

**John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Faculty Research Working Papers Series**

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Mass Opinion**

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April 2001

RWP01-041

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April 29, 2001
Version 1.1

This paper extends the well-studied phenomenon of interviewer effects (race-, gender-, and ethnicity-of-interviewer) to the yet unexamined domain of language-of-interview. Using data from the 1989-1990 Latino National Politics Survey, the paper finds that the answers that survey respondents give differ, sometimes markedly, depending on whether an interview is conducted in Spanish or English. The paper then considers several explanations for why language-of-interview should matter. Methodological answers – that such effects result from sample characteristics or measurement error – fail to fully explain the effects. The influence of social desirability also does not fully explain language-of-interview effects. In addition to these factors, the findings suggest that interviews in different languages enable and evoke a distinct set of meanings, experiences, and attitudes about what it means to be Latino in the United States. Viewed thus, language-of-interview effects are more than just corrective for how we conduct surveys but also a valuable tool for examining how language informs and influences Latino mass opinion.

Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 19-22, Chicago, Illinois. Thanks are due to Mike Alvarez, Darren Davis, Zoltan Hajnal, Lynn Sanders, and colleagues in the Robert Wood Johnson Scholars in Health Policy program at Yale University for their insights, encouragement, and forbearance on my early thoughts about language-of-interview effects. This paper is a draft; please do not cite it without prior permission. Comments, queries, and suggestions can be directed to the author at Taeku_Lee@harvard.edu.

Introduction

At least as far back as the 1940s, survey researchers have observed that interviewer characteristics can profoundly effect on the answers that respondents give (Katz, 1942; Hyman, et al, 1954). A particularly well-studied case in point is the “race-of-interviewer” effect (Hyman, et al, 1954; Schuman and Converse, 1971; Hatchett and Schuman, 1975-1976; Schaeffer, 1980; Campbell, 1981; Cotter, 1982; Anderson, et al, 1988a; Anderson, et al, 1988b; Finkel, 1991; Davis, 1997a, 1997b). African Americans who are interviewed by whites will give substantively distinct responses on some questions than their counterparts who are interviewed by another African American. The same is true of white respondents and black or white interviewers. And there is evidence of parallel such effects with interviewer ethnicity (Weeks and Moore, 1981; Reese, et al, 1986; Hurtado, 1994) and interviewer gender (Johnson and DeLamater, 1976; Groves and Fultz, 1985; Kane and Macaulay, 1993).

These effects, moreover, are not isolated to face-to-face interviews. Rather, such outcomes are also found in telephone interviews (Cotter, 1982), even when the telephone interviewers are all of the same phenotypic race (Sanders, 1995). Thus while interviewer effects may have been initially viewed as an artefact and nuisance to the validity of survey data, researchers are increasingly prone to interpret them as illustrative of more broadly social and political phenomena (Kane and Macaulay, 1993; Sanders, 1995, 2001; Davis, 1997a, 1997b). Darren Davis argues quite persuasively that these “race-of-interviewer” effects shed significant insight into the nature of racial interactions (Davis, 1997). In Lynn Sanders’s work on *perceptions* of the interviewer’s race, the exchange of words itself—accent, inflection, dialect, even idiosyncratic enunciative mannerisms—plays a central part in how “race” is ascribed in telephone interviews. Sanders also reminds us that survey interviews are a form of dialogue. As such, survey interviews are conversations that can either be privatized or public, racially segregated or integrated, choices which bear consequences for the prospects of deliberative and multiracial democracy (2001).

In this paper, I extend the study on such contextual effects by considering the language in which interviews are conducted. Narrowly put, I explore whether and how language affects the nature of the interaction between interviewer and respondent and the substance of survey responses that are given. Following the lead of Davis and Sanders, I also consider whether language-of-interview effects can draw some new insights about the nature of the survey interaction and about the role that language plays in defining the political and racial views of a predominantly immigrant ethnic community.

The specific case I examine in this paper is polling the opinions of Latino Americans in English and Spanish. The results demonstrate fairly pervasive language-of-interview effects. Of

particular note, the effects are not isolated to questions pertaining to language policy, immigration, or issues that explicitly or implicitly refer to Latinos. In addition, language-of-interview effects are not simply a matter of measurement error, sampling bias, or even social desirability effects. Rather, language-of-interview effects also appear to evoke the distinct influence of conversations in Spanish and English in mediating the experiences and attitudes of Latinos in the United States.

Language-of-Interview Effects

Before we jump to a theoretical discussion of why the language in which an interview is conducted might matter in the answers that survey respondents give, it may help to first demonstrate the *prima facie* case that there is indeed something here worth explaining. The data are from the 1989-1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS).¹ The LNPS completed 2,817 face-to-face interviews with Latinos between July 1989 and April 1990. Of this sample, 1,546 respondents were Mexican, 589 Puerto Rican, and 682 Cuban. Roughly 60 percent of the Latino sample chose Spanish as their preferred language-of-interview.² The distribution of interviews by language-of-interview breaks down by ethnicity as follows: roughly half the interviews with Mexican respondents, roughly 60 percent of the interviews with Puerto Rican respondents, and more than 80 percent of the interviews with Cuban respondents are conducted in Spanish.³

The LNPS is a lengthy survey (the average interview with Latinos took more than an hour and a half to complete), and thus offers a wide array of items to use to test for language-of-interview effects. In total, Table 1 shows the distribution of responses by language-of-interview on fifty-eight items. The first cluster of items concern one's political values and policy

¹ de la Garza, Falcon, Garcia, and Garcia (1998). See also de la Garza, et al (1992) and Garcia, et al (1989). The full sample includes 598 non-Latino subjects. The overall response rate for the Latino sample was 74 percent.

² In many other bilingual surveys of Latinos, such as the 1999 *Washington Post*/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University survey of Latinos, closer to 40 percent of respondents choose a Spanish interview. de la Garza and his colleagues speculate that this may be due to an oversample of Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Another possibility which de la Garza and his colleagues do not discuss is that the LNPS enjoys a high response rate by today's standards and is based on face-to-face interviews, two factors that may also lead to a higher proportion of Spanish interviews. A third possible explanation for this difference is that the underlying language use patterns of Latinos may have changed over time (i.e., a greater proportion of Latinos in 1999 who prefer to converse in English than in 1989).

³ The principal investigators of the LNPS note that "[t]ranslation of the instrument into Spanish was a crucial step in the conduct of the LNPS. This is especially true in light of the differences between Latino subgroups in their choice of words to represent certain ideas, behaviors and attitudes. It was imperative that the Spanish version of the LNPS instrument be sufficiently general to be understood by Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans." The investigators translated the English instrument into Spanish using what they term an "in-depth focus group technique," which entailed multiple iterations of refining the instrument both at the translation stage and at the pretest stage. Although no individual-level interviewer characteristics are available with the LNPS, the principal investigators note that 159 interviewers were trained for the LNPS, 138 interviewers actually conducted one or more interviews, and that five-sixths of this pool were bilingual.

preferences (Table 1a). In all cases but two, these items ask about general values and policies rather than those specifically affecting Latinos. A second cluster of items are feeling thermometers on sentiments toward Latino home countries, Latino groups, and other racial/ethnic groups in the United States (Table 1b). A third battery of items ask about the perceived levels of discrimination that different groups, Latino and non-Latino, face in the United States (Table 1c). The final cluster of items involve questions that explicitly or implicitly address Latino concerns – language policy, immigration, and about U.S. policies affecting sending countries or regions, i.e., Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Central America (Table 1d). The question wording on these items is in the Appendix.

As Table 1 shows, the language in which interviews are conducted can affect what respondents say to varying degrees across a broad range of topics.⁴ Moreover, consistent with Schuman and Hatchett's (1974) findings on race-of-interviewer effects, these language-of-interview effects are not isolated to language-related, or Latino-related, or even race and ethnicity-related items, broadly construed. Table 1a shows some striking differences by language-of-interview even in with general political values and policy preferences. Respondents in English interviews appear much more supportive of some measure of equality of opportunity and much more patriotic in their love for the United States. Respondents in Spanish interviews appear much more trusting of government officials and more supportive of an active government role in solving problems affecting the nation, localities, and the respondent's ethnic group. On policy items, respondents in Spanish interviews appear generally more supportive of greater government spending across a wide array of issue areas. The magnitude of effects here do not fall into any easily definable pattern: respondents in Spanish interviews, for instance, appear much more supportive of government spending on science and technology but only marginally more supportive on social welfare programs while respondents in English interviews appear more supportive on environmental policy. Finally, Table 1a shows that there is only a slight language effect on affirmative action, but a sizeable one on abortion and the death penalty.

In domains that highlight Latino concerns or group interests, we find a more consistent pattern of effects. Table 1b, for instance, shows that respondents interviewed in Spanish tend to react more coldly towards other racial and ethnic groups in the United States (blacks, whites, Asians, and Jews) than those interviewed in English. Respondents interviewed in Spanish also respond more warmly toward Latino home countries (even those not represented in this sample – Nicaragua and Venezuela) and toward Latino groups. The one exception to this pattern is that

⁴ The actual sample used is comprised of 2,646 respondents – 645 Cubans, 1,428 Mexicans, and 543 Puerto Ricans. Because of the relatively large sample size of the LNPS almost all of the language-of-interview differences on Table 1 are statistically significant.

respondents interviewed in Spanish were colder towards “Mexican Americans” than those interviewed in English (but warmer toward “Mexico” and toward “Mexican immigrants”). In Table 1c, there is one principal relationship: respondents interviewed in English are overwhelmingly more likely to view all groups identified – blacks, Asians, Jews, women, Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans – as facing significant levels of discrimination in the United States. Thus although respondents Spanish interviews appear warmer toward Latino groups, this does not translate into attitudes about the relative barriers facing Latinos in the U.S.

Finally, Table 1d presents a mixed pattern of language-of-interview effects. Across a wide spectrum of questions about language and education policy, respondents interviewed in English appear more supportive of monolingual and monocultural policies than respondents interviewed in Spanish. With immigration policy, English-interview respondents are much more inclined to object to giving special immigration preferences to non-US Latinos. With the items on home country politics, respondents’ language-of-interview results in especially striking effects with questions about U.S. policy in Central America and about the balance of respondents’ attentiveness between U.S. politics and the politics of one’s home country.

Competing Explanations and Corresponding Expectations

The “null hypothesis,” that survey response does not vary by language-of-interview is thus easily falsifiable. The question thus remains as to why language-of-interview matters. One obvious explanation to consider is that survey responses differ by language-of-interview because people who choose to be interviewed in English differ categorically from people who choose to be interviewed in a non-English language. In the LNPS, as in most other bilingual and multilingual surveys, respondents are given a choice over which language they prefer to be interviewed in. Respondents may thus “self-select” into groups and language-of-interview effects may simply reflect prior differences in the respondents’ characteristics.

Table 2 shows that there are, indeed, differences in sample characteristics between respondents interviewed Spanish and those interviewed in English. Respondents interviewed in Spanish are older, somewhat less educated, considerably less wealthy, less likely to own a home or to be employed full-time, and more likely to be married. Politically and ideologically, Spanish language respondents show a more Republican profile and are more likely to be conservative and Catholic. Perhaps the most striking difference is in immigrant and citizenship status. More than 90 percent of respondents interviewed in Spanish are foreign-born (compared to only one in four respondents interviewed in English) and less than half of these respondents are citizens (compared to more than 90 percent of respondents interviewed in English).

A second explanation to consider is that respondents who choose to be interviewed in a non-English language may ultimately differ from respondents interviewed in English in one salient aspect: their English language skills. By this explanation, the relevant characteristic that explains language-of-interview effects is language proficiency. We see different responses because individuals who are more comfortable with Spanish may misunderstand questions asked in English. Implicit in this explanation is the view that contextual factors like interviewer race or interview language are sources of “measurement error” that obscure survey instruments from revealing a respondent’s “true attitudes.”⁵ This “measurement error” explanation leads to two different kinds of expectations.

The first is that, absent any priors about the direction of the measurement error, our expectation should be that monolingual interviews of a bilingual (or multilingual) population should result in a greater variance in responses and a greater proportion of ambivalent or non-compliant answers (i.e., “don’t know,” “no opinions,” “refused” categories of response) than we might find in bilingual interviews. Importantly, we should not expect any mean differences in responses. We have already seen in Table 1, however, that there are in fact mean differences in survey responses by language-of-interview.⁶

A second reading of this measurement view would be that interviews in a respondent’s second language can lead to systematically biased interpretations of survey questions. Questions that involve more abstruse concepts or that otherwise travel poorly between languages in translation may skew responses in a particular direction. We might test this version of the measurement error hypothesis by conducting a close textual reading of a survey instrument, generate expectations about which questions are likely to yield biased interpretations and what direction those biases will likely take, and then see if the data bear out these expectations. A less stringent but more expedient method of proceeding would be to take the mean differences in Table 1 as given and statistically control for differences in language proficiency and language use. As with the sampling bias theory, if the measurement error theory is correct, the language-of-interview effects we see in Table 1 should disappear.

⁵ This view is well-illustrated in the following excerpt from a survey research text on matching interviewer race and ethnicity: “Interviewers who are drawn from the racial/ethnic background to be studied are generally the most successful: blacks are more successful interviewing blacks; whites are more successful interviewing whites (and similarly, Puerto Ricans with Puerto Ricans, American Indians with American Indians, Chinese with Chinese).” (Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, 1981: 243)

⁶ More persuasive than the simple fact that mean differences exist within the LNPS is the striking similarity of responses in English interviews to the LNPS with responses to English interviews to the American National Election Studies (based on pooling all Latino respondents from the cumulative file of the ANES from 1978-1998). Put simply, the Latino sample in the ANES looks very comparable to the English-interview respondents to the LNPS and very different from the Spanish-interview respondents to the LNPS on the limited number of attitude items that are comparable between the ANES and the LNPS.

Beyond methodological explanations like sampling and measurement, survey responses may also differ by language-of-interview because the particular social dynamic that results may differ. A discussion that occurs between two parties in English may be a meaningfully distinct interaction than a parallel discussion in Spanish (over the same set of topics, with the same structural relationship between the two dialogic partners). The prevailing explanation of interviewer response effects is premised on just such a psychodynamic view. By this “social desirability” thesis, respondents may try to anticipate what the interviewer wants to hear rather than give their “true attitude.” The typical motivation is to avoid offending the interviewer and generally try to be agreeable and accommodating. This dynamic is especially likely where the interviewer and respondent diverge (or converge) on a key characteristic on which there are clearly identifiable and commonly understood social divisions and status expectations.

Race, ethnicity, and gender are three obvious such characteristics in U.S. society today. For instance, white respondents are more likely to express a willingness to vote for an African American candidate in the presence of an African American interviewer than in the presence of a white interviewer (Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg, 1991). Survey respondents are even apt to give socially desirable responses on their self-reported voting behavior, and this response in turn may influence their actual voting behavior (Anderson, Silver, and Abramson, 1988a). In such cases, respondents often acquiesce or defer when a status differential is perceived between respondent and interviewer (Campbell, 1981).

Language is a somewhat less obvious case. In particular, our expectations are likely to vary depending on whether the language-of-interview effects we see result from social dynamics intrinsic to the language-of-interview or whether the effects result from some extrinsic dynamics, such as interpersonal deference. With the intrinsic view, we may find language-of-interview effects because of perceived status differences between English and Spanish speakers in the United States (e.g., Hurtado, 1994). If this were the case, in bilingual surveys respondents should sort themselves according to this status characteristic because they choose the language in which they preferred to be interviewed. We have already seen in Table 2 that on status-related characteristics like education, income, employment, home-ownership, and citizenship, there is indeed a difference between English-language respondents and Spanish-language respondents. This version of the social desirability thesis thus reduces to a variant of the “sampling bias” thesis.⁷

In the case of interpersonal deference, it is not sufficient that social dynamics are an important aspect of survey interaction. Rather, it must be the case that the nature of interpersonal

⁷ Once the status characteristics of language are controlled for, the language-of-interview effects we should find should be between responses in bilingual (English and Spanish) surveys and monolingual (English only) surveys.

deference is fundamentally different between a conversation held by two Spanish speakers and one held by two English speakers. An interviewer may judge the status and the performance of a Latino respondent (e.g., vis-à-vis their level of competence and cooperation) differently if they are conversing with that respondent in English than in Spanish. And a respondent may view the status, motivation, and legitimacy of a Spanish-speaking interviewer differently from that of an English-speaking interviewer.

A more explicitly political version of this interactive view is that language-of-interview defines the ideological terms of survey response. Interviews conducted in English are conducted in the dominant tongue of the United States. Beyond interpersonal deference, then, the choice of English as the language-of-interview may result in a form of ideological deference. In parallel with this possibility, the choice of Spanish as the language-of-interview among Latino respondents may be a political and ideological one with quite different implications. The choice of the language in which a survey is conducted, then, may reduce to a political choice between assimilation into the dominant practices of a new homeland or the preservation and reaffirmation of the cultural practices of one's native land. If this is the case, then, the choice over languages in which to express one's social and political attitudes may not simply be a matter of flattening or heightening social status and deference, but also enabling or disabling different forms of ethnic expression.

In terms of empirical expectations, the difference between the political and social versions of interpersonal deference are likely to emerge in the issues on which we see a significant language-of-interview effect. If having a second language-of-interview (Spanish) simply flattens status differences, we might expect to see language-of-interview effects over a broad spectrum of social issues. Alternatively, if having a Spanish interview further denotes a common ethnic bond, then we might expect to see the strongest language-of-interview effects on questions about ethnic identity, racial politics, immigration policy, and the like.⁸ Note also that these dialogic, interactive effects are only in play if we cannot explain away our first-order language-of-interview effects by controlling for demographic characteristics and language proficiency.

Model Specification and Empirical Results

The LNPS allows us to test these four competing explanations about why language-of-interview effects occur. The empirical strategy is straightforward. Each item in Table 1 is modelled separately as a dependent variable. Each of our explanations is operationalized in a distinct

⁸ Or, in cases where the interviewer is not of the same ethnic ingroup as the respondent, respondents may still infer an interviewer's sympathy from their willingness and ability to dialogue in Spanish.

vector of independent variables. In addition, in each model, our key variable of interest is the respondent's choice over language-of-interview.⁹ With each specific regression, the primary focus is on the estimated coefficient on this language-of-interview choice – its significance, its sign, and its magnitude. Aggregated across all 56 items, the focus is on the number of items for which there remains a statistically significant language-of-interview effect, as compared to the simple bivariate relationship suggested in Table 1.

The results are shown in Table 3. The first column, labeled “BiVar,” captures the relationship from Table 1 in simple bivariate regressions. To keep the analysis and exposition simple across a vast number of regressions, the model is estimated using ordinary least squares and cell entries show standardized coefficients (with their corresponding test statistic in parentheses). As a baseline of bivariate relationships, there is a statistically significant language-of-interview effect in 48 out of the 56 items we examine.¹⁰ The eight items for which there no initial language-of-interview effect are support for affirmative action, support for government spending on crime and drugs, affect toward Nicaragua and toward Asian Americans, belief that U.S. residents should speak English only, belief that there are too many immigrants to the United States, support for a re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Cuba, and belief that the political unrest in Central America is due to U.S. meddling (and not poverty or human rights abuses).

The first explanation we test is that language-of-interview effects result from the sampling characteristics of respondents who choose to be interviewed in Spanish, rather than English. The characteristics we control for are respondent age, education, family income, home ownership, employment status, sex, race, and marital status.¹¹ The results from controlling for these factors are shown in the column labeled “Dem1.” This test of the “sample bias” explanation yields mixed results. While in most instances, the magnitude of our parameter estimates and their significance decreases when we control for these demographic factors, they rarely cease to be statistically significant. In fact, in more than a quarter of our cases (15 out of the 56 items), the magnitude of a significant language-of-interview effect *actually increases*.¹²

⁹ LOI is coded as 1 = English language interview, 0 = Spanish language interview.

¹⁰ Significance is defined at the 95 percent confidence level. The three separate items in Table 1 on government's appropriate role (over national problems, local problems, and problems affecting Latinos) are combined into an additive index; thus there are two fewer items in Table 3.

¹¹ The LNPS codes for six racial categories that do not easily map onto most survey race categories: white, black, other, “Spanish label” (e.g., Hispanic, Latino, Mestizo, Latin-American), “Color oriented” (e.g., Moron, Triune, Brown, Olive, Tan, Cafe), and “Race label” (e.g., “mulatto,” North American, Indian). In Table 3, we simply code the dummy variable for whites (1 = “whites,” 0 = all other categories).

¹² The arbitrary cut-off I choose as a noteworthy increase in a standardized coefficient (comparing between the bivariate and multivariate regressions) is a positive change greater than or equal to 0.01. Note that I only compare the standardized coefficients that are statistically significant.

These heightened effects are concentrated in the feeling thermometer items toward Latino groups and destinations from which Latinos immigrate (Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Venezuela). In terms of summary statistics, we still find a significant language-of-interview effect in 47 out of the 56 items we test for.¹³

One might object that the specification of the sample bias explanation is rigged to favor the persistence of language-of-interview effects. Since language is intimately linked to one's immigrant status and ethnicity, "Dem1" may simply be controlling for the wrong demographic variables. In the column labeled "Dem2," we add to the variables in "Dem1" some immigrant-specific background variables: respondents' immigrant status, the age at which they immigrated, their immigrant generation, and their ethnicity – Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rican. This more inclusive set of demographic controls fare substantially better in explaining language-of-interview effects. Statistically significant effects persist in only 35 out of the 56 items we examine. In only five instances do the language effects increase in magnitude (compared with simple bivariate relationships).¹⁴ When we look more closely at the items that no longer seem to matter, the general implication is that the sample bias explanation fares best on policy items – specifically, government spending items and on preferences on policy matters involving different sending countries and regions. Notably, the sample bias story leaves intact fairly robust language-of-interview effects in Latino opinion on core political values, affect toward Latino and non-Latino groups, perceptions of discrimination, and policy preferences on issues affecting Latino communities.

The next explanation we considered is the "measurement error" thesis. By this view, respondents are apt to make more mistakes in interpreting a question or a response choice if their knowledge of English is limited, if they seldom use what English they know, or if their ability to move from one language to the other is encumbered.¹⁵ The column in Table 3 marked "Lang" controls for the following three items: respondents' self-rated fluency in English, their primary language at home, and their bilingualism (measured as respondents' ability to translate a number of sentences from Spanish to English). These three variables alone fare almost as well as the dozen items under "Dem2." Significant language-of-interview effects remain in 36 items. When

¹³ Four items (government spending on public education, programs for African Americans, and environmental programs; the cause of the Mexican economic crisis) lose their statistical significance, but three items (affect toward Nicaragua, affect toward Asian Americans, and support for diplomatic ties with Cuba) now show significant language effects once respondents' demographic profile is controlled for.

¹⁴ In only one case does an item for which there is no language effect in "BiVar" is there a significant effect in "Dem2" (affect toward Nicaragua).

¹⁵ The LNPS tests respondents' ability to translate nine sentences of varying complexity, but it is only asked of a fraction of the sample. The missing values are coded as zero and coded as the mean value by language of interview.

we compare these results against the simple bivariate regressions, there are only five instances in which the magnitude of a significant language-of-interview effect increases.¹⁶ Clearly, language proficiency and use are a substantial part of the story behind language-of-interview effects, but they are not the whole of this story. Whether an interview is conducted in English or Spanish remains a powerful and robust determinant of Latino mass opinion in the LNPS. So we press on to the remaining explanations.

Perhaps the dominant view today on the kind response effects we consider is the “social desirability” or status deference thesis. Respondents may opt for the “politically correct” response on sensitive questions or, even absent any racial or linguistic coding, they may simply acquiesce to the perceived preferences of the interviewer. In the column labeled “SocDes,” we control for the respondents’ sense of control over their destinies, interviewer evaluations of respondent’s understanding, cooperativeness, phenotype, and any social dynamics that result from a third party to the interview being within earshot (we code for the presence of the third party and the duration of the third party’s presence). Each of these variables capture different dimensions of interpersonal dynamics and subjectively perceived status differences.

Table 3 shows that, in the majority of items we examine, controlling for these social desirability factors does indeed diminish any language-of-interview effect. Yet the language effects, by and large, do not wash away. In 45 out of the 56 items we examine, there remains a statistically significant effect simply by conducting an interview in Spanish rather than in English. Moreover, as with the other explanations we examine, in a non-trivial number of cases (eight items, in this case), controlling for a plausible explanation actually heightens any language-of-interview effects.¹⁷

The traditional explanations for these interview effects – whether methodological or psychological – thus have a limited reach. As Lynn Sanders (2000) and Darren Davis (1997b) observe, survey interviews reveal important insights into the nature of political and racial discourse. For a predominantly immigrant ethnic group like Latinos in the U.S., a prevailing subtext to the survey dialogue along these lines is likely to be respondents’ publicly professed views on assimilation and immigrant incorporation. In the column marked “Assim,” we examine the possibility that differences in responses given by language-of-interview reveal a form of *ideological* deference, or political assimilation, to the mainstream political orientation in the U.S. by Latinos interviewed in English.¹⁸ The explanatory controls here are citizenship status,

¹⁶ In one case (affect toward Nicaragua), the language effect reverses from non-significant to significant.

¹⁷ Unlike the previous explanations, however, there is no instance in which controlling for social desirability factors actually shifts the effect from non-significant to a significant one.

¹⁸ For an interesting and more generalized variant on Sanders and Davis’ political view of language effects, see Bourdieu (1991).

political partisanship, liberal-conservative ideology, knowledge about mainstream politics, attention to mainstream media, attention to politics generally, and active participation in mainstream politics. The results are modest. Significant language-of-interview effects persist in 45 out of the 56 items we examine. Moreover, in nine cases, the strength of the language effects actually heightens when we control for political assimilation items.¹⁹

A final variant that we consider is less about the social constraints of interviews conducted in English than about the expressive possibilities of interviews conducted in Spanish. Specifically, in the column marked “EthId” in Table 3, we examine the following measures that are likely to reinforce a sense of ethnic identity and in-group interaction: respondents sense of a linked fate among Latinos in the U.S., an index of political group consciousness, perceived common Latino culture, attention to politics affecting Latino communities, attention to Spanish news media, personal experience with racial discrimination, degree of social interaction with one’s ethnic in-group, and the population density of one’s ethnic in-group in respondents’ residential neighborhood. Controlling for these factors has a compelling influence. Language-of-interview effects persist in only 37 out of the 56 items we examine. By this admittedly limited criterion (of proportion of items with statistically significant language effects), only the full set of 14 demographic variables under “Dem2” fares better.²⁰

These results, taken together, suggest that no single explanation is sufficient to account for language-of-interview effects. Rather, each of the explanations we examine – sample characteristics, language proficiency and usage, interpersonal deference, political assimilation, and ethnic self-expression – tells us something important about the dynamics of language in a survey interview. Perhaps the set of explanations we have considered, taken together, can account for the universe of circumstances in which language-of-interview effects occur. In the final column of Table 3, appropriately labeled “AllVars,” we control for all plausible reasons why we should find language of interview effects. The summary result is that with a fairly comprehensive set of explanatory variables, language-of-interview effects persist for 25 out of the 56 items we test. With only a few exceptions, the magnitude of the language-of-interview effects is substantially attenuated.²¹ In terms of general patterns, language effects vanish almost entirely on government spending items and on language policy. At the same time, language

¹⁹ In two cases – affect toward Nicaragua and belief that there are too many immigrants in the United States – we see significant language-of-interview effects where none previously existed.

²⁰ In eight cases, pre-existing language effects are actually heightened. In four cases, items that previously appeared unaffected now show statistically significant relationships.

²¹ The strength of language-of-interview effects actually increases substantially with three feeling thermometer items: affect toward Cuba, Mexico, and Nicaragua.

effects remain robust on core political values, perceived discrimination facing Latinos and non-Latino social groups, and in immigration and education policies that affect Latinos.

Additional Considerations

Differences in survey response by language-of-interview appear to be an enduring feature of Latino mass opinion. We have thus far established some general parameters on what kinds of questions are likely to elicit such language-of-interview effects, and how robust the effects are to different methodological and substantive explanations. We turn now to two final nuances: which explanation performs best in explaining language effects and whether inter-ethnic differences between Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans themselves can explain language effects.

First, we have seen that not all explanations or all indicators of each explanation are equally determinative of language-of-interview effects. Which explanations do a better job? One means of answering this question is to model directly the respondent's choice to be interviewed in English or Spanish as a function of the various competing explanations. The results from this test are shown in Table 4. Our dependent variable is binary, so our parameters are estimated using a logit model. The three columns beside each explanatory variable are the parameter estimate, its corresponding test statistic, and its odds-ratio. Of the demographic factors we examine, Spanish-interview respondents are much likelier to be less-well educated, female, married, immigrant or second generation, and to have immigrated to the U.S. later in one's life. Among the language markers, language use alone significantly predicts respondents' choice of language-of-interview. Of the social desirability factors, individuals who were viewed as uncooperative were more likely to be Spanish-interview respondents. In addition, the presence of a third-party to the interview appears to induce respondents to choose English as their language-of-interview. When a third party to the interview is present for an extended period of time, however, respondents are likelier to choose to interview in Spanish.²² With our political assimilation variables, citizenship is the single most determinative factor (and predicts English as the language-of-interview). Finally, of our ethnic self-expression measures, a general sense of linked fate, political group consciousness, reliance on Spanish-language news sources, and residence in neighborhoods with high concentrations of one's ethnic in-group all significantly predicted a Spanish interview.

The influence of these individual indicators are meaningful in themselves, but we can also compare the goodness-of-fit and explanatory power of each cluster of variables against the

²² One implication of this finding is that third party observers who linger during the interview are likelier to be family members or intimate acquaintances and those who observe the interview only briefly are likelier to be a passing acquaintance or stranger.

remaining independent variables. This is shown at the bottom of Table 4. The first column compares the pseudo-R-squared statistic (McFadden's) for each restricted model.²³ Because our strategy is to compare the unrestricted (full) model to specifications that eliminate a particular cluster of variables, the greater the *decrease* in the pseudo-R-squared statistic, the greater the implied explanatory power of that cluster of variables. For instance, eliminating the "PolAssim" variables (citizenship, partisanship, ideology, knowledge, media exposure, political attention, political partisanship) affects the pseudo-R-square hardly at all, implying that we garner relative little added explanatory power from these measures. By this reading, note that the greatest loss in explanatory power comes when we remove the "Dem2" variables from our model specification: the pseudo-R-square drops from 0.63 to 0.53.²⁴

Perhaps a more discriminating means of comparing across models is the likelihood ratio test, which compares the performance of our unrestricted (full) model against a more restricted model – in this case, the full model less the cluster of variables that correspond to a particular explanation.²⁵ The corresponding statistic tells us the likelihood that the added explanatory value (from including a particular cluster of variables) results from random variation, given as a test statistic with a chi-squared distribution. The results here are comparable to that from looking at pseudo-R-squared statistics: the fit is most definitive when we controlled for a broad range of demographic background variables. Respondents' sense of ethnic identity and level of in-group interaction also substantially define one's choice of language of interview.

There is a final potential rejoinder to these results in this paper that merits some consideration. We have thus far treated Latinos in our empirical analysis as a monolithic, homogeneous group. This is a regrettable simplification that surely flattens key ethnic-specific distinctions.²⁶ The ethnicity-specific dummy variables in the regressions for Table 3 reveal significant and often large differences in Latino mass opinion by ethnicity.²⁷ Table 4 too shows

²³ This statistic is referred to as a "pseudo-R-squared" because it is bounded between 0 and 1, with values approaching 1 when a model performs well and values approaching 0 when a model performs poorly. This statistic shares the limitations of R-squared statistics in the OLS/GLS setting in that we cannot interpret anything that is substantively meaningful from it.

²⁴ When we consider the immigrant/Latino-specific (i.e., immigrant status, generation, age of immigration, ethnicity) variables alone, there remains a significant effect on the pseudo-R-squared, which diminishes to 0.59.

²⁵ Our comparisons of the likelihood ratio test are somewhat limited, since the number of restrictions across models (ranging from removing 3 variables in the "Lang" case and 14 variables in the "Dem2" case) and the number of observations are not comparable between the restricted and the unrestricted model estimates.

²⁶ See, e.g., Portes and Bach (1985), Lopez and Espiritu (1990), de la Garza, et al (1992).

²⁷ The full results for the 56 regressions in Table 3 are not shown, but available upon request.

that Cuban-origin respondents are less likely to interview in English than are Mexican or Puerto Rican-origin respondents.²⁸

If we simply cross-tabulate the 56 items from Table 1 by language-of-interview and by ethnicity, we find pervasive effects across all three ethnic groups. For the Cuban-origin respondents in our sample, we find significant language-of-interview effects on 40 out of 56 items; for Mexican-origin respondents, on 49 out of 56 items; and for Puerto Rican respondents, on 43 out of 56 items. The sample size of Mexican Americans is more than twice that for Cubans and Puerto Ricans, so the fact that there are more statistically significant differences by language-of-interview for our Mexican respondents is not surprising. One notable difference across ethnic groups is that the magnitude of language-of-interview effects is discernibly slighter for Puerto Ricans, especially on the perceived level of discrimination items.

Keeping in mind the considerable loss of observations when we disaggregate by ethnicity in mind, Table 5 summarizes the number of statistically significant language-of-interview effects by ethnicity once we control for each of the various explanations from Table 3.²⁹ The upshot of these results is that language-of-interview effects, even disaggregated by ethnic group, are durable. Even in the most inclusive model in which all six explanations are controlled for, language-of-interview effects remain prevalent. One important note from Table 5 is that the relative power of different explanations does appear to be somewhat ethnic-specific. Language-of-interview effects, for instance, appear to be a story about language proficiency and usage *moreso* for Puerto Ricans than for Mexican Americans or Cuban Americans (the number of significant items drops from 43 to 18 for Puerto Rican respondents). To take another example in this vein, the explanation that language-of-interview captures a subtext of ideological deference (to an assimilationist political voice) appears more *apropos* to Mexican Americans than to Puerto Ricans or Cubanos. Such comparisons, however, are ultimately only enticements for further analysis since the different sample sizes for the three Latino ethnic groups do not allow us to draw any precise implications.

²⁸ When the characteristics of English and Spanish interview respondents are compared by ethnicity (as in Table 2), the rank-order of differences by language-of-ethnicity is preserved across ethnic groups. Spanish-interview respondents are older, less educated, less wealthy, less commonly employed full-time, more likely to be married and Catholic, more likely to be Republican, and more likely to be immigrant (and less likely to be citizens). There are of course conspicuous differences between ethnic groups independent of language-of-interview (e.g., Cubans are more Republican, earn higher incomes, are better educated, more Catholic, and more likely to be immigrant).

²⁹ Results for these disaggregated analyses are available on request.

Summary and Implications

The idea that language is a defining component of one's ethnic identity is far from novel. At least as far back as the cultural nationalism of Johann Gottfried Herder (1772), language has been understood as the gateway to a group's collective self-understanding. In studies of comparative politics, the emotional and instrumental dynamics of language is commonly implicated as a critical factor in the construction of national identity and the mobilization of nationalist political movements.³⁰ And in the U.S. context, we understand language as a central determinant in whether an ethnic immigrant assimilates into a dominant culture, maintains a resilient ethnic identity, or some hybrid reconfiguration.³¹ No surprise, then, that the racial resentment and nativism that has characterized recent racial politics in the United States often manifests itself in language politics – as manifested by recent initiatives in Florida, Arizona, California, and now Colorado and Massachusetts to legislate English as the official language or to eliminate bilingual education in public schools.³²

This paper have given us a glance into the power of language through the refracted lens of the survey interview. The choice over which language to use in conducting a survey can be a critical one. Our findings from the Latino National Politics Study show that language-of-interview effects are pervasive, powerful, and persistent. We examined a large number and broad diversity of opinion items, and find sizeable language-of-interview effects in most of them. The language in which an interview is conducted can dramatically alter our substantive understanding of a predominantly immigrant ethnic group's political beliefs, racial attitudes, and their policy preferences.

Our analyses and results are limited in two ways that bear note. First, the explanations of language-of-interview effects we have examined are neither collectively exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. For one thing, words – their style and their syntax – may be open to multiple, conflicting, and deeply subjective interpretations far and beyond the explanations we have considered. The language-of-interview may impose a interpretive lens through which the entire survey interaction is defined, much like a “framing” experiment. If the proportion of Americans who support affirmative action can be so radically altered simply by changing the words we use to define affirmative action, then such interpretive differences across languages are almost sure to explain at least some of what we find as language-of-interview effects.³³

³⁰ See, e.g., Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Hosbawm (1990), Laitin (1992), Smith (1998), Mar-Molinero (2000)

³¹ See, e.g., Gordon (1964), Glazer and Moynihan (1970), Stevens (1985, 1992), Fishman (1989), Oboler (1995), Portes (1996), Zhou and Bankston (1998).

³² See, e.g., Citrin, et al (1990), Crawford (1991, 1992), Tatalovich (1995), Schmidt (2000).

³³ See, e.g., Kinder and Sanders (1990), Iyengar (1991), Stoker (1998)

For another thing, language-of-interview effects may interact in significant, potentially problematic ways with the ethnicity of the interviewer. The psychodynamic elements of survey response – whether simple social desirability or Goffman’s interaction rituals or Sanders’ interracial dialogue – are almost surely a combination of interview and respondent phenotype, mannerisms, language, and the like. One of the important limitations of this paper, in its current version, is that the LNPS does not include any information about interviewer characteristics, including interviewer race and ethnicity. This limitation does not, it turns out, threaten the basic conclusion that language-of-interview matters. The robustness of the language-of-interview effects can be replicated forcefully using the 1999 *Washington Post*/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard University Latino Survey. This telephone survey asks respondents about the perceived ethnicity of their interviewer. The upshot is that language-of-interview effects endure, even controlling for ethnicity-of-interviewer.³⁴

Beyond these limitations, it is worth noting that language-of-interview effects are not limited to the Latino National Politics Study or to Latino mass opinion. Across a wide range of surveys, a substantial proportion of Latinos and Asian Americans opt for a non-English language-of-interview when offered a choice. In four ethnic-specific *Los Angeles Times* polls, 46 percent of Filipino-Americans, 55 percent of Chinese-Americans, 89 percent of Vietnamese-Americans, and 90 percent of Korean-Americans surveyed preferred to be interviewed in Tagalog, Vietnamese, Korean, and Cantonese or Mandarin, respectively. In each of these surveys, there are comparably significant and durable language-of-interview effects.³⁵

In addition to questions about data reliability and validity, we have seen that language-of-interview effects cannot be easily explained away. This paper has demonstrated that language effects cannot be reduced to a technical matter about sample characteristics or measurement error, or even to a psychodynamic account of interpersonal status deference. Rather, they seem to reveal something about the nature of ethnic self-expression and the particular adaptation and acculturation trajectories of immigrant ethnic groups. In the space that remains, I speculate a bit on what exactly these language-of-interview dynamics, *in toto*, tell us about Latino mass opinion and ethnic expression.

³⁴ Results are available from the author upon request. In most instances, language-of-interview appears to be a more decisive influence on Latino mass opinion than does ethnicity-of-interviewer.

³⁵ Another way to state this case is to compare the results from the LNPS to survey data on Latinos that does not offer Spanish as a language-of-interview. To do this, I pooled all codable Latino respondents in the cumulative American National Elections Studies from 1978 to 1998 (1,438 cases). There is one unsurprising, yet valuable, finding: the Latino sample in the NES looks very comparable to the English-interview respondents to the LNPS and very different from the Spanish-interview respondents to the LNPS. Thus researchers face serious limitations to making any general claims about Latino politics using the NES.

Our findings intimate that both Spanish-interview Latinos and English-interview Latinos manifest a vibrant ethnic consciousness. But the ethnic consciousness appears to differ in kind. With English-interview Latinos, the ethnic expression is distinctly rooted in and informed by the experience with race in the United States. Thus Latinos are perceived to face high levels of discrimination, but so are African Americans, Asian Americans, Jewish Americans, and women. In addition, English-interview Latinos are warmer towards Anglos, African Americans, and Jewish Americans than their Spanish-interview counterparts. English-interview respondents also adhere much more strongly to the “American ethos” of equality of opportunity. By contrast, the ethnic expression for Spanish-interview Latinos appears more rooted and informed by transnational experiences and diasporic ties. Spanish-interview respondents express significantly warmer feelings toward Latino sending countries and greater support for government spending on programs for immigrants and refugees, for bilingual education and government services, for a multicultural educational curriculum, and for immigration priorities to Latinos. The most universal expression of this transnational group consciousness is the significantly greater concern for the politics of one’s home country.

If this potential insight is correct, then focal debates in immigration scholarship between theories of assimilation or ethnic resilience may create a false dichotomy that obscures the real experiences of Latinos in the U.S.. Latino ethnicity may neither dissolve into an Anglo-American cauldron of assimilated immigrant groups, nor manifest itself as a singular, fixed racial formation. Rather, Latino ethnic expression may exhibit heterogeneous and hybrid forms. Along these lines, we have only seen the distinctiveness of ethnic expression through language. Presumably, we might find similarly distinct shades of Latino ethnic identity mediated through the lens of religion, culture, immigration histories, regional and spatial dynamics, and the like.

Finally, the findings in this paper suggest an obvious comparative analysis of language-of-interview effects for Asian Americans. This comparison merits undertaking not simply because Asians share a similar recent immigration history (a post-1965 boom), similar spatial and regional concentration (urban, California, Texas, New York), comparable ethnic heterogeneity, or even because a substantial proportion of Asians are apt to select a non-English language-of-interview if given the choice. In addition to these factors, an Asian-Latino comparison may help us to understand how the dynamics of ethnic identity differ from panethnic identity for predominantly immigrant communities of color. This is because – key commonalities notwithstanding – Latinos and Asians diverge with respect to language: while a common language is often cited as an important activating ingredient for Latino panethnicity (i.e., as “Latinos,” rather than as “Cubanos,” “Chicanas,” or “Puertoriquenos”), the absence of a common language is correspondingly implicated as an important impediment to such panethnic formations for Asians.

Table 1. Language-of-Interview Effects

<i>A. General Political Values and Policy Preferences</i>			
<i>General Political Values</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>Spanish</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Equal opportunity to succeed	95.4	75.0	-20.4
Unequal chances in life all right	34.8	55.5	+20.7
Trust in govt. officials (usually, always)	39.7	55.8	+16.1
Love for U.S. (very, extremely strong)	81.2	69.8	-11.4
Govt. role, national problems	90.0	97.2	+7.2
Govt. role, local problems	87.0	97.9	+10.9
Govt. role, Latino/in-group problems	67.6	86.1	+18.5
<i>Government Spending on Programs</i>			
Increase spending on public education	84.1	79.2	-4.9
Increase spending on welfare	37.9	44.5	+6.6
Increase spending on health care	75.9	78.8	+2.9
Increase spending on child care	72.4	69.4	-3.0
Increase spending on crime and drugs	89.1	90.3	+1.2
Increase spending, immigrants and refugees	39.2	69.0	+29.8
Increase spending on programs for in-group	64.2	72.3	+8.1
Increase spending on programs for blacks	52.5	57.7	+5.2
Increase spending on science and technology	64.2	72.3	+8.1
Increase spending on the environment	70.4	60.4	+10.0
Increase spending on defense spending	19.0	35.1	+16.1
<i>Public Policy Preferences</i>			
Support for affirmative action quotas	27.2	31.7	+3.5
Support for women's right to choose always	39.4	22.0	-17.4
Support for the death penalty	65.1	53.8	-11.3
<i>B. Feeling Thermometer Toward Nations and Groups</i>			
<i>Latino Home Countries</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>Spanish</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Cuba	36.7	42.4	+5.7
Mexico	61.8	64.5	+2.7
Nicaragua	38.6	40.2	+1.6
Puerto Rico	63.0	67.6	+4.6
Venezuela	51.8	54.0	+2.2
<i>Latino Groups</i>			
Cubans in the U.S.	54.5	66.3	+11.8
Mexican Americans	78.0	69.5	-8.5
Mexican Immigrants	62.6	68.3	+5.7
Puerto Ricans in the U.S.	62.9	67.8	+4.9
Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico	64.9	69.9	+5.0
<i>Other Groups in the U.S.</i>			
Anglos	73.5	71.2	-3.3
African Americans	63.6	56.9	-6.7
Asian Americans	53.9	53.7	-0.2
Jewish Americans	55.9	50.3	-5.6

C. Perceived Level of Discrimination Faced by Groups

<i>Latino Groups</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>Spanish</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Cuban Americans: None/A Little	29.3	62.8	+33.5
Mexican Americans: None/A Little	19.7	42.4	+22.7
Puerto Ricans: None/A Little	26.0	62.1	+36.1
<i>Other Groups in the U.S.</i>			
African Americans: None/A Little	13.1	37.9	+24.8
Asian Americans: None/A Little	38.8	71.8	+33.0
Jewish Americans: None/A Little	48.4	77.2	+28.8
Women: None/A Little	34.1	62.9	+28.8

D. Language, Immigration, and Home Country Politics

<i>Language Policy</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>Spanish</i>	<i>Difference</i>
English as official language	45.7	35.1	-10.6
Govt. services in English only	11.3	3.0	-8.3
Businesses requiring English only	30.5	18.6	-11.9
English as citizenship requirement	90.2	90.8	+0.6
Only or mostly teach U.S. history/culture	52.6	37.9	-14.7
Oppose bilingual education	8.5	2.4	-6.1
Oppose more spending for bilingual education	35.7	28.6	-7.1
<i>Immigration Policy</i>			
Too many immigrants to U.S.	73.5	72.8	-0.7
Jobs to citizens, not immigrants	46.5	39.3	-7.2
No immigration priority to Latinos	65.8	40.0	-25.8
<i>Home Country Politics</i>			
Re-establish ties with Cuba	35.2	32.4	-2.8
Puerto Rican statehood	24.4	17.3	-7.1
U.S. to blame for Mexican econ crisis	5.5	4.0	-1.5
Greater U.S. role in Central America	45.0	55.5	+10.5
Central Am. unrest due to poverty/hum rights	62.9	53.5	-9.4
Concern US politics more than home country	82.2	42.6	-39.6

Table 2. Demographic and Political Profile Comparisons

	<i>English</i>	<i>Spanish</i>
Age	35.2 years	45.3 years
Education	11.5 years	8 years
Family Income	\$20-25,000	\$15-17,000
Male	42.1%	41.5%
Immigrant	26.0%	90.6%
Full-time	50.6%	43.0%
Home-owner	36.1%	30.6%
Married	45.9%	53.8%
Catholic	71.2%	82.0%
Party: Democrat	58.6%	44.1%
Independent	19.8%	15.6%
Republican	21.6%	40.3%
Ideology: Liberal	28.9%	26.1%
Moderate	33.5%	22.8%
Conservative	37.7%	51.2%
Citizen	91.3%	44.0%

Anglos	.046 (2.29)	.057 (2.44)	.109 (3.52)	.010 (0.33)	.035 (1.70)	.068 (2.61)	-.003 (0.12)	.038 (1.03)
African Americans	.130 (6.46)	.056 (2.36)	-.019 (0.61)	-.001 (0.03)	.106 (5.15)	.100 (3.80)	.029 (1.06)	-.011 (0.30)
Asian Americans	.005 (0.23)	-.079 (3.26)	-.008 (0.25)	.038 (1.35)	-.013 (0.63)	.021 (0.78)	-.074 (2.64)	-.041 (1.06)
Jewish Americans	.102 (4.88)	.083 (3.43)	.113 (3.54)	.063 (2.09)	.089 (4.17)	.107 (4.04)	.023 (0.81)	.089 (2.33)
<i>Perceived Discrimination: Latinos</i>								
Cuban Americans	.353 (19.15)	.265 (12.25)	.147 (5.30)	.243 (9.31)	.342 (17.88)	.305 (13.03)	.257 (10.46)	.129 (3.92)
Mexican Americans	.209 (10.93)	.113 (5.10)	-.004 (0.15)	.100 (3.71)	.189 (9.59)	.146 (6.01)	.099 (3.91)	.003 (0.08)
Puerto Ricans	.358 (19.45)	.269 (12.48)	.118 (4.42)	.208 (8.03)	.342 (18.01)	.206 (8.96)	.240 (9.96)	.087 (2.75)
<i>Perceived Discrimin: Other Groups</i>								
African Americans	.280 (14.97)	.182 (8.40)	.078 (2.82)	.176 (6.63)	.261 (13.49)	.203 (8.51)	.187 (7.43)	.086 (2.58)
Asian Americans	.353 (19.17)	.278 (12.89)	.150 (5.37)	.192 (7.40)	.340 (17.79)	.298 (12.72)	.231 (9.28)	.097 (2.89)
Jewish Americans	.332 (17.70)	.264 (12.01)	.114 (4.05)	.225 (8.45)	.325 (16.72)	.276 (11.54)	.231 (9.12)	.090 (2.66)
Women	.304 (16.32)	.226 (10.52)	.112 (4.07)	.183 (6.92)	.282 (14.61)	.203 (8.62)	.210 (8.40)	.105 (3.20)
<i>Language Policy</i>								
English as official language	-.085 (4.39)	-.115 (4.98)	-.061 (2.00)	-.061 (2.21)	-.100 (4.98)	-.064 (2.52)	-.004 (0.16)	.058 (1.60)
Govt. services in non-English	-.205 (10.74)	-.196 (8.69)	-.141 (4.71)	-.052 (1.92)	-.208 (10.47)	-.177 (7.09)	-.062 (2.40)	-.016 (0.44)
Businesses English-only	-.114 (5.88)	-.106 (4.57)	-.083 (2.76)	.000 (0.00)	-.116 (5.73)	-.123 (4.83)	-.033 (1.26)	-.009 (0.24)
English-only, citizens	-.021 (1.06)	-.011 (0.47)	.026 (0.86)	.062 (2.25)	.000 (.002)	-.011 (0.42)	.053 (1.97)	.050 (1.35)
Multicultural education	-.136 (7.07)	-.119 (5.30)	-.143 (4.90)	-.086 (3.12)	-.125 (6.24)	-.143 (5.73)	-.081 (3.08)	-.121 (3.42)
Bilingual education	-.160 (8.28)	-.162 (7.03)	-.133 (4.38)	-.069 (2.51)	-.169 (8.40)	-.138 (5.45)	-.103 (3.93)	-.071 (1.96)
Spending for bilingual ed	-.076 (3.92)	-.096 (4.18)	-.134 (4.53)	-.081 (2.93)	-.103 (5.13)	-.082 (3.24)	-.104 (3.94)	-.086 (2.39)
<i>Immigration Policy</i>								
Jobs to citizens	-.067 (3.47)	-.144 (6.37)	-.017 (0.59)	.004 (0.14)	-.092 (4.58)	.025 (0.98)	-.068 (2.52)	-.024 (0.66)
Too many immigrants	.001 (0.04)	-.025 (1.06)	.031 (1.03)	.030 (1.07)	.008 (0.40)	-.045 (1.76)	-.002 (0.08)	.009 (0.25)
No immigration priority to Latinos	.268 (14.28)	.228 (10.28)	.231 (8.02)	.198 (7.38)	.254 (13.09)	.204 (8.42)	.227 (9.00)	.199 (5.77)
<i>Home Country Politics</i>								
Re-establish ties with Cuba	-.014 (0.73)	.047 (2.06)	.048 (1.57)	.009 (0.33)	.029 (1.45)	.006 (0.23)	.042 (1.56)	.037 (1.00)
Mexican economic crisis	-.047 (2.44)	.007 (0.31)	.029 (0.95)	-.018 (0.66)	-.015 (0.74)	-.057 (2.23)	.018 (0.67)	.009 (0.27)
Puerto Rican statehood	-.098 (5.05)	-.051 (2.21)	-.010 (0.32)	-.064 (2.33)	-.066 (3.26)	-.066 (2.60)	-.042 (1.59)	-.044 (1.20)
U.S. role in Central America	.103 (5.24)	.088 (3.76)	-.022 (0.77)	.013 (0.45)	.090 (4.43)	.084 (3.34)	.032 (1.22)	-.038 (1.06)
Central American unrest	-.015 (0.77)	.005 (0.21)	-.035 (1.14)	-.023 (0.81)	.008 (0.39)	-.021 (0.82)	-.027 (1.00)	-.097 (2.60)
Concern for home country	-.375 (20.77)	-.373 (17.65)	-.231 (8.47)	-.212 (8.35)	-.366 (19.47)	-.281 (11.94)	-.238 (9.81)	-.185 (5.66)
<i>Number of Significant Items</i>	48	47	35	36	45	45	37	25

Table 4 Determinants of Language-of-Interview Choice

<i>DEMI</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>Odds-Ratio</i>
Age	-.054	1.55	0.95
Age squared	.000	1.20	1.00
Education in years	.169	5.34	1.18
Family income	.050	1.81	1.05
Full-time employ	-.328	1.65	0.72
Home owner	-.159	0.71	0.85
Male	.497	2.58	1.64
Married	-.591	3.08	0.55
White	.004	0.02	1.00
<hr/>			
<i>DEM2</i>			
Immigrant	-1.752	3.98	0.17
Age immigrated	-.064	4.68	0.94
Generation	-1.450	3.86	0.24
Cuban	-.662	2.12	0.52
Puerto Rican	-.199	0.73	0.82
<hr/>			
<i>LANGUAGE</i>			
Language ability	-.092	1.04	0.91
Language use	.786	8.32	2.20
Bilinguality	.301	0.71	1.35
<hr/>			
<i>SOCDES</i>			
Cooperative	-.288	2.15	0.75
Understanding	-.087	0.76	0.92
Skin color	.073	0.78	1.08
Third party presence	.631	1.98	1.88
Third party time	-.257	2.38	0.77
Self-control	-.116	1.56	0.89
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<i>POLASSIM</i>			
Citizenship	.824	2.86	2.28
Partisanship (Democrat)	-.071	0.60	0.93
Ideology (Conservative)	.051	0.99	1.05
Political knowledge	-.045	0.96	0.96
Media exposure	-.053	2.24	0.95
Political attention	.131	1.54	1.14
Political participation	.008	0.13	1.01
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<i>ETHID</i>			
Linked fate	-.409	4.76	0.66
Political group consciousness	-.180	2.97	0.84
Common culture	-.178	1.33	0.84
Political attention to group issues	.052	0.60	1.05
Media exposure (Spanish news)	-.351	2.15	0.70
Experienced discrimination	.068	0.37	1.07
Social interaction, in-group only	.003	0.08	1.00
Puerto Rican pop density	-.184	3.14	0.83

Chicano pop density	-0.063	1.83	0.94
Cubano pop density	-.153	3.05	0.86
Constant	3.349	2.65	
<hr/> <i>MODEL SUMMARY STATISTICS</i>			
Sample size			1935
Log likelihood			492.23
Percent predicted (null = 55.0)			55.9
McFadden's pseudo-R-squared			0.63
<hr/> <i>COMPARATIVE STATICS</i>			
		pseudo-R	LR test (df)
w/o Dem1 variables		0.60	164.41 (9)
w/o Dem2 variables		0.53	359.11 (14)
w/o Language variables		0.60	78.23 (3)
w/o SocDes variables		0.62	47.85 (6)
w/o PolAssim variables		0.62	76.31 (7)
w/o EthId variables		0.61	197.38 (10)
<hr/>			

Table 5. Explaining Language-of-interview Effects, by Ethnicity*

	<i>Mexican</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban</i>
Bivariate	49	43	40
Sample bias (<i>Dem1</i>)	40	23	32
Sample bias (<i>Dem2</i>)	44	25	33
Measurement error (<i>Language</i>)	35	18	29
Social desirability (<i>SocDes</i>)	42	30	33
Ideological desirability (<i>PolAssim</i>)	31	34	30
Ethnic expression (<i>EthId</i>)	35	20	27
All variables (sig if $p < .05$)	21	8	15
All variables (sig if $p < .10$)	26	11	20

*cell entries are the number of items from Table 1 for which language-of-interview is a significant independent variable. The model estimated is the same as in Table 3.

Appendix. Question Wording on Dependent Variables

Equal opportunity: “Tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements: Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed?”

Fair chance: “Tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements: It is OK if some people have more of a chance in life than others?”

Trust in government: “How much of the time do you think you can trust government officials to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?”

Government role: “Which of the following two statements best describes your views about this problem – One: A lot of progress can be made on this problem without involving the government, Two: In order to make substantial progress on this problem the government will have to get involved” where the problem is the most important one facing “this country today,” facing “people in your (city/county),” and facing the respondent’s ethnic group.

Government spending: “Now we would like to ask you about your views on various types of government programs. As I read each program, tell me if you would like to see it increased even if it meant paying more taxes, if you would like to see it decreased or if you would leave it the same ...

- ... improving and protecting the environment”
- ... public education”
- ... public assistance or welfare”
- ... medical or health care”
- ... programs to support science and technology”
- ... child care services”
- ... programs to help legal immigrants and refugees”
- ... defense spending”
- ... crime control and drug prevention”
- ... programs to help (respondent’s ethnic group)”
- ... programs to help blacks”

Abortion policy: “Which one of the statement on the card best agrees with your view? By law: 1—an abortion should never be permitted, 2—an abortion should be permitted only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger, 3—an abortion should be permitted but only after the need for abortion has been clearly established, or 4—a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice?”

Death penalty: “For persons convicted of murder, do you favor or oppose the death penalty?”

Affirmative action: “The following statements cover issues that are in the news these days. In each scale, the number 1 represents a position held by some people, the number 5 represents an opposing position, and the numbers 2 through 4 stand for positions between these two ... What number best describes your opinion on this issue? One: The government should establish quotas

in college admissions and job hiring to insure (respondent's ethnic group/Hispanic) representation. Five: College admission and job hiring should be based strictly on merit.”

English as official language: “Laws should be passed making English the official language of this country. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?”

Government services in non-English language: “Government agencies should provide services in Spanish and other languages to non-English speaking clients. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?”

English only by businesses: “Businesses have the right to require that employees speak only English during working hours. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?”

English as citizenship requirement: “All citizens and resident of the U.S. should learn English. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?”

Multicultural education: “Should (respondent's ethnic group) children in U.S. schools study the history and culture of: 1—only the United States, 2—both the U.S. and (respondent's home country), but more about the U.S., 3—both the U.S. and (respondent's home country) equally, 4—both the U.S. and (respondent's home country), but more about (respondent's home country), or 5—only study the history and culture of (respondent's home country)?”

Bilingual education: “How strongly do you support or oppose bilingual education?”

Willingness to pay for bilingual education: “Would you be willing to pay more taxes to expand bilingual education?”

Immigration flow: “There are too many immigrants coming to this country? Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?”

Job priorities to citizens: “If a citizen and an immigrant apply for the same job, the citizen should be hired. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?”

Immigration preferences to Latinos: “Latin Americans should have preferences over people from other countries who want to immigrate to the U.S. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?”

Cuba policy: “Some people say that the U.S. government should begin immediately to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. Others are opposed to this. What do you think? Do you think that the U.S. government should: 1—begin immediately to re-establish relations, 2—or should not reestablish relations?”

Puerto Rico policy: “Some people want Puerto Rico to become a state, others want it to become independent, and others want it to remain as it is, a Commonwealth. What do you think? Do you think that Puerto Rico should: 1—become a state, 2—become independent, 3—or remain as a Commonwealth?”

Mexico policy: “Some people say that U.S. policies are a major cause of Mexico’s economic crisis; others say that governmental corruption and inefficiency in Mexico are an even greater cause of Mexico’s problems. Which do you think is a greater problem for Mexico: 1—U.S. policies, 2—or governmental corruption and inefficiency in Mexico?”

U.S. in Central America: “Some people think that the U.S. government should be more involved in the internal affairs of Central American countries. Others think it should be less involved in this area ... Do you think the U.S. should be 1—more involved, 2—or less involved?”

Cause of unrest in Central America: “Which do you think is the greater cause of unrest in Central America today: 1—subversion from Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, 2—or poverty and the lack of human rights in the area?”

Concern for home country politics: “Are you 1—more concerned about government and politics in (R’s home country), 2—or more concerned about government and politics in the U.S.?”

Feeling thermometer: “I am going to read the names of some countries. Rate each country using this feeling thermometer. You may use any number from 0 to 100 for rating. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the country. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel too favorable toward the country ...

- ... Mexico
- ... Puerto Rico
- ... Nicaragua
- ... Cuba
- ... Venezuela
- ... Mexican Americans
- ... Mexican immigrants
- ... blacks
- ... Puerto Ricans in the U.S.
- ... Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico
- ... Anglos
- ... Cubans in the U.S.
- ... Asian Americans (such as Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and other groups)
- ... Jewish Americans

Discrimination faced by different groups: “Now I would like to ask you about how much discrimination or unfair treatment you think different groups face in the U.S. Do you think the following groups face a lot of discrimination, some, a little, or no discrimination at all? ...

- ... blacks
- ... Asian Americans (such as Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and other groups)
- ... Mexican origin people
- ... Cuban Americans
- ... Puerto Ricans
- ... women
- ... Jewish Americans

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