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Do Public Perceptions of Electoral Malpractice Undermine Democratic Satisfaction? The U.S. in Comparative Perspective

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Electoral Integrity Project

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Do public perceptions of electoral malpractice undermine democratic satisfaction? The U.S. in comparative perspective

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Abstract: Doubts about the legitimacy of the 2016 U.S. elections continue to reverberate and deepen partisan mistrust in America. The perfect storm followed Republican allegations of fake news and massive voter fraud, Democratic complaints of voter suppression and gerrymandering, discontent with the way that the Electoral College anointed the presidential candidate who lost the popular vote, compounded by Comey's interventions and intelligence reports of Russian meddling.

These issues raise the broader question: how serious do any perceived electoral flaws usually have to be to raise doubts not just about the process and results – or even the legitimacy of the declared winner - but about democracy itself? Do ordinary people actually care most about the quality of their elections (input legitimacy) or are they more concerned with the pocket-book economy of jobs, growth, and taxes (output legitimacy) and/or are attitudes shaped by partisan cues (the winners-losers thesis)? And how do attitudes vary among electoral winners and losers?

To understand these issues, *Part I* outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework. *Part II* describes the evidence used to investigate these issues drawing upon cross-national data from the World Values Survey 6th wave in 42 diverse societies and from the 7th wave U.S. survey, as well as expert indices measuring the quality of elections. *Part III* establishes the key cross-national findings. *Part IV* presents the US results. *Part V* summarizes the key findings and overall implications, demonstrating that doubts about electoral integrity undermine general satisfaction with how democracy works.

Paper for the panel on '*Election dynamics in the developing world*' at the American Political Science Association annual convention, Boston, 4.00-5.30pm on Saturday 1 September 2018.

Doubts about the legitimacy of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections continue to reverberate and deepen partisan mistrust in America. A toxic brew has heightened concern about the election following Republican allegations of fake news and massive voter fraud¹, Democratic rebuttals claiming voter suppression and gerrymandering², and the way that the Electoral College awarded victory to the presidential candidate who lost the popular vote. These doubts have been compounded by intelligence reports of foreign cyber-security attempts to gain access to state election records, and Russian meddling through fake news and social media disinformation campaigns.³ The Comey interventions did not help matters. And the Mueller investigation proceeds apace. These events raise the broader question: how serious do any perceived electoral flaws usually have to be to raise doubts not just about the process and results – or even the legitimacy of the declared winner - but about democracy itself? Is satisfaction with the performance of democracy among ordinary citizens influenced most by the perceived quality of their elections (input legitimacy), or by policy performance (output legitimacy), and/or partisan cues (the winners-losers thesis)? And how do attitudes vary among winners and losers?

To understanding these issues, *Part I* outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework. Theories of ‘input’ legitimacy suggest that in general, effective democratic institutions –and thus free and fair electoral procedures meeting standards of integrity --should serve to strengthen diffuse satisfaction with how democracy works. Several previous studies, drawing upon U.S. and cross-national survey evidence, lend plausibility to this claim.⁴ If this argument is correct, however, any potential relationship deserves to be unpacked more fully since ‘electoral integrity’ is a multidimensional concept and diverse problems can arise at different stages of the electoral cycle.⁵ Moreover alternative theories of ‘output’ legitimacy suggest that although experts care about electoral procedures, in fact ordinary people’s satisfaction with how democracy works is influenced more strongly by bread and butter issues such as jobs, taxes, and the costs of health care, and thus by perceptions of policy performance. Finally, other accounts emphasize the role of partisan cues in evaluating elections retrospectively—in particular whether citizens backed the winner or loser in any contest, and leadership cues about the fairness of the contest. *Part II* describes the evidence used to investigate these propositions drawing upon cross-national and U.S. data. For expert indices measuring the quality of elections, we use the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert global and U.S. surveys. For public opinion cross-national data, we draw upon the 6th wave of the World Values Survey comparing 42 societies, and, for American data, the 7th wave of the 2016 U.S. WVS. *Part III* establishes the key cross-national findings. *Part IV* examines the results of similar models in the U.S. 2016 election. *Part V* summarizes the key findings and implications.

I: Conceptual and theoretical framework

Evidence of low or eroding political trust has aroused considerable concern ever since Almond and Verba’s *Civic Culture (1963)* theorized that regimes are most durable when built upon political legitimacy.⁶ Thus popular support for democratic regimes is thought to rest upon public trust and confidence in representative institutions connecting citizens and the state, including political parties, legislative assemblies, the courts, and elections, as well as the

news media, social movements and interest groups in civil society. Where the popular legitimacy of these institutions declines, however, then cultural accounts suggest that democratic regimes have fewer effective bulwarks against the risks of backsliding under authoritarian leaders.

These issues resonate today since there is a widespread perception that citizens on both side of the Atlantic have grown increasingly distrustful of politicians, cynical about national and global governance institutions, and disillusioned with democratic processes and principles.⁷ For example, Hay argues that: “*Politics is a dirty word, a term which has come to acquire a whole range of negative associations...Politics is synonymous with sleaze, corruption and duplicity, greed, self-interest, and self-importance, interference, inefficiency and intransigence.*”⁸ Lack of confidence in a broad range of public institutions is believed to have behavioural consequences, by eroding civic engagement, voting turnout, and conventional forms of political participation, while heightening protest politics.⁹ These orientations may also have implications at elite level for government effectiveness and the policymaking process; Hetherington argues that public mistrust has heightened partisan polarization in the U.S. and thus weakened incentives for politicians to cooperate across the aisle, while loss of confidence in the federal government has weakened support for progressive public policies like the Affordable Care Act requiring state regulation of the marketplace.¹⁰ Loss of trust in the governing authorities -- from judges, politicians, and parties to bureaucrats, the news media, and scientific experts -- is thought to provide the oxygen fuelling mass support for authoritarian-populist leaders and parties, which typically exploit conspiratorial suspicions that votes are stolen, all politicians are corrupt, and the system is rigged.¹¹

Resilient democracies develop a deep reservoir of popular legitimacy over many decades or even centuries, however, allowing them to survive particular shocks, such as major cases of government corruption, economic crisis, or leadership scandals. Hybrid regimes, however, which are neither fully democratic nor autocratic, are more vulnerable to severe risks of democratic backsliding under authoritarian-populist leaders where dissatisfaction with how government works has heightened disillusionment with core liberal democratic institutions, procedures, and principles, exemplified by growing cynicism about the impartiality of information from the news media and greater intolerance of minority rights.¹² In deeply divided societies, as well, trust in elections is even more important for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power through the people’s will, including acceptance of the result among losers, preventing boycotts, attempted annulment of the results and violent outbreaks of conflict.¹³ By contrast, if contests are widely regarded by the public as illegitimate, this is feared to risk political instability, by triggering protests and boycotts.¹⁴ For example, in a long series of publications, Synder has warned that disputed elections in post-conflict peace settlements can in fact backfire by exacerbating violent conflict, heightening inter-communal tensions and deepening social intolerance.¹⁵

In analyzing these issues, studies conventionally build upon the conceptual framework of David Easton, expanded by Norris and by Dalton.¹⁶ This suggests that support for the political system within the nation-state can be subdivided into five different objects, ranging from the most diffuse to the most specific level.¹⁷ This includes citizens orientations towards :

- (i) Feelings of belonging to a *national community*, such as feelings of patriotism and a sense of national identity;
- (ii) Support for *regime principles*, such as endorsement of the democratic ideals of freedom, inclusion, tolerance, pluralism, and equality;
- (iii) Evaluations of *regime performance*, such as satisfaction with how democracy works;
- (iv) Confidence in *political institutions*, such as political parties, parliaments, governments, the news media, the courts, and elections; and,
- (v) Support for *specific political authorities*, such as leaders and politicians.

What theories help us to understand the links between public perceptions of elections as political institutions and more diffuse levels of satisfaction with democracy? An extensive literature in comparative politics has used cross-national survey data to examine trust and confidence in political institutions and public support for the ‘d’ word and its sub-components, including satisfaction with democracy and the endorsement of democratic normative principles around the world, and more recently a growing body of work has analyzed perceptions of electoral fraud and malpractice.¹⁸

Theories differ in the weight they place upon the input or output side of the policymaking process and also the role of winner and losing. Let us unpack these theories and then consider the evidence.

Procedural performance

‘Input’ or ‘procedural performance’ accounts suggest that satisfaction with democracy is likely to reflect evaluations of the quality of core procedures and institutions which lie at the heart of well-functioning liberal democracies, including standards of electoral integrity.¹⁹ The concept of ‘*electoral integrity*’ refers to international standards and global norms governing the appropriate conduct of elections. There are several general reasons to expect these perceptions to be closely related to evaluations of how democracy works in many countries. Following the spread of elections to all but a handful of states around the world, in many nations (especially in liberal democracies), legitimate political authority is widely understood to flow from the ballot box. Elected office-holders are recognized to have the rightful authority to govern where the electoral rules ensure that leaders are ultimately accountable to the popular consent of the governed. Trust in the electoral process and rules of the game can be expected to secure acceptance of the legitimacy of the outcome. Free and fair elections, meeting international standards of electoral integrity and leading to the orderly and peaceful transfer of power, are therefore thought likely to strengthen public assessments of democratic performance in general.²⁰ And the reverse pattern is also expected, so that if citizens believe that an election is deeply flawed or even stolen, for whatever reasons, then doubts are likely to spread rapidly to infect other core institutions in the body politic. Like necrotizing fasciitis, mistrust could spread horizontally, undermining confidence in leaders, parties, parliaments, and governments, as well as moving vertically upwards, by corroding satisfaction with the overall performance of democratic regimes and potentially deepening skepticism or even outright cynicism about democratic ideals.

Yet if procedural legitimacy is important, it still remains unclear how ordinary citizens make judgements about the performance of democratic regimes. Elections provide only one criteria and many alternative democratic benchmarks could be employed, for example, whether the courts and police uphold access to justice for all and rule of law, governments respect civil liberties and minority rights, the news media reflect a pluralistic diversity of views, and so on and so forth. For example, studies report that the main determinants of trust in government are perceived integrity, reliability, fairness, and responsiveness, as well as satisfaction with certain public services.²¹ Yet electoral integrity is likely to be a central part of forming such judgments, however, because most people regard free and fair elections and rule of law as the core pillars of democracy.²² Competitive elections are essential for standard conceptualizations of liberal democracy, whether understood in Schumpeterian terms more minimally, or else as the core institution which are buttressed by a more extensive range of civil liberties and political rights.²³ Elections provide the most common way that most people can and do participate in representative democracy. If these contests are seen to work well then this seems likely to color positive impressions of the performance of liberal democracy in general. By contrast, other political institutions are also important but their operations are typically more distant and at arms length from the experience of the average citizen, making it far harder to judge their performance, such as the role of the courts or the national parliament.²⁴ Therefore, if procedural theories are correct, the first proposition to be tested (H1) is whether *those who believe in the integrity of electoral processes are more likely to express general satisfaction with the performance of democracy.* By contrast, (H2) *citizens perceiving flawed contests and malpractices, such as voter fraud, unfair officials or vote-buying, are expected to express less general satisfaction with how democracy works in their country.*

Several comparative studies, drawing upon survey evidence from diverse world regions, provide empirical support for the plausibility of these claims.²⁵ For example Bratton and Mattes compared political attitudes in Ghana, Zambia and South Africa, reporting that satisfaction with democracy in these countries is based on an appreciation of political reforms, perceptions of government responsibility and honesty, and guarantees of civil liberties, voting rights, and equal treatment under the law, as much as by perceptions of material benefits, improved living standards, and the delivery of economic goods.²⁶ A study among post-Communist states in Central Europe during the mid-1990s by Evans and Whitefield also found that political experience influenced democratic satisfaction more strongly than the expansion of economic markets.²⁷ In Europe, Wagner and colleagues analysed a series of Euro-barometer surveys from 1990 to 2000, demonstrating that quality of governance indicators for rule of law, well-functioning regulation, and low corruption strengthened satisfaction with democracy more strongly than economic considerations.²⁸ Similarly multilevel analysis comparing forty nations, based on the CSES Module II survey, also concluded that political goods such as freedom, accountability and representativeness, were more important sources of democratic satisfaction than narrower indices of policy performance.²⁹ Fortin-Rittberger, Harfst, & Dingler found that winning and losing was linked with satisfaction with democracy but this relationship was conditioned by levels of electoral integrity.³⁰ In previous work, analysing 20 countries using the 6th wave of the WVS, multivariate analysis found that

scales measuring perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices were significantly related to democratic satisfaction, views that the country respected human rights, confidence in elected institutions, and willingness to obey the law.³¹

Nevertheless, there are several reasons why we need to re-examine the evidence to test whether the integrity of elections influences general satisfaction with democracy.

Firstly, if we compare satisfaction with the performance of democracy using the 5th and 6th wave of the World Values Survey (WVS-6), it is apparent at face-value that several cross-national cases appear to challenge procedural theories, exemplified by relatively high levels of democratic satisfaction recorded in autocracies lacking free and fair multiparty elections, such as China and Vietnam, despite these states repressing political rights and civil liberties. By contrast, relatively low levels of democratic satisfaction can be observed in the same survey among citizens living in some long-standing democracies with a long history of competitive contests, such as in Italy, the U.S. and U.K.³²

Moreover there remains disputes about several of the standard measures commonly used in the research literature, hence it remains unclear whether the 'satisfaction with democracy' measure reflects either citizen's satisfaction with its actual performance or else an expression of support for its ideals.³³ Related survey measures of 'trust in government' have also been criticized for capturing the popularity of current governments rather than 'structural' trust in governmental institutions.³⁴ Much of the literature on so-called 'democratic disenchantment' uses evidence such as low or declining levels of political participation.³⁵ But it is a common mistake to read political attitudes directly from behavioural indicators; mass membership of political parties and voting turnout, for example, can fall for many reasons, such as the frequency of elections, the reduction in the age of voting, or practical barriers in getting to the polls, of which attitudes (like political trust or efficacy) are only one potential explanation.³⁶

Most longitudinal research within the U.S. has focused on measuring trust in regime institutions, notably Congress and the federal government, using resources such as the General Social Survey, Gallup polls, and the American National Election Study.³⁷ Despite this, there is remarkably little consistent time-series opinion poll data in these sources monitoring long-term trends in American evaluations of the quality of their elections and the performance of American democracy, perhaps because widespread public endorsement has usually been taken for granted. As a result many previous U.S studies have limited capacity to test linkages among specific and diffuse indicators of system support. By contrast in Europe, and in many other countries elsewhere around the world, surveys have focused far more closely on measuring satisfaction with the performance of democratic regimes and support for democratic ideals and principles, using resources such as the Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey and the Global-barometers and World Values Survey/European Values Survey.³⁸ More recently a growing literature has focused on measuring trust and confidence in elections, and perceptions of electoral integrity, and their implications for cultural attitudes and civic engagement.³⁹

Finally, in addition, we also need to understand more about the conditions under which citizens' perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices are most likely to shape their general satisfaction with democracy. Electoral integrity is a multidimensional concept which needs to be unpacked in terms of the severity of any types of problems which arise. Diverse flaws can arise at different sequential stages of the electoral cycle. Schedler conceptualized these problems as the 'menu of manipulation.'⁴⁰ The Electoral Integrity Project has identified eleven sequential stages in the electoral cycle which range from the pre-election period through the campaign, polling day, and the post-election period.⁴¹ Some malpractices -- such as manipulated laws, pervasive vote-buying, partisan bias by the electoral commission, opposition boycotts, and election-related violence -- may be so severe that they call the legitimacy of the outcome into question and trigger protests and even deadly violence, especially in close contests and in countries emerging from conflict. For example, contentious presidential elections declared null and void, requiring do-over contests, were held in 2014 in Ukraine and 2017 in Kenya. Other malpractices are arguably far less serious, such as minor cases of maladministration in one or two local polling stations with machine malfunctions, shortages of ballots, or slight delays in opening hours. These types of human errors do not necessarily mean that people reject the overall results, especially in long-established democracies with a reservoir of legitimacy and in contests where minor flaws are unlikely to alter a decisive victory for the winner. Thus the legal hullabaloo triggered by the faulty ballot design and hanging chads of Florida did not lead to a major legitimacy crisis for the presidency of George W. Bush.⁴²

Policy performance

In addition, theories of input legitimacy are challenged by accounts emphasizing that legitimacy arises more from system 'output' or economic policy performance. Models need to control for these factors. These accounts suggest that in fact most citizens care mainly about the impact of government decisions, including the pocket book economy, but much less about the abstract procedures leading up to them. This reflects the old adage: The proof of the pudding is the eating. Policy performance theories emphasize that citizens evaluate how democracy works in the light of their general satisfaction with the government on the issues they care most about, especially the state of the pocketbook economy, such as household pay-packets and savings. Where successive governments have generally succeeded in meeting public expectations, it is believed that this record gradually builds a reservoir of generalized support towards the regime, which anchors support for democratic governance throughout bad times as well as good.

Previous studies have used time-series data to predict confidence in governance and satisfaction with democracy based on national levels indicators of economic conditions, as well as several individual-level retrospective and prospective evaluations of the economy.⁴³ The evidence provides some support for the policy performance account; hence an early study by Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg examined pooled Eurobarometer time-series data for eight countries from the late-1970s to mid-1980s, reporting that economic conditions affected feelings of satisfaction with democracy, although the effects were limited.⁴⁴ McAllister reviewed the comparative

evidence among two dozen affluent postindustrial nations, also concluding that individual-level attitudes towards economic performance play a modest role in shaping confidence in political institutions in these countries, although the impact of policy performance is negligible compared with the effect of other factors, such as political culture and historical circumstances.⁴⁵ Lawrence examined the evidence for how far the economic record of successive governments in the United States mirrored trends in political trust, concluding more cautiously that any links are not straightforward.⁴⁶ In this study, the third proposition (H³) suggests that *satisfaction with democracy will be greater among the economically better-off*. Models incorporate three individual-level indicators of the pocketbook economy, including household income, reported level of financial satisfaction, and reported economic security (household savings).

Partisan cues and the winning-losing gap

Judgments of both policy and procedural performance can also be colored by the intermediary roles of political parties as the main mechanism connecting citizens and the state. Partisanship is thought to cue evaluations of democracy, in particular an extensive literature has found that satisfaction with democracy is consistently shaped by whether citizens support the winner or losers in any election.⁴⁷ By extension, therefore, a similar logic suggests that the winners-losers thesis should also impact evaluations of electoral integrity.

Anderson et al suggest that the reason behind the thesis may be utilitarian (people anticipate benefits from winning), affective (losing generates feelings of anger and disappointment), and cognitive consistency (winning makes people bring their subsequent attitudes into congruence with their prior voting choice).⁴⁸ The institutional arrangements in the U.S, can be expected to exacerbate this pattern; Anderson and Guillory argue that the gap between winners and losers in democratic satisfaction is amplified in majoritarian systems like the U.S. using winner-take-all rules and presidential executives, compared with consensual systems using proportional representation electoral systems and parliamentary executives, like many European states.⁴⁹

At the same time, however, recent work suggests that perceptions of the fairness of the electoral process may also condition the winners-loser gap. Using cross-national data, Fortin-Rittberger, Harfst, & Dingler found that winning and losing was generally linked with satisfaction with democracy, but levels of electoral integrity conditioned this relationship. Specifically, in contests with widespread fraud or malpractices, they report that winning and losing no longer influenced satisfaction with democracy.⁵⁰ What may help to explain the Fortin-Rittberger et al findings is the potential role of political leadership and media framing of electoral process. Normally it is not possible to use observational cross-sectional survey data to disentangle the effects of the leadership rhetoric about the fairness of the election from any general feelings of disaffection by citizens arising directly from electoral loss. In most elections, winning leaders and parties returned to power usually praise the process and outcome, to strengthen their popular legitimacy. By contrast, the 'sore losers' are most likely to claim that the election was illegitimate and unfair, for example that fraud or vote-buying determined the outcome, or even that democracy was flawed, in part to provide an excuse for their loss

and thereby deter rivals seeking to replace them within their own party.

Yet the 2016 U.S. election provides an interesting contrarian ‘natural experiment’ where the eventual winner, Donald Trump, was the loudest to claim widespread electoral fraud. In general, partisan cues can be expected to be linked with leadership rhetoric and processes of political communications, framing information for supporters about how elections work, and priming evaluations of these contests among their voters.⁵¹ If claims of fraud are believed by ordinary citizens, then these partisan frames may outweigh the impact of their party winning or losing the election. The winners-losers thesis suggests (H⁴) that *winners will usually express greater general democratic satisfaction*. To test evidence for the winners-losers thesis, both cross-nationally and in the unique environment of the 2016 U.S. election, models therefore control for individual-level partisanship (voting for the winning party) in each society.

II: Data and Methods

For all these reasons, building upon previous studies, it is important to establish how the public evaluates the performance of elections in their own country and, in particular, whether any perceived problems with elections contribute towards more general satisfaction with the state of democracy.⁵² To start to examine the evidence about these issues across diverse contexts and types of regimes, a comparative perspective can be analysed using the 6th wave of the World Values Survey, where perceptions of electoral integrity were monitored in 42 diverse societies, with fieldwork conducted from 2010-2014. The cross-national comparison includes long established democracies with relatively high levels of electoral integrity, according to expert indices, such as Germany, India and Australia.⁵³ It also includes third wave democracies such as Ghana, Taiwan, Poland, and Chile, as well as countries with authoritarian regimes and poor records of electoral integrity, such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Rwanda, Algeria, and Egypt. In addition, to provide a more detailed examination of public reactions to the 2016 American presidential election, we can draw upon new data from the U.S. survey contained in Wave 7 of the World Values Survey, with fieldwork conducted in 2017.

Both waves of the WVS survey use a new battery of questions designed to monitor public perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices. These items are designed to tap into common issues occurring in different contests where judgments do not require any detailed technical expertise, such as asking citizens about national elections in their own country, including how often they think that votes are counted fairly, voters are offered a genuine choice in elections, rich people buy elections, or voters are threatened with violence at the polls. It should be emphasized that these aim to capture ordinary people’s *perceptions* of how often problems occur in elections in their own country, since these judgments are arguably what is most important for their satisfaction with democracy, institutional trust, and political behaviour, irrespective of whether the perceptions are factually accurate or not. Moreover for some of these issues, such as perceptions of electoral threats and intimidation, ordinary people are the best judge of conditions and other independent evidence is lacking. Public concerns about malpractices are measured by a multi-item battery tapping into citizen’s evaluations about several different qualities of elections occurring throughout the electoral

cycle. The alternative positive and negative items, with Likert-type responses, fall generate two scales. The question preamble asks “*In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections?*”

Electoral Integrity scale

- Election officials are fair (P)
- Women have equal opportunities to run for office. (P)⁵⁴
- Journalists provide fair coverage of elections (P)
- Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections (P)
- Votes are counted fairly (P)

Electoral Malpractice scale

- Opposition candidates are prevented from running. (N)
- Rich people buy elections (N)
- TV news favors the governing party (N)
- Voters are bribed. (N)
- Voters are threatened with violence at the polls (N)

Principle component factor analysis of the battery of items contained in Table 1 shows that these fall into two dimensions, as expected: several items reflect the positive notion of electoral integrity, while the remainder highlight perceptions of common malpractices. Factor analysis and Cronbach Alpha tests suggests that the positive and negative items fall into consistent and robust scales. They are therefore summed, and standardized to 100 point measures for ease of comparison, to generate the Electoral Integrity and Electoral Malpractice scales respectively.⁵⁵

[Table 1 about here]

Expert evaluations

To provide external robustness checks on public perceptions of electoral integrity, we can compare the mean evaluations of electoral integrity by ordinary people in each country against the expert rolling survey measuring Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI), run by the Electoral Integrity Project. The global study has asked experts to evaluate national parliamentary and presidential elections around the world using 49 indicators, grouped into eleven categories reflecting the whole electoral cycle.⁵⁶ In total, the latest release, PEI 6.0, covers 285 elections held in 164 nations worldwide from mid-2012- end-2017. The country coverage represents 94% of all independent nation-states (defined by UN membership) excluding a dozen micro-states (population less than 100,000) and eight states without de jure direct elections during the time-period of the study. The global PEI-6.0 survey gathered 3,253 completed responses, representing just under one third of the contacted experts (28%). The dataset generates a summary 100-point PEI Index based on summing all 49 indicators. Similar methods have also been employed to evaluate electoral integrity across states and provinces within several countries, including the PEI-US-2016, based on evaluations from 726 political scientists based at universities in each U.S. state.

[Figure 1 about here]

The PEI index provides one way to summarize the overall integrity of the election. Alternatively, analysts can examine indices for each of the eleven dimensions, or use the disaggregated scores for each of the 49 individual indicators. The PEI dataset is designed to provide a comprehensive, systematic and reliable way to monitor the perceived quality of elections. For external validity tests, the global PEI-6.0 Index was significantly correlated with other standard independent indicators from major cross-national datasets.⁵⁷ The PEI expert evaluations is used in models to control for the quality of electoral integrity both at global level and across the U.S. states. As shown in Figure 1, there is a moderately strong correlation between the public evaluations of electoral integrity (in the WVS-6) and the expert perceptions (from PEI-6.0). Thus in countries such as Germany, Australia and the Netherlands, election are regarded as high in integrity by both the public and experts. By contrast, in Malaysia, Jordan and Azerbaijan, contests are assessed far more negatively by both. There are some outliers, such as Tunisia (judged more positively by experts, following the contests held after the ouster of President Ben Ali) and Singapore (seen more favourably by citizens than experts) but overall the national-level correlations show that public assessments of elections in their own country are fairly similar to expert evaluations.

Democratic satisfaction

The meaning of the question used for the dependent variable, democratic satisfaction, continues to be debated, and it is treated here as an evaluation of performance, rather than principles.⁵⁸ It is measured in the World Values Survey using a scale with the following question: “*And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?*”

Comprehensive models analysing democratic satisfaction need to incorporate a series of control variables commonly thought to be important in the previous literature for both perceptions of electoral integrity as well as satisfaction with democracy. Individual level variables including attitudes such as political interest, life satisfaction, and the standard socio-demographic background characteristics of sex, age, education, and urbanization. The pocket-book economy is measured at individual-level by reported household income and by feelings of financial security (household savings). The comparative models include indicators of economic performance, per capita GDP in purchasing power parity. Partisan winners-losers cues are monitored by voting for the winning party. The technical appendix describes the concepts and measures.

III: Comparative results and analysis

We can start by analysing the comparative evidence and describing the observed cross-national patterns. Figure 2 displays the scatterplot illustrating where countries rank on the measure of public perceptions of electoral integrity, on the vertical axis, and also the 10-point scale monitoring public satisfaction with the performance of democracy, on the horizontal. As shown in Figure 2, a moderately strong correlation between these measures can be observed at national-level – hence in countries where most citizens are

relatively positive about free and fair elections, such as Australia, the Netherlands and Uruguay, they are also generally more satisfied with how their democracy works. By contrast, poor perceptions of electoral integrity are linked with low democratic satisfaction in cases such as Tunisia, Ukraine, Egypt and Georgia. This relationship is not surprising; elections are central to theoretical concepts of liberal democracy and they are most commonly selected criteria when ordinary people are asked what qualities they associate most strongly with 'democracy'.⁵⁹

[Figure 2 about here]

But at the same time, beyond minimalist Schumpeterian notions, the way that liberal democracy works requires many other conditions beyond elections with party competition; hence Dahl's notion of polyarchy emphasized important civil liberties and political rights, including universal franchise, freedom of expression, and assembly.⁶⁰ Beyond elections, liberal democracy also requires many other constitutional arrangements to work effectively to ensure representation, accountability and responsiveness, such as competitive political parties, an independent judiciary, parliamentary oversight, and checks and balances on executive power. For this reason, liberal democracy requires much more than simply free and fair elections. Hence not surprisingly, there remain some outliers which can be observed empirically in Figure 2; in particular, citizens are more positive about the quality of their elections in Germany, Estonia and Libya than they are satisfied with democracy more generally.

[Table 2 about here]

Many factors could be generating these correlations, however, so we need to use multiple regression models which incorporate many controls. Table 2 shows the cross-national results in 42 societies where democratic satisfaction is the dependent variable. Model A examines the impact of the summary scales of electoral integrity and malpractices on democratic satisfaction, with controls. To understand different types of malpractices, Model B breaks down the disaggregated items in the survey. Both models were tested and found to be free of problems of multicollinearity.

The results of the cross-national analysis in Model A confirm that public perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices were significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy, in the expected direction. Indeed among all the variables in the model, the public's electoral integrity index had the strongest relationship with democratic satisfaction (Beta 0.19***). The three indicators of the pocket-book economy (household income, financial security and satisfaction) were also significantly associated with greater democratic satisfaction, although the coefficients were weaker than for electoral integrity. Finally the winners-losers thesis behaved as expected, with voting for the governing party or parties generally expressing more satisfaction with democracy. Other socio-demographic controls in Model A proved significant but relatively weak. To look further, Model B then added the disaggregated measures of electoral integrity and malpractices to similar models. The results showed that overall the strongest predictors of democratic satisfaction were perceptions that votes are counted fairly, elections are fair and voters are offered a genuine choice, while the negative effects were associated with imbalanced media coverage, in particular the

perception of pro-government bias on TV news.

[Figure 3 about here]

To look further at the winners-losers thesis, Figure 3 illustrates the cross-national evidence for the size of the winners-losers gap in perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices, with countries classified by the PEI expert index into those with low, moderate and high levels of integrity. As illustrated, the gap between winners and losers was particularly strong in countries which have held a long series of contests with major problems and conflict, such as in Zimbabwe, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Thailand and Malaysia. In these states there are largest observed differences in perceptions of the quality of the election between those supporting the government and opposition. By contrast, there often tended to be more modest gaps between winners and losers in countries with contests which experts suggest reflected international standards of electoral integrity.

[Figure 4 about here]

In addition, Figure 4 illustrates the winners-losers gap in both electoral integrity and democratic satisfaction across societies. Again, contests such as those in Zimbabwe and Azerbaijan prove to have the largest gaps between winners and losers. Argentina appears to have a winners-losers gap in democratic satisfaction but not in electoral integrity. Finally a few countries see a reverse winners-losers gap in democratic satisfaction, such as Australia and Ghana, where the electoral losers expressed more satisfaction than winners, but the size of these gaps was usually observed to be relatively modest.

IV: Analyzing American elections

Do similar relationships hold in the U.S. case? To examine these issues further, we can turn to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This is an important ‘natural experiment’ since, as mentioned earlier, American concern about the contest, exacerbating a longer term fall in trust in elections, were fed by a ‘perfect storm’ on both sides including by Republican assertions of massive electoral fraud and fake news⁶¹ and by Democratic counter-claims of voter suppression and Russian/FBI interventions.⁶² Under assault from constant cries of ‘fake news’, confidence in the impartiality and reliability of the news media has eroded.⁶³ And Russian meddling in the 2016 contest astutely exploited these vulnerabilities, through breaches of cyber-security in the Democratic National Committee and state election records, as well as online misinformation campaigns by the Internet Research Agency.⁶⁴ Russians hackers targeted the official voter registration rolls of 21 U.S. states, including Illinois and Arizona, and they stayed inside the system for several weeks prior to the 2016 presidential election. They stole personal information on 500,000 voters from one state office and they had opportunities to alter voter registration data and vote tallies, although the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that they did not actually do so.⁶⁵ The Director of National Intelligence has warned that Russian efforts are continuing in the context of the 2018 mid-term elections, including phishing attacks on the office of Senator Claire McCaskill.⁶⁶ President Trump’s victory also rested on a close outcome, turning on around 80,000 votes in three states, and the way that the Electoral College anointed the candidate who lost the popular vote. The winner-take-all system, and Republican control of the legislative and

executive branches of the federal government, exacerbates polarization. Misgivings about the legitimacy of the 2016 U.S. election continue to fester and heighten partisan mistrust in Congress and the country long after the event.

In the U.S. election, both the major parties claimed problems with the campaign and results. This included repeated claims of ‘massive’ voter fraud and fake media by the Republican leadership, and claims of the suppression of voter’s rights and Russian meddling by Democrats. Stymied by partisan gridlock, is by no means evident that the political response to these serious threats has been effective or sufficient to reverse the damage to public confidence. The challenges to electoral integrity in America are far from novel; the contemporary fault lines started many years earlier, in the litigious wars over Floridian ballots in Bush v. Gore in 2000.⁶⁷ Even earlier decades witnessed historic battles over cleaning up elections and expanding civil rights in America.⁶⁸ But the 2016 campaign highlighted several long-standing weaknesses and revealed new risks.

Not surprisingly, in reaction to all these developments, the contemporary era has seen plummeting public trust in the integrity of American elections.⁶⁹ As Figure 5 illustrates, the Gallup World Poll reports that in 2016 only one third of Americans (30%) expressed confidence in the honesty of their elections, down from a majority of the public (52%) a decade earlier.⁷⁰ Moreover this is not simply the bitter fruit of the 2016 election nor is it a common trend observed across all Western states; American trust in their elections has been persistently lower than many comparable democracies during the last decade. Not surprisingly, assessments of how well U.S. elections work are also sharply split by party, with Democrats expressing more concern about gerrymandering and low voter turnout, while Republicans are more worried about problems of ineligible votes being cast.⁷¹

[Figure 5 about here]

In the light of these developments, the question which arises is whether any perceived problems about the electoral process in the U.S. are confined to this level, or whether misgivings have indeed metastasized to infect faith in democracy. To consider the evidence, Table 3 replicates the analysis of the cross-national data, using a similar range of indices. Several substantive findings emerge. The results of Model A confirm that, as procedural theories suggest, *perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices are significant and strong predictors of democratic satisfaction*, confirming similar patterns to those observed in the cross-national data. When broken down by disaggregated items, in Model B, the only items which emerged as significantly associated with democratic satisfaction were whether electoral officials are fair, rich people buy elections, and women have equal opportunities to run for office. Secondly, contrary to policy performance theories, *only one indicator of the pocket book economy emerged as significant* – namely financial satisfaction. By contrast, household income and financial security (savings) were not predictors of democratic satisfaction. Thirdly, as the winners-losers thesis suggests, *voting for President Trump (as the winner of the Electoral College) was by far the strongest predictor of democratic satisfaction*.

To look into these results further, we can examine how the American public assess the overall quality of U.S. contests and how far these perceptions are

shaped by partisanship. Public assessments of the Electoral Integrity and Electoral Malpractice scales can be compared among Clinton and Trump voters in the 2016 election, measured by the items in Table 1 from the WVS survey, as well as by satisfaction with both democracy and the U.S. political system.

[Figure 6 about here]

The results are illustrated in Figure 6. What is perhaps most striking, given the strength of party polarization on so many issues in contemporary America, and the literature on the winners-losers thesis, is that the gap between Clinton and Trump voters in the overall electoral integrity and malpractices scales is remarkably modest (2-percentage points). Moreover, contrary to the cross-national evidence supporting the winners-losers thesis, the slight observable difference suggests that it was the losers in this election (Democrats voting for Clinton) who have *slightly* more positive assessments of the integrity of elections than the winners (Trump voters). By contrast, there is a marked winners-losers difference observed if we examine overall satisfaction with how democratically the U.S. is seen to be governed (a net 10 percentage point gap), and satisfaction with the American political system (an 18-point gap). Thus despite the fact that, after the elections, Trump voters expressed far more satisfaction with the American system than Clinton supporters, this gap was not observed in partisan assessments of electoral integrity.

What can explain this pattern? Figure 7 breaks down items measuring the perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices by Clinton and Trump voters. Each item is scaled from low (1) to high (4), to identify the contrasts in voters' assessments. The results show that some of the largest gaps concern how Trump voters were far more likely than Clinton supporters to believe that voters are often bribed, TV news is often biased, and journalists often provide unfair coverage of elections. By contrast, Clinton supporters were far more likely to believe that rich people buy elections and that women do not have equal opportunities to run for office. Few clear partisan gaps can be observed on some other items, such as the fairness of the vote count or the fairness of electoral officials.

V: Conclusions and Implications

Theories seeking to explain public satisfaction with democracy differ in the importance they place upon the *'input'* side of the policy process and measures of 'procedural performance', such as trust and confidence in parties, the news media, and elections, versus the *'output'* side measured by economic policy performance, such as public evaluations about the delivery of public goods and services maintaining jobs and prosperity. Moreover scholars suggest that public judgments of both procedures and policies may be colored by partisan cues, notably backing the winning or losing side in any contest. The relative weight of each of these factors remains unresolved, however, and interpretations differ, in part because studies adopt different comparative frameworks, measures, models, and time periods and, until recently, few systematic social surveys monitored perceptions of electoral integrity.⁷²

Based on the cross-national evidence, we can conclude by summarizing several key substantive findings emerging from the analysis, namely:

- I. As input or procedural theories predict, *public perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices are usually significant and strong predictors of democratic satisfaction* in both the comparative and the U.S. data (lending additional support confirming H¹ and H²).
- II. Of the procedural indicators, the results differed across the datasets. In the cross-national data, the fairness of the vote count and media bias were seen as most significant predictors of democratic satisfaction. In the U.S. data, the fairness of the electoral officials, the role of money in politics, and equal opportunities for women to run for office were the most significant predictors of democratic satisfaction.
- III. As policy performance theories suggest, *in the cross-national data, the pocketbook economy was also associated with greater satisfaction with democracy*, although these coefficients were usually weaker than the effects of electoral integrity. The size of the winners-losers gap was greatest in countries such as Zimbabwe, Iraq, Malaysia, Thailand and Yemen, and Azerbaijan, with poor records of electoral integrity, and the gap diminished in countries with more electoral integrity. In the U.S. data, only one indicator (financial satisfaction) predicted greater satisfaction with democracy. This suggests more mixed support for H³ which deserves to be evaluated more fully by direct indices of policy performance
- IV. Finally, as the winners-losers thesis posits, *voting for the victorious party or candidate was usually linked with greater democratic satisfaction*. In the case of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, Trump voters expressed far more satisfaction with democracy than those who had supported Clinton. This provides support for H⁴: *winners usually express greater democratic satisfaction*,

Therefore, based on the evidence presented in this study, we can conclude that citizen's views about the fairness and integrity of the procedures used their elections are closely linked with more diffuse evaluations of how liberal democracies work. Political elites, such as officials, lawyers, politicians, and commentators, commonly express concern about malpractices. Many of these problems typically involve relatively abstruse technical issues which may not be visible to ordinary citizens, including the constitutional and legal procedures regulating the apportionment of electoral districts, the security of voting machines against the risks of cyber-attacks, and the constitutional design of the Electoral College. It might be assumed that most ordinary citizens may not know or care much about these sorts of flaws in electoral procedures compared with more bread-and-butter matters like how well the federal government delivers goods and services like good jobs and low taxes, or affordable health care and social justice.

Yet this assumption would be incorrect: when it comes to how liberal democracy works, elections play a central role. It follows that if the public comes to believe that serious electoral malpractice are widespread, whether problems of 'massive' voting fraud or systematic restrictions on voters' rights, so that people feel that the rules of the game are rigged, the outcome stacked, and genuine choices limited, then even in long-standing democracies, this has the capacity to corrode the reservoir of public faith in democracy itself, facilitating democratic backsliding under pressure from authoritarian-populist leaders.

These challenges face all countries but they are particularly severe in the United States, where there has been a steady drumbeat of criticisms of the electoral process by both sides of the aisle. This includes repeated cries of ‘massive voter fraud’ by the GOP leadership in successive elections since Florida, heightened by the Trump campaign’s onslaught on credibility of the news media, as well as repeated Democratic counter-claims of violations of voting rights arising from overly-restrictive state registration requirements. The reports of Russian meddling through hacking attempts and disinformation campaigns has exacerbated a climate of mistrust.

Leadership messages have subsequently been amplified by legacy and social media sympathetic to each party, for example, the story of Russian interference in the campaign and its aftermath was framed dramatically differently on Fox News and CNN, which may be expected to shape perceptions among their viewers.⁷³ Concern about fraud among Republican supporters is likely to have been amplified by President Trump’s assertions that he won the popular vote “*if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally*”.⁷⁴ After inauguration, President Trump continued to allege that more than three million fraudulent votes were cast in the 2016 elections.⁷⁵ “*In many places, like California, the same person votes many times. You probably heard about that. They always like to say, "Oh, that's a conspiracy theory." Not a conspiracy theory, folks. Millions and millions of people.*”⁷⁶ This could be dismissed as partisan hot-air and rhetorical hyperbole, without factual foundation.⁷⁷ But many Americans find these types of claims credible. In January 2017, for example, a poll found that one quarter of Americans said that they believed that voter fraud was ‘widespread’ in the November 2016 general election – including one third of Republicans.⁷⁸

Leading watchdog agencies report that major flaws in U.S. elections have important consequences by damaging the quality of American democracy. Thus Freedom House noted that “*in recent years (U.S.) democratic institutions have suffered erosion, as reflected in partisan manipulation of the electoral process,*” downgrading the country’s political rating from 1 to 2 “*due to growing evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 elections...*” (Freedom House 2018). Similarly the Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual report (2018) downgraded its rating of the U.S. in 2016 from a “full democracy” to a “flawed democracy”, noting the problems of growing party polarization, partisan gerrymandering, and the erosion of public trust in government, ranking America 21st in the 2017 global comparison. Other reports by the Electoral Integrity Project, Reporters without Borders, Transparency International, and Human Rights Watch largely concurred with these assessments of the risks facing U.S. elections and democracy.⁷⁹

Moreover party polarization disputing the outcome of the 2016 U.S. elections is only the latest set of problems which add to a system already creaking under the strain of the excess of money in politics, the lack of gender equality and minority representation in elected office, and effective electoral choice restricted through partisan gerrymandering.⁸⁰ For all these reasons, the persistence of many serious flaws in American contests, and partisan attacks on elections without the capacity to mobilize effective reforms addressing these shortfalls, is playing with fire by threatening faith in American democracy.

Table 1: Electoral integrity and malpractice scales

	Malpractices	Integrity
Voters are bribed	0.81	
Rich people buy elections	0.79	
Voters are threatened with violence at the polls	0.73	
TV news favors the governing party	0.64	
Opposition candidates are prevented from running	0.63	
Election officials are fair		0.80
Votes are counted fairly		0.72
Journalists provide fair coverage of elections		0.69
Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections		0.68
% Variance	32.6	21.4

Note: Q: “How often do the following things occur in your country’s elections?”
Individual-level principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization. N. 46,073.

Source: World Values Survey-6 www.worldvaluessurvey.org

Table 2: Cross-national models predicting public satisfaction with democracy, WVS-6

	Model A: Summary				Model B: Disaggregated			
	B	SE	Beta	Sig.	B	SE	Beta	Sig
Electoral Integrity index	0.03	0.00	0.19	***				
Electoral Malpractice index	-0.02	0.00	-0.13	***				
How often: Votes are counted fairly					0.35	0.02	0.14	***
How often: Journalists provide fair coverage of elections					0.04	0.02	0.01	***
How often: Election officials are fair					0.13	0.02	0.05	***
How often: Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections					0.13	0.02	0.05	***
How often: Opposition candidates are prevented from running					-0.04	0.02	-0.02	N/s
How often: TV news favors the governing party					-0.25	0.02	-0.10	***
How often: Voters are bribed					-0.08	0.02	-0.03	***
How often: Rich people buy elections					-0.11	0.02	-0.05	***
How often: Voters are threatened with violence at the polls					0.06	0.02	0.02	***
VALUES								
Importance of living in a democracy	0.18	0.01	0.15	***	0.19	0.01	0.16	***
Importance of having honest elections	-0.05	0.02	-0.02	***	-0.05	0.02	-0.02	***
WINNERS-LOSERS								
Voted for governing party(ies)	0.56	0.03	0.10	***	0.52	0.03	0.10	***
POCKET-BOOK ECONOMY								
HH Income	0.07	0.01	0.06	***	0.06	0.01	0.05	***
Financial security	0.04	0.02	0.01	***	0.03	0.02	0.01	***
Financial satisfaction	0.14	0.01	0.14	*	0.14	0.01	0.13	N/s
CONTROLS								
Sex (male)	-0.10	0.03	-0.02	*	-0.10	0.03	-0.02	*
Age (years)	0.00	0.00	-0.02	***	0.00	0.00	-0.02	***
Education (Low to high, 4 cat)	-0.04	0.01	-0.03	***	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	***
Level of urbanization	-0.04	0.02	-0.01	***	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	***
Subjective class	0.10	0.02	0.04	***	0.10	0.02	0.04	***
(Constant)	2.86	0.17		***	2.57	0.15		***
R ²	0.15				0.16			

Note: OLS Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the performance of democracy, 0-10 scale. Models were tested and found to be free of problems of multicollinearity.

Source: WVS-6 Pooled N.31,106 in 42 societies, 2010-2014 N. 26,595 respondents.


Table 3: Predicting public satisfaction with democracy, US 2017

	Model A: Summary				Model B: Disaggregated			
	B	SE	Beta	Sig.	B	SE	Beta	Sig.
Electoral Integrity index	0.04	0.01	0.21	***				
Electoral Malpractice index	-0.02	0.01	-0.12	***				
How often: Votes are counted fairly					0.19	0.11	0.06	N/s
How often: Journalists provide fair coverage of elections					0.09	0.08	0.04	N/s
How often: Election officials are fair					0.23	0.10	0.08	**
How often: Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections					0.10	0.09	0.04	N/s
How often: Opposition candidates are prevented from running					-0.10	0.08	-0.04	N/s
How often: TV news favors the governing party					-0.05	0.07	-0.02	N/s
How often: Voters are bribed					-0.07	0.09	-0.03	N/s
How often: Rich people buy elections					-0.22	0.07	-0.09	***
How often: Voters are threatened with violence at the polls					0.00	0.09	0.00	N/s
How often: Women have equal opportunities to run for office					0.30	0.09	0.11	***
VALUES								
Importance of living in a democracy	0.28	0.03	0.24	***	0.28	0.03	0.24	***
Importance of having honest elections	0.13	0.12	0.03	N/s	0.13	0.12	0.03	N/s
WINNERS-LOSERS								
Voted for Trump in 2016	1.43	0.13	0.32	***	1.21	0.17	0.27	***
POCKET-BOOK ECONOMY								
HH Income	0.00	0.02	0.00	N/s	0.00	0.02	0.00	N/s
Financial security	0.13	0.07	0.05	N/s	0.12	0.07	0.05	N/s
Financial satisfaction	0.09	0.03	0.09	***	0.08	0.03	0.08	***
CONTROLS								
Sex (Male)	-0.01	0.13	0.00	N/s	-0.01	0.13	0.00	N/s
Race: White	0.03	0.16	0.01	N/s	0.02	0.16	0.00	N/s
Race: Black	-0.11	0.28	-0.01	N/s	-0.16	0.28	-0.02	N/s
Age (years)	-0.02	0.00	-0.11	***	-0.02	0.00	-0.11	***
Education (Low to High, 4-cat)	0.04	0.08	0.02	N/s	0.03	0.08	0.01	N/s
Level of urbanization	0.42	0.19	0.06	*	-0.25	0.09	-0.09	***
Subjective class	-0.25	0.09	-0.09	**	0.40	0.19	0.06	*
(Constant)	1.35	0.85		**	1.51	0.85		**
R ²	0.23				0.23			
N.	1,127				1,127			

Note: OLS Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the performance of democracy, 0-10 scale. Models were tested and found to be free of problems of multicollinearity.


Source: WVS-US-2017

Figure 1: Citizen and expert perceptions of electoral integrity



Sources: WVS-6 Pooled N.31,106 in 42 societies, 2010-2014 www.worldvaluessurvey.org; PEI 6.0 www.electoralintegrityindex.com


Figure 2: Citizen’s perceptions of electoral integrity and satisfaction with democracy



Note: For the electoral integrity index, see Table 1. Democratic satisfactions is measured “*And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is ‘not at all democratic’ and 10 means that it is ‘completely democratic’, what position would you choose?*”

Source: World Values Survey-6 www.worldvaluessurvey.org


Figure 3: The winners-losers gap in perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices, WVS-6



Note: For the scales, see Table 1.

Source: World Values Survey-6 www.worldvaluessurvey.org


Figure 4: The winners-losers gaps in perceptions of electoral integrity and democratic satisfaction



Note: For the scales, see Table 1.

Source: World Values Survey-6 www.worldvaluessurvey.org


Figure 5: Public confidence in the honesty of their country's elections in five Anglo-American democracies, 2006-2016



Note: Q: “In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about honesty of elections?” Response options: Yes/No/Don’t know. (% Yes)


Source: The Gallup World Poll <http://www.gallup.com/analytics/213704/world-poll.aspx>

Figure 6: Satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices by party, US



Source: World Values Survey, US only, 2017.

Figure 7: Perceptions of electoral integrity and malpractices by party, US



Source: World Values Survey, US only, 2017.

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