴ The result of the consultative Brexit referendum was extremely close and, like similar contests in Ireland and Denmark, could have been rerun, or the rules could have required a qualified majority to win. But instead Leave's wafer-thin victory was treated by Theresa May as decisive, in part to secure ministerial backing for her own position as party leader. After she entered No 10, parliament triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and endorsed negotiations leading to Britain's eventual divorce from the EU, which is due to occur by midnight 29 March 2019. Yet reports suggest that the government appears to have no clear plan of what it wants to secure from these talks – and no realistic chance of securing its goals of restricting the right of Europeans to live and work in Britain while simultaneously maintaining tariff-free access to European markets.⁷⁵ May also miscalculated by calling the snap general election in June 2017, losing her parliamentary majority, eroding her authority as party leader, and weakening her negotiating hand in Europe by becoming dependent on the DUP.⁷⁶ Like Trump's unexpected edge in the Electoral College in the 2016 US elections, there are multiple 'what-ifs' in the series of steps leading towards Brexit that could have led to a very different outcome.

Nevertheless on the 'demand-side' of the equation, the evidence we have scrutinized suggests more predictable and consistent patterns about the main drivers of public opinion and voting behavior in the Brexit referendum, once the referendum had been called, and in patterns of electoral support for UKIP in the 2015 and 2017 general elections.

Three key findings deserve emphasizing from this case study.

The cultural backlash theory argues that a new cleavage has emerged in both party competition and in the electorate in many Western societies. In Goodhart's depiction of this situation, Britain has become split between the 'Anywheres', the degree-educated geographically mobile professionals who embrace new people and experiences, and define themselves by their achievements. In contrast, the 'Somewheres' have an identity rooted in their hometown and find rapid change unsettling, particularly that brought on by the flow of migrants, the growth of multiethnic cities, and more fluid gender identities.⁷⁷ We believe that the heart of this cultural division concerns authoritarian values, endorsed by socially-conservative groups that feel most threatened by the rapid pace of cultural change and the loss of respect for traditional ways of life. This triggers an authoritarian reflex –emphasizing the importance of maintaining collective security by enforcing conformity with traditional mores, a united front against outsiders, and loyalty to strong leaders. This orientation is reinforced by anti-establishment populist rhetoric kicking 'Them' and reasserting the legitimate voice of 'Us' through claiming 'power to the people'. The cultural backlash thesis suggests that authoritarian-populist values among the older generation and less educated sectors have generated a new cultural cleavage that can be mobilized by populist

leaders such as Nicholas Farage, and opportunities to express public preferences, such as the Brexit referendum. *The empirical evidence in this study confirm that both authoritarian and populist values are strongly linked with voting behavior in the United Kingdom*, as hypothesized. These patterns persist in predicting not only Leave support in the EU referendum, but also the votes cast for UKIP in the 2015 and 2017 general elections. The results of the analysis remain significant and strong in size, even with multiple controls for the social background of British voters and their economic characteristics.

This paper also examined the economic grievance thesis, which holds that those who are less well-off – the economic losers from globalization-- will be more likely to embrace Brexit and UKIP. Although a widely popular argument in media commentary, and supported by studies in political economy based on the areas where the Leave vote was strongest, this study (like other individual-level analyses) found little support for this thesis.⁷⁸ In the analytical models, *support for Brexit was not significantly stronger among unskilled manual workers, among the unemployed, and among those with left-wing economic values.*


Striking generation gaps are evident in voting for Brexit and in recent general elections in the UK. This confirms the patterns observed in Europe and the US and raises important questions about the changing nature of electoral cleavages and party competition in these countries. If these patterns persist and if younger generations can be mobilized to vote, this is likely to be potentially important for transforming the policy agenda, for the future of party competition, and for long-term electoral change in Britain and elsewhere.

What explains the large and growing generational gaps in Brexit and UKIP? On the one hand, it could be that younger people feel that they face more limited economic opportunities than their parents and grandparents. Howker and Malik argue that, in stark contrast to the older generations, millions of young Britons today face the most uncertain future since the early 1930s, without good pensions, secure jobs and affordable housing.⁷⁹ Moreover, Millennials face the costs of attending university and growing levels of student debt,⁸⁰ lack of secure well-paid jobs⁸¹, stagnant wages and relatively high levels of youth unemployment (with rates more than double the national average).⁸² In this sense, age may have become the new social class. If young people feel less well off than their parents and grandparents, they may be attracted by the radical socialist message of the Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn. But systematic evidence for this claim is mixed. For example a study using the British Social Attitudes data from 1985 to 2012 reported that young people who came of age under Thatcher were more rightwing in their economic attitudes than previous generations, not more left-wing.⁸³

An alternative argument, which is more persuasive, is that the Millennials and Gen X in Britain dislike the Leave camp and UKIP's appeals to English nationalism and white nativism, racial and ethnic intolerance, and social conservatism. They were more strongly attracted to other parties with a cosmopolitan outlook on Britain's place in the EU and socially-liberal policies on cultural and moral issues, such as Labour's manifesto pledges to supportGBTQ equality, women's rights, anti-racism, protecting animal welfare, lowering the voting age to 16, supporting international development, and building sustainable environments.⁸⁴ But Figure 10 demonstrates, Labour supporters are far from alone in endorsing these values, since voters for the Green party, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party were also all clustered in the quadrant endorsing pluralism over populism and libertarian over authoritarian values. There is widespread evidence from the British Attitudes Survey that British society continues to move in a socially-liberal direction, with younger and college-educated people being far more tolerant than older and less-educated groups on same-sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia, pornography, and pre-marital sex.⁸⁵ Millennials are also far more likely to have voted Remain – especially university students, because Britain's membership in the European Union presents opportunities to work, live and study in Paris, Berlin or Rome. A post-Brexit study of young people in Britain, involving focus groups and a large-scale survey, concluded that many are concerned about the negative impact of Brexit on multi-ethnic communities – and they expressed concern about rising intolerance, discrimination, racism and the decline of Britain's multicultural image.⁸⁶ They were also resentful that the decision to leave the EU was made by the older generation and concerned that Brexit would limit their opportunities to live and work in Europe. Meanwhile the Interwar generation was drawn towards Leave, and UKIP, because they tend to endorse a broader range of socially-conservative and authoritarian values associated with nationalism, Euroscepticism, and immigration. We have already demonstrated how strongly the generation gap in Europe and America is associated with cultural cleavages around these issues. As the old Left-Right divisions of social

class identities have faded in Britain, an emerging cultural war deeply divides voters and parties around values of national sovereignty versus cooperation among EU member states, respect for traditional families and marriage versus support for gender equality and feminism, tolerance of diverse lifestyles and gender fluid identities, the importance of protecting manufacturing jobs versus environmental protection and climate change, and restrictions on immigration and closed borders versus openness towards refugees, migrants, and foreigners. These are the issues that divide many contemporary Western societies – and elected representatives within mainstream political parties on the center-left and center-right. Prospects for a no-deal crash seem increasingly likely if both the main British parties and the UK general electorate are so deeply internally fragmented between the Leave-and-Remain sides, as well as split between the hard and soft Brexit factions. The clock is rapidly running out before the 29 March 2019 deadline. There seems to be no easy way to agree upon an EU divorce plan which is simultaneously capable of commanding sufficient support to: (i) unify the Conservative party under Theresa May's leadership; (ii) maintain the minority government under the Conservative-DUP agreement; (iii) overcome parliamentary stalemate at Westminster; (iv) generate widespread public endorsement and a decisive majority; and also (v) produce a negotiated settlement with Brussels and EU member states. At the time of writing (end-July 2018), deep internal divisions remain on display within the Conservative party, Brussels has rejected key parts of May's Chequers plan, and the prospect of a no-deal divorce have crept closer. In the context of talk about preparing for food and medicine shortages in the event of a crash, survey evidence suggests some buyer's regret has set in among the British public. For example the Euro-tracker series compiled by NatCen suggest that if a multi-option referendum were to be held today, depending upon the choice of ballot question(s) and levels of turnout, the Leave decision could potentially be (narrowly) reversed.⁸⁷ But a second UK referendum on the terms of the UK departure from the EU faces major logistical obstacles, like timing.⁸⁸ Even if these could be overcome, given the toxic depths of parliamentary and public polarization, the campaign would be unlikely to generate a clear and decisive majority for any single option, especially an outcome able to overturn the earlier Leave decision which triggered Article 50.⁸⁹ The story continues to unfold with no clear resolution in sight.

Figure 1: Party voting intentions in UK polls, 2012-2017



Notes: These estimate voting intentions for the four largest nation-wide parties based on the monthly average in 649 published national polls by major pollsters (MORI, ICM, YouGov, Populus, Communicate Research, NOP, Opinium, Survation, ORB, Ashcroft).

Source: Calculated from data <http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/voting-intention-2>

Figure 2: UKIP's share of votes and seats in UK European and general elections, 1997-2017






Figure 3: The dynamics of the Leave-Remain voting intentions, Jan-June 2016



Note: All national British opinion polls published on Brexit from Jan-June 23 2016.


Figure 4: Vote Leave by birth cohort



Note: “In the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, how did you vote?”


Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13. Wave 9 post-Brexit (24 June to 6 July 2016)
<http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>

Figure 5: Generation gaps in UKIP voting, 2015-2017



Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13.
<http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>


Figure 6: Vote Leave and UKIP by authoritarian-libertarian values



Notes: The Libertarian-Authoritarian standardized 10-point scale is constructed by summing the following items:“(1) Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values; (2) People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences; (3) For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence; (4) Schools should teach children to obey authority; (5) The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong; (6) Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.”

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13. Wave 9 post-Brexit (24 June to 6 July 2016). <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>


Figure 7: Vote Leave and UKIP by populist values



Notes: The *Populist* standardized scale is a summary (Z-score) measured in BES W7 from the following 5 Likert-style agree/disagree items: “1) The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the people; 2) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions; 3) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician; 4) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action; 5) What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13. <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>


Figure 8: Vote Leave and UKIP by social class



Note: Social Class. A: Professionals and higher managerial, B Lower managerial, C1 Skilled non-manual, C2 Foremen and supervisors, D Skilled manual, D Unskilled manual.

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13. <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>


Figure 9: Populist and authoritarian values of voters in the UK 2017 general election



Note: The *Populist* standardized scale is a summary (Z-score) measured in BES W10 post-Brexit from the following 5 Likert-style agree/disagree items: “1) The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the people; 2) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions; 3) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician; 4) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action; 5) What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.” The *Authoritarian* values standardized scale is a summary (Z-score) measured in BES W10 post-Brexit from the following items: “Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: 1) independence/respect for elders; 2) obedience/self-reliance, 3) considerate/well-behaved, 4) curiosity/good-manners.” The Brexit Leave/Remain vote was measured post-Brexit (W9). The recalled party vote was measured post-2017 UK general election vote (W13).

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13. <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>

Figure 10: Populist and authoritarian values of voters in the UK 2015 and 2017 general election



Note: The *Populist* standardized scale is a summary (Z-score) measured in BES W10 post-Brexit from the following 5 Likert-style agree/disagree items: “1) The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the people; 2) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions; 3) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician; 4) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action; 5) What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles. The *Authoritarian* values standardized scale is a summary (Z-score) measured in BES W10 post-Brexit from the following items: “Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: 1) independence/respect for elders; 2) obedience/self-reliance, 3) considerate/well-behaved, 4) curiosity/good-manners.” The Brexit Leave/Remain vote was measured post-Brexit (W9). The recalled party vote was measured post-2017 UK general election vote (W13).

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13. <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>

Table 1: Predicting Leave Vote in Brexit

		Model 1 Demographics			Model 2 +Economic			Model 3 +Culture			Model 4 +All		
		B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.
Generation	Interwar (1900-1945) Ref	0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00		
	Boomers (1946-1964)	-0.18	0.15	N/s	-0.27	0.15	N/s	-0.16	0.16	N/s	0.12	0.29	N/s
	Gen X (1965-1979)	-0.43	0.20	**	-0.58	0.20	***	-0.38	0.23	N/s	-0.01	0.39	N/s
	Millennials (1980-1996)	-0.88	0.25	***	-1.00	0.25	***	-0.87	0.28	***	-0.78	0.48	N/s
Background	Married	0.27	0.16	N/s	0.34	0.16	*	0.22	0.18	N/s	0.03	0.31	N/s
	Children	0.04	0.15	N/s	0.00	0.15	N/s	-0.06	0.17	N/s	0.13	0.28	N/s
	Education	-0.53	0.04	***	-0.47	0.05	***	-0.24	0.05	***	-0.14	0.08	N/s
	Sex (Male)	0.00	0.10	N/s	0.02	0.10	N/s	-0.01	0.12	N/s	-0.28	0.19	N/s
	White British	0.30	0.19	N/s	0.35	0.19	N/s	0.42	0.22	*	-0.44	0.36	N/s
Class	Professional and managerial				-0.30	0.17	N/s	-0.03	0.19	N/s	0.09	0.32	N/s
	Skilled clerical				-0.07	0.19	N/s	0.09	0.21	N/s	0.08	0.35	N/s
	Foremen and technicians				0.17	0.19	N/s	0.14	0.21	N/s	0.54	0.36	N/s
	Skilled manual				0.00	0.24	N/s	0.14	0.26	N/s	-0.14	0.44	N/s
	Unskilled manual (Ref)				0.00			0.00			0.00		
Economic	Unemployed				0.21	0.46	N/s	0.81	0.53	N/s	0.76	0.87	N/s
	Subjective economic insecurity				0.06	0.03	*	0.03	0.03	N/s	0.10	0.05	*
Culture	Libertarian-authoritarian BES scale							0.41	0.03	***	0.11	0.06	*
	Populism scale							0.47	0.06	***	0.37	0.13	***
Values	Left-right economic scale										-0.03	0.06	N/s
	Allow more or fewer immigrants										0.00	0.00	N/s
	European Integration scale										0.74	0.05	***
	Like/dislike: UKIP										0.44	0.04	***
Constant		1.39	0.31	***	1.02	0.36	***	-2.36	0.47	***	-6.15	0.85	***
Nagelkerke R2		0.17			0.19			0.38			82.40		
% Correct		65.4			66.5			74.3			91.6		

Note: Logistic regression analysis where the dependence variable is vote Leave in Brexit. See Appendix B for all variables. Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 8-9. <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>

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