

**John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Faculty Research Working Papers Series**

**Bridging Networks, Social Capital, and
Racial Segregation in America**

Xavier de Souza Briggs

January 2003

RWP02-011

The views expressed in the KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or Harvard University. All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s). Papers may be downloaded for personal use only.

Bridging Networks, Social Capital, and Racial Segregation in America

Xavier de Souza Briggs
Harvard University and MIT

January 2003

John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA, 02138, U.S.A.
617.496.2776

Comments welcome at: xavier_briggs@harvard.edu

The author is the Martin Luther King, Jr. Visiting Fellow in Urban Studies and Planning at MIT and a faculty member (on leave) at Harvard. This draft was prepared for seminar presentation at the University of Cambridge, England, January 28, 2003. An earlier version was presented at Harvard in February 2002, and some of the ideas were presented at the International Seminar on Segregation in the City, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A., July 2001. For helpful advice, I am grateful to Keith Hampton, Peter Marcuse, Robert Putnam, Tom Sander, David Varady, Barry Wellman, and William Julius Wilson. Meghan Dolan, Marilyn Milliken, and Michael New provided invaluable assistance with data access.

BRIDGING NETWORKS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICA

Xavier de Souza Briggs

January 2003

Abstract. Recent work on social capital has underlined the importance of networks and other ties among socially dissimilar persons (bridging ties). The resources stored in such ties are thought to play a uniquely vital role in the social, economic, and political life of diverse societies, expanding identities, opening up insular communities of interest, containing ethnic and other inter-group conflicts, and reducing inter-group status inequalities, e.g., by widening access to valuable information and social endorsements. In the U.S, *interracial* ties are particularly significant and worth strengthening because of the country's long-standing racial divide, the increased ethnic diversity associated with rapid immigration, and the tendency for racial and socio-economic divisions to correlate. Yet little up-to-date empirical evidence exists on the array of factors that shape interracial bridging – or, conversely, racial isolation – in Americans' personal networks or formal associations. Using a phone survey of 29 communities matched with census data, this study analyzes effects of individual, associational, and spatial factors. A path model is specified. While higher educational attainment, non-religious organizational involvement, and socializing with co-workers are robust and encouraging predictors of interracial bridging for all groups, effects of religious involvement vary. Notably, the great civic generation of older Americans is also the most racially insular in the case of whites. There is some evidence that residential segregation exerts direct or indirect inhibiting effects on bridging, at a minimum through selection effects of residential choice. Finally, low-income, less educated minorities who report having at least one white friend are also much more likely to have friends with comparatively higher status and influence.

Introduction

In the late 1960s, a Catholic priest working in a high-poverty, mostly black inner-city neighborhood used ties to wealthy, politically connected suburban parishes to launch what would become one of the largest and most successful nonprofit community development organizations in America, the New Community Corporation in Newark, New Jersey. In Monterey Park, California, America's "first Chinese-American suburb," cross-cutting class and ethnic ties built over years of civic organizing have fueled a rich politics of diversity, helping the community of whites, Hispanics, and Asian Americans adapt to the kinds of sweeping economic and demographic changes now facing many American communities (Horton 1995). And somewhere in America, right now, a mentoring connection to a middle-

class professional is enabling a teenager from a disadvantaged background to obtain a life-changing college scholarship.

On individual as well as collective levels, *bridging* ties – informal personal networks, formal associations, and other connections among socially dissimilar persons or groups – are uniquely important in social life as well as social theory. By connecting persons and other social “sites” with distinct traits, such ties often constitute bridges across roles, status differences, material and symbolic interests, space, norms, and even worldviews. Bridging ties are particularly crucial when they bind *diverse* societies, expanding social and civic identities, opening up insular communities of interest, containing ethnic and other inter-group conflicts, and reducing inter-group status inequalities, for example by widening access to valuable information and conferring endorsements across higher and lower status group lines. As exceptions to the rule of “homophily” in social relations, ties among birds of *different* feathers are important in public as well as private life and in multiple dimensions – social, economic, and political.

Sociologists have shown a particularly long interest in bridging ties, most explicitly in such classics as Laumann’s (1973) study of social differentiation and social distance in urban networks, Granovetter’s (1973) essay on the significance of “weak” ties, and Blau’s analyses of cross-cutting social circles and stratification in society (Blau 1977; Blau and Schwartz 1984), but also in analyses of status attainment that emphasize the benefits of diverse social contacts (seminally, Granovetter 1974; review in Lin 1999). Further back, Simmel’s (1923) work on multiple identities, intersections, and “webs” of group affiliation helped define modern life in complex societies. More than any other influence, though, it is political scientist Robert Putnam’s work on social capital that has turned a scholarly concern for bridging ties into a public concern in recent years, encouraged attention to the multiple benefits of bridges (rather than the more specialized foci traditionally applied in subfields of social science), and stirred an activist interest in creating more bridging ties and, through them, more “bridging social capital” (Putnam 2000; also Briggs 1997; Gittel and Vidal 1998).

Acknowledging the social support and other historically important functions played by ties among *like* persons – i.e., by *bonding* social capital in America – Putnam’s widely read *Bowling Alone* (2000) highlights the urgency of creating more bridging capital in a society marked by rapid social change and civic disengagement. More recently, in a far-ranging analysis of social capital in eight advanced democracies, Putnam and collaborators offer a pointed case for bridging:

It is true ... that without the natural restraints imposed by members’ crosscutting alliances and diverse perspectives, tightly knit and homogeneous groups can rather easily combine for sinister ends. In other words, bonding without bridging equals Bosnia. (Putnam and Goss 2002, pp.11-12)

As Putnam and others have reminded us, networks and formal associations (civic clubs, faith institutions, etc.) that bond along one dimension of social identity (socio-

economic status, for example) can bridge on others (race and gender, say). Such *cross-cutting* ties are quite significant but understudied, as we will see.

In the U.S, *interracial* ties are among the most precious social bridges, and bridges well worth extending, for several reasons: first, the country's long-standing racial divide and deep ambivalence, beneath the creed *e pluribus unum*, about racial and ethnic differences; second, the increased racial diversity¹ associated with rapid, largely non-white immigration in recent decades, particularly to metropolitan areas (Zhou 2001); and finally, the tendency for race and class differences to be correlated, exacerbating inequality and complicating its politics (Blau and Schwartz 1984; Loury 2001; Wilson 1999).

The local dynamics of race bridging vary widely, of course, and history casts a long shadow. As the *Boston Magazine* observed recently, for example, in a look at the significance of race thirty years after Boston's "crisis" of racial desegregation in public schools, "In this town, where blacks and whites have been singing different tunes for years, the two groups are still struggling to find common ground" (Most 2002, p.105). The black/white divide remains especially newsworthy in America and undeniably unique given the legacy of slavery. But bridging ties between whites and all other groups are important in light of ethnically diverse immigration, the lower rate of natural increase in the white population, suburbanization, and other demographic and cultural trends. This may reflect a more global urgency, for as Putnam and Goss (2002, p.15) observe, "In some respects, the growing ethnic heterogeneity of the established democracies (as well as the nativist backlash that has often accompanied this change) is the most striking commonality among [advanced democratic societies]."

Using a uniquely detailed telephone survey of civic engagement, social attitudes, and social networks in 29 locales (differing widely in racial make-up and covering all major U.S. regions), and matching those data with census data on population subgroups and racial segregation, this study analyzes predictors of interracial bridging in friendship ties. A structural equation model is specified to handle *direct* effects of individual (respondent) traits and spatial (ecological) factors on bridging, as well as *indirect* effects that may work through associational participation or other intervening factors.

The contribution of this study is three-fold. First, while there is considerable published data describing the extent of network diversity or lack of the same, little up-to-date empirical evidence exists on the array of factors that *predict* interracial bridging (or, conversely, racial isolation) in Americans' personal networks. This includes factors related to the local or "community" context in which most work, play, worship, and other face-to-face

¹ Mindful of the debates in social science and public conversation about the usefulness of the terms "race" and "ethnicity," in this paper, I opt for "race" and "racial" as shorthand for "racial and ethnic." Both race and ethnicity have been employed in the social network literature (see, e.g., Briggs 1998; Fischer 1982), but *race* is more commonly employed in reference to residential segregation in the U.S. (see, e.g., Lewis Mumford Center 2001; Massey 2001). In such usage, "race" in fact encompasses the five principal classifications that combine, however imperfectly, racial *and* ethnic ancestry: white non-

elements of everyday life are conducted, in which both intense ethnic subcultures and pluralist ties can emerge (Fischer 1982). The notion that living apart—residential segregation by race—segregates networks is largely that, for example: an untested notion with important implications in a society characterized by stubbornly high rates of segregation, particularly in older cities (Lewis Mumford Center 2001; Massey 2001). Second, studies that explore effects of local context on bridging and other network traits have thus far been limited to a single city or metro area, for example Detroit (Fischer 1977; Laumann 1973; Verbrugge 1973; Welch et al. 2001), Northern California (Fischer 1982), and Philadelphia (Yancey, Erickson and Leon 1985). This multi-city, multi-region study allows us to explore possible context effects in a wide array of dimensions. Finally, key drivers of bridging ties may operate through direct causation or more indirectly, such as by shaping participation in civic, religious, or other associations, habits of work-based socializing, or other aspects of social life. Such path effects have not been directly analyzed to date; previous analysts have relied on single-equation models to make inferences. The next section outlines previous research on the causes and consequences of bridging ties. The subsequent sections cover data and method, the statistical model and results, and key implications.

Bridging Ties and “Birds of a Feather”

In part because of the analytic complexities and diverse methodological traditions involved, distinct literatures have addressed the causes and the consequences of bridging ties, including race bridges. Each of these literatures, in turn, is fed by a considerable variety of specific research concerns. This is perhaps most evident in the fact that benefits of bridging and cross-cutting ties have been explored by students of collective action and democratic politics as well as by those building network models of individual status attainment.

Predictors of Bridging

The observation that bridging or pluralism is the exception rather than the rule in social relations is literally age old. The folk wisdom that “birds of a feather flock together” — *homophily*, in the label employed first by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) — has been traced back at least as far as the ancient Greeks in the Western tradition. Plato expressed it quite directly: “similarity begets friendship” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001, p.416), and the attractions of similarity have been confirmed in countless empirical studies. This holds most powerfully for race/ethnicity, followed by class status and religion, but also for gender, age, functional role (e.g., in an organization), behavior patterns, and even attitudes, beliefs, and aspirations (review in McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).

As a basic organizing principle of human life, homophily or bonding among like actors is nearly universal, though the degree to which social relations are structured along any given dimension, e.g., by similarity in religious affiliation, appears to vary significantly across societies. Moreover, while homophily shapes many types of relationships, it appears

Hispanic (Anglo); black non-Hispanic; ethnic Hispanic (of any race); Asian American/Pacific Islander; and Native American/American Indian.

to act more powerfully on close or strong ties, including marriage and friendships, than on acquaintanceships or other “weak” ties (Marsden 1988). Granovetter’s (1973) classic essay on “the strength of weak ties” highlighted this to make a powerful case for the social consequences of bridging, to which I will turn in a moment. But race bridging is relatively uncommon in close friendships, through which important material exchanges, everyday expressive support, and attitudinal influence operate (Jackson 1977). Using the General Social Survey, the first survey with network data representative of a national population, Marsden (1987) found that only 8% of Americans with networks of size two or more reported discussing “important matters” with a person of another race—less than one-seventh the heterogeneity that population sizes alone would predict if relational choices were purely random. Larger networks tended to be more racially diverse.

Human relationships reflect choice as well as opportunity and constraint. Relationships vary distinctly across the life course and are shaped by a variety of contexts or foci, including neighborhood, school, work, and civic and religious organizations. Moreover, our ascriptive traits, such as gender, and achieved statuses, such as higher levels of education, shape friendship and other social ties.

Research on homophily reveals, in effect, three keys to the formation of the exceptional (non-homophilous) ties that are bridges. The first is “baseline” *opportunity for contact* (baseline homophily) measured by population or pool sizes, and its significance is clearest in majority-group networks (Blau 1977; Blau and Schwartz 1984; McPherson, Miller, and Smith-Lovin 2001). One reason the average white American’s social ties are mostly to other whites is that most whites live, work, worship, and mobilize politically in majority-white milieus, i.e., where other whites are abundant. Random contact and affiliation alone would predict mostly white ties for the “typical” member of the racial majority group in America. Indeed, white non-Hispanics (Anglos) have the most racially homogeneous networks of any Americans. African-Americans and Hispanics’ networks show moderate levels of homogeneity, and Asian Americans and smaller ethnic groups tend to report networks dominated by the majority racial group (Marsden 1987; review in McPherson, Miller, and Smith-Lovin 2001). Pool or population size, preferably in a milieu conducive to interaction and relationship building, is thus the first basis for bridging ties, just as it is for bonding ones.

The second factor encompasses personal preferences as well as effects of associations or other substructures that favor in-group ties within a larger population pool. The power of this factor—*in-breeding* homophily, in the lingo—is most evident in minority-group networks (Laumann 1973; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). In-breeding helps explain the deviation of network composition from what group population sizes alone would predict if social ties were chosen at random (McPherson, Miller, and Smith-Lovin 2001). Even in majority-white milieus, racial minorities tend to report high proportions of co-ethnics in their non-kin networks. In some cases, these non-kin networks are majority minority even in cases where minority respondents spend most waking hours outside the home in majority-white workplaces and other institutional settings.

The National Organization study found that 34% of all business establishments in the U.S. are “all white,” while the median firm is 80% white (Kalleberg et al. 1996). And where workplaces are racially mixed on the whole, occupational and other structures often promote racial segregation within. In a study of pluralist ethnic relations in California’s Silicon Valley, for example, Fernandez and Nichols (2002, p.14) note, “Hispanic Americans work alongside European and Asian Americans in the Valley’s most lucrative industries but in ‘invisible’ occupations as janitors and gardeners,” and Waldinger (1996) and others have shown how pervasive ethnic-occupational niching is in some of America’s most ethnically diverse labor markets. But the most studied products of in-breeding are the racially segregated friendships found in many officially *desegregated* primary and secondary schools in America (review in Schofeld 1995). Race homophily appears to increase steadily over the early part of the life course, beginning in the early grades; by middle school, only 10% of expected (random-model) friendships are observed. In both school and adult studies, African Americans show more in-breeding homophily than do whites (McPherson, Miller, and Smith-Lovin 2001).

Where relational *preferences* per se are concerned, the powerful attraction of co-ethnics reflects a variety of shared traits, such as language (or code or dialect), regional or national origin, tastes and normative disposition, physical appearance (physiognomy and/or dress), and more (Laumann 1973; Blau and Schwartz 1984). Out-breeding, or the tendency toward bridging ties to out-groups, lacking historical endowments of such powerful social glue, hinges on discovering or creating such traits as shared or potentially shared interests, activities, tastes, and attitudes – a process that residential and associational segregation should undermine.² Associational life is particularly important for the formation of bridging ties, as it enables the recognition of mutuality, as well as the activation and maintenance of tangible ties. On the flip side, associations, by requiring intentional commitments, also sort in ways that favor ethnic bonding (Jackson 1977).³

Friendship and other strong ties bridging *multiple* divides – say, race as well as socio-economic status differences – are particularly uncommon in America (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). In general, such differences are often compounded – or “consolidated,” to use Blau’s term – and thus operate together to make networks more homogeneous and insular. In their study of 125 metro areas using 1970 census data, Blau and Schwartz (1984) found race and socio-economic consolidation to be most extensive in metro areas with high proportions of nonwhites, which may capture pro-segregative ecological and traits of those metros, such as an historic reliance on manufacturing jobs (Farley and Frey

² Citing longitudinal linguistic research, for example, Massey and Denton (1993, pp.162-165) note that Black English has become more uniform among blacks over the past few decades – that is, a more distinct group boundary. It is the only spoken code or dialect in America that has shown this pattern, a testament to the uniquely high and persistent rates of segregation faced by blacks.

³ Strongly held racial attitudes and formative experiences in which race is salient (or dominant), such as experiences of racial discrimination, may affect in-breeding preferences as well. But whatever their sources, relational preferences should not be assumed to fully *determine* relational choices, especially where pool availability or economic or institutional incentives seem to demand bridging.

1994).⁴ In effect, though, most so-called “bridging” ties in America are necessarily *cross-cutting* ones, bridging on some dimension of interest while bonding on others – a feature important both for creating more bridging ties and for understanding their consequences.

Beyond opportunity for contact and one’s own preferences, others’ preferences also shape relational choices and outcomes. This third factor includes preferences by individual others but also *agency by groups*. The latter may include inward pressure to associated with one’s own group, outward pressure from one’s own group aimed selectively at out-groups deemed desirable (for status advancement, historical similarity, or other reasons), exclusionary pressure by out-groups, or all of the above. Historical cross-group animus, a strong norm of cultural and religious preservation, perceived economic threat or opportunity, political conflicts or other polarizing episodes, and other factors may all contribute to this kind of group agency for or against bridging ties, for which empirical evidence is primarily qualitative (see, e.g., Rieder 1985). In some contexts, crossing group lines becomes anything but a neutral act.

Residential segregation by race is presumed to interact perniciously with all three factors favoring bonding over bridging, limiting opportunity for cross-group contact, increasing in-group salience by adding territorial differences to other cross-group differences, perpetuating negative stereotypes, and more. True, neighbors tend to be casual contacts rather than socially significant ties (Wellman 1996), and this is especially true where neighborhoods are heterogeneous in race, religion, and other dimensions (Gans 1967; Greenbaum and Greenbaum 1985).⁵ Compounding this, lower travel and communication costs have reduced the effort required to maintain relationships at a distance – and, through on-line “community,” expanded the scale and variety of potential relationships (Wellman 2001). Long before personal computing or the internet became ubiquitous in the developed economies, spatial communities (neighborhoods) were in many instances less significant for social relations than “personal communities” or networks (Wellman and Leighton 1979). Etzioni’s (1959) characterization of the contextual extremes remains illuminating more than forty years later: on one end, geographically-based “totalistic” ethnic community, with primarily localized interactions and heavy dependence on local institutions (probably evident now mainly in language-isolated immigrant enclave neighborhoods), and on the other, geographically dispersed social worlds in which ethnicity “activates” only in limited social situations – wired, place-less, portable identity in today’s terms.

The extra-local character of strong ties is true of inner cities as well as suburbs, and of mostly minority as well as predominantly white areas, though some variation has been observed. Urban blacks have somewhat stronger social ties in their neighborhoods (Oliver

⁴ That is, education, occupation, religion, and other homophilies multiply the effect of race homophily beyond what race-specific preferences and opportunity for contact alone would produce in the way of segregated ties. This should be most true where racial differences align with relationally significant *threshold* divides, such as that between persons with and without college education, as well as white and blue collar occupations (McPherson, Miller, and Smith-Lovin 2001).

⁵ Fischer (1982) found the social ties of the poor to be generally more localized (and also smaller and more strained) than those of the more affluent. On poverty, localism, and networks, see Briggs (1998).

1988), and the social worlds of blacks in areas of ghetto poverty seem to have become more socially and geographically insular – “ghetto-bound,” to use the 1960s label – as these areas transformed socially and economically (Wilson 1987; Fernandez and Harris 1992). Pedder (1991), for example, met black residents of Chicago’s South Side who had never been downtown and who rarely left their neighborhoods at all or associated with non-blacks. Wellman (1971) found quite cosmopolitan attitudes and habits, including racial border crossing, among inner-city minority youth in Pittsburgh 25 years earlier, when urban schools were much more racially integrated. Finally, immigrant ethnic enclaves and areas of extreme physical isolation also tend to localize their residents’ ties (Fischer 1982).

Two studies have directly investigated associations among neighborhood racial make-up, social ties (including interracial or inter-ethnic friendships), and organizational participation. Using a 1975 survey of Philadelphia, Yancey, Ericksen, and Leon (1985) found that four clusters of in-bred friendship networks, in effect distinct worlds of close relations: African-Americans who associated regardless of religion; Puerto Ricans who did the same; Jewish Americans who associated regardless of national origin (Polish, Russian, etc.); and a large cluster of mostly white, non-Hispanic Protestants and Catholic who associated regardless of national origin. While residential dissimilarity (segregation) and friendship dissimilarity among ethnic groups were highly correlated, the authors remind us that this is partly a matter of selection effects (like friends recommend and choose like neighborhoods) and not strictly of residence driving social relations. In general, the researchers found friendship and associational involvement alike to be more residentially embedded primarily for respondents with less education who lived in stable communities. These were largely working-class white ethnics still clinging to Philadelphia’s declining industrial base. Many were long-time homeowners of modest means with few prospects of “trading up” into new neighborhoods. Finally, differences in political attitudes (liberal, conservative) and racial prejudice were large explained by status, not ethnicity, though lower status respondents were more likely to show prejudice *and* racially insular friendships.

Using a 1992 survey of metropolitan Detroit, Welch et al. (2001) found that living in mixed-race neighborhoods generally predicted more casual interracial contact, more interracial friendships, and less prejudice and stereotyping on the part of both whites and blacks. This was true for both city dwellers and suburbanites. Here again, the authors note that the direction of causality is unclear. Whites who worked in the mostly black city of Detroit, and blacks who worked in its still mostly white suburbs, were more likely to report interracial contact at work, including “frequent interracial conversations,” but this did not appear to be associated with interracial friendships for either racial group. Welch et al. found churchgoers more likely to have interracial ties, but since the analyses did not control for other, *non*-religious involvement, it may be that the more organizationally active overall have more bridging friendships and that some of these people include religious activity in their lives.

Beyond localism mostly locally defined – neighborhoods or the even more micro “face-blocks” – the racial heterogeneity of the urban environment as a whole also helps

explain the greater racial diversity in friendship and other ties in urban versus non-urban areas (Marsden 1987). Pool sizes in the larger local context, then, may be as or more important than make-up of immediate neighborhood for the strongest ties. Collective action around neighborhood interest nevertheless depends on creating and activating ties that are geographically proximate; in diverse neighborhoods, bridging ties are a crucial enabler (Briggs 1997; Granovetter 1973).

As noted above, organizational life can cut both ways in this picture, channeling in-breeding by de-limiting the subpool of a larger population actually accessible for contact and perpetuating mutual ignorance and prejudice or mitigating in-breeding effects by enabling bridging. Participation in religious organizations is generally race segregative in American life (Jackson 1977; Marsden 1990; Putnam 2000), many workplaces are racially segregated yet contribute more to bridging ties than does organized religion or other voluntary group membership (Jackson 1977; Marsden 1990; Estlund forthcoming). Where place-based associations are concerned, residents' associations and parent-teacher associations attached to neighborhood schools track patterns of racial segregation or integration in particular places. Unions, trade associations, and other work-based foci likewise track the racial composition of particular occupational categories, some of which feature distinct ethnic niching as well as strong education homophily. Activity clubs, political parties, emotional support groups, and other associations vary widely in terms of racial draw. But in the aggregate, as McPherson et al. (2001, p.433) put it, "The social homogeneity of most organizational foci creates a strong baseline homophily in networks that are formed there." This reduces race, age, and religious diversity of close, confiding relations in particular.⁶

In sum, race homophily is not only the most powerful among a set of powerful forces binding birds of a feather in America. In a society in which key differences in race, religion, socio-economic status, and other dimensions correlate, the corresponding attractions reinforce one another, as does the segregation of many associations, workplaces, neighborhoods, and other sorting substructures. What is more, the limited available evidence on network *change* over time suggests that homophilous or bonding ties are not only more likely to form than bridging ties but less likely to fade as well. On average, bonding ties appear to better survive crises and "structural challenges" than do bridging ties (McPherson, Miller, and Smith-Loving 2001). More hopefully, certain factors that are good for same-race bonding are also good for interracial bridging, including larger pools of potential contacts, racially integrated associations and workplaces (such as they exist), and having larger networks overall. While the aim of this paper is to extend what we know about *predictors* of interracial bridging in America, the next section briefly elaborates the case for that extension.

⁶ A key, under-studied question here is why persons draw more heavily on some domains (sources) than others for particular types of ties (Fischer 1982; Marsden 1990). Bluntly put, the quickest way to increase racial integration in friendships, holding all else equal, would be to ensure that all such ties were formed at work, not in faith institutions, neighborhood groups, or other domains. Beyond being unlikely, of course, this scenario would no doubt impose unforeseeable costs and trade-offs—even at the workplace itself.

Consequences of Bridging

Bridging ties have important consequences for individuals and for society, for equality as well as for democracy. At the individual level, the value of bridging is most evident in the area of status attainment or “getting ahead.” The societal consequences of bridging aggregate both those status-shaping effects (to affect economic inequality and group status reputations), as well as the effects of bridging ties on political attitudes and patterns of collective action.

In the broadest terms, as McPherson et al. (2001, p.415) explain of forces that favor bonding over bridging, “Homophily limits people’s social worlds in a way that has powerful implications for the information they receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they experience.” Conversely, in Blau’s formulation, intergroup relations and socio-economic mobility exert reciprocal influences that strengthen the integration in a community or society (Blau and Schwartz 1984).

The first and most material effects of this are individual and status shaping. Bridging ties improve access by lower status out-groups to information, vouching (recommendations and other social endorsements), preparation, mentoring, and other keys to economic access and attainment (Dickens 1999; Lin 1999). In the U.S context, research confirms the particular importance of bridging ties for poor minorities in inner cities (Briggs 1998; Warren, Thompson, and Saegert 2001; Keyes 2001). Holding human capital and other factors equal, black females who get job information from neighbors earn less than those who utilize job contacts from outside the neighborhood (Johnson, Bienenstock, and Farrell 2000). Ties to white, better employed, better educated people, and usually to people outside the neighborhood, are all valuable, and often these dimensions of bridging can be had in a single or a small number of distinct relationships.⁷ Likewise, black children educated in desegregated schools outperform their segregated counterparts in terms of long-run occupational attainment. More than to credentials or human capital accumulation in school, these effects seems to owe to more racially diverse social networks and a greater comfort level functioning in majority-white environments (Crain and Wells 1994).

True, particular minority concentrations, such as immigrant ethnic enclaves with high labor force participation and ethnic business ownership and trade, illustrate the opposite benefit: that of dense bonding networks of co-ethnics (Waldinger 1986). Enclave members may face excessive claims from co-ethnics, however, and more start-up than long-run benefit, especially if relationships within the enclave foreclose more lucrative “mainstreaming” opportunities (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). It is not the race, residential location, or status of the relation, then, so much as the potential aid or obligation

⁷ Or via institutions that compensate for the limits of personal networks. Most important are workforce development programs that develop networks linking economically disadvantaged persons and neighborhoods to regional employment growth (Harrison and Weiss 1998).

therein (the “content” of the tie) that determines its benefit or cost relative to alternative ties (Briggs 1998).⁸

Collective action is the second reason that bridging ties matter, especially for democratic politics in a large society becoming more socially diverse and institutionally complex. Cross-cutting ties are essential to the development of broader identities and communities of interest (Simmel 1923; Blau and Schwartz 1984; Horton 1995). These are the social foundations of power sharing, without which the formal machinery of democratic government—competitive elections, rule of law, freedom of assembly and of the press, and more—tends to falter around the world (Lipset 1994), particularly where the reciprocal influences of out-group exclusion and visible material inequalities create a vicious, conflict-promoting cycle (Blau and Schwartz 1984).

The absence of bridging ties undermines the reciprocity and learning crucial to democratic behavior (Putnam 2000), as well as the formation of bridging coalitions essential for significant political change (Wilson 1999). But political inequality and fragmentation also result. Residential and associational segregation not only segregate political jurisdictions (spatially bounded interest communities) by race (Massey and Denton 1993); they also reduce access by the minority poor to political influence networks and groups (Briggs forthcoming; Gittel and Vidal 1998; Warren, Saegert, and Thompson 2001). Barriers of race, socio-economic status, *and* space compound all too easily in lieu of bridging ties.

Data and Method

My data are from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000 (SCCBS) and the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses. The SCCBS collected data on respondents’ personal and household traits, as well as attitudes, social relationships, psychological sense of community, and civic and political participation. The survey included a national survey of adults (N=3,003) that over-sampled for blacks (N=501) and Hispanics (N=502), as well as 41 “community samples” in selected metropolitan regions and states (N=26,200). The community samples ranged from 500 to 1,500 respondents each and employed proportionate sampling. This random-digit dial survey, averaging 26 minutes in length, was conducted between July and November 2000.⁹ Overall, the SCCBS achieved an adjusted cooperation rate of 42.3% (Saguaro Seminar 2001).

Because the large number of community surveys was made possible by actively engaged local philanthropic foundations, these funders, rather than census boundaries, helped decide final sample geography. I selected 29 of the 41 community samples that matched or closely approximated the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA or SMSA)

⁸ In general, the value of network composition and contents depends on the specific outcome of interest, for example, getting a job, getting a “good” job, or attaining upward mobility in the labor market over the career course (reviews in Briggs 1998; Lin 1999).

⁹ The survey was conducted by TNS Intersearch for Harvard University’s Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement in America, led by Robert Putnam. Data are available on-line through the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Archive, University of Connecticut, but the public-use dataset does not include the sublocal geographic identifiers employed here. See below.

boundaries designated by the federal government as census geographies; these 29 community samples, with N=23,028, are the focus of this study (see Table 1).¹⁰ Comparisons to the SCCBS national sample show that this subset of communities is quite representative on the key variables of interest. In addition, the aggregated 29-community sample provides statistically adequate sample sizes for African-Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanics on many variables. The latter two groups include large proportions of foreign-born non-citizens in the sample (34.8 and 31.3%, respectively) and, in the case of Hispanics, respondents who preferred to conduct the interview in Spanish (36.1%).¹¹ Both factors affect social access.

The 29 surveyed communities represent almost one-tenth of the nation's (331) metro areas. While not nationally representative in the formal sense, these 29 encompass all major census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), small and large population centers, and diverse demographic trends. Year 2000 metro populations range from 90,1000 for Lewiston-Auburn, Maine to over 9.5 million for Los Angeles-Long Beach, California (Table 3), and population trends in recent decades range from modest decline (Cleveland) to very rapid growth (Phoenix). Metros with major population loss are not represented here. Since previous research on social ties has asserted powerful effects of historical settlement patterns, long-run ethnic presence in key occupational niches, and other structural factors on which regions, and even cities within regions, vary widely, the geographic breadth of the dataset is extremely useful.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE- ATTACHED AT REAR OF PAPER]

The 1990 and 2000 segregation indices and population figures and trends for these metro areas were calculated by the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research at the University at Albany, under the direction of John Logan, and are available on the Center's website. I rely on the two segregation measures – *dissimilarity* (D) and *exposure* (P*) – most commonly employed in social research (Massey, White, and Phua 1996). Dissimilarity measures spatial unevenness in the distribution of a racial group population, while exposure indicates the racial make-up of the neighborhood (census tract) of the average person of each racial group. White-black dissimilarity scores for the 29 metros range from low to high (23 to 85), while white-Hispanic (21 to 63) and white-Asian (21 to 51) rates, which run a narrower range nationally than the white-black rates (see Figure 1), range from low to moderate, for the most part.

This variation is obviously useful for purposes of my analysis, but its limitations pose serious challenges as well. The *exposure* measure is a direct function of area population sizes; i.e., measures of group A's average neighborhood (census tract) exposure rate to group B

¹⁰ Non-metropolitan areas were excluded first. Next, if the SCCBS sample included one or more of the major central cities and more than half of the county areas in the corresponding MSA, I treated this as a match. Finally, three city-only samples were part of the SCCBS, and for these I use central city data on population and segregation (see Table 3).

¹¹ This is not the case across all 29 communities for the two smallest groups, Hispanics and Asian Americans, so key analyses drop metro-level and census region controls for those groups.

tend to be lower in metro areas with small numbers of B to “go around.” And while the derivation of *dissimilarity* makes it mathematically independent of group population sizes, D happens to correlate with racial group population sizes in the sample. For example, as segregation researchers consistently highlight, metro areas with large black populations are also among the most segregated in terms of dissimilarity ($r=.54$ in this 29-community sample). Collinearity with group population sizes thus affects the two best available measures of segregation, challenging our effort to disentangle effects of overall pool size in a given local context (as measured by population percentages indicating “diversity”) from specific effects of residential segregation that may further limit opportunity for contact, encourage prejudice and avoidance behaviors, and in other ways undermine race bridging. Fortunately, 1990 census tract-level data on interracial exposure is available for the survey respondents, along with data on tenure (percent renter households), poverty, labor participation, percent foreign-born, residential stability, and other variables.¹²

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The SCCBS includes data on traits of respondents’ social ties (alters) only in the case of “personal friends.” These data therefore understate the full range of bridging ties maintained by respondents. Furthermore, as we have seen, friendships, when compared to more casual ties, tend to include fewer social bridges and are less likely than other ties to lie in the respondent’s immediate neighborhood – a factor to which I will return when interpreting effects of segregation. Finally, when the interviewer asked about friendship ties, the respondent reported on the number, traits, and aid available from his/her ties or alters as a group, not tie by tie through the more time-intensive *name generator* approach used in the General Social Survey and other instruments (Marsden 1987). We know, for example, whether the respondent has any personal friends who are white, black/ African American, Hispanic, or Asian American but not how many.¹³ The data nevertheless capture important information about relationships that the respondents identify as important to them, including the presence or absence of a race bridge among each respondent’s friendships. There is considerable value in studying, in effect, racial isolation in friendships, and even on this dichotomous measure, there is substantial variation across racial groups and communities.

As outlined above, effects of space and individual traits on networks are mediated in part by associations and other substructures that channel opportunity for contact and shape interests, commitments, and habits. The SCCBS offers an exceptionally rich view of

¹² Through special agreement with the Roper Center, I obtained a restricted-use dataset that includes 1990 census boundaries. These were matched with data in the 1990 extract prepared by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (Adams 2000).

¹³ On a still more technical note, the SCCBS network data are ego-centric; we do not know whether and how respondents’ friends are tied to each other. While this is unimportant for a direct assessment of race bridging in the respondent’s own (first-order) ties, earlier research indicates that homophilous ties are not only more common in respondents’ networks but more likely to know each other (McPherson et al. 2001). This is another confirmation of the more dispersed quality of non-homophilous ties – the quality that *makes* them bridges, as Granovetter (1973) theorized.

associational life, political participation, and informal socializing in the subject communities, including religious affiliation, membership, and activism as well as extremely varied indicators of non-religious membership and activism.¹⁴ For my purposes, four of the most important indicators are: the level of racial/ethnic diversity of the respondent's self-identified "most important group" (association) and of the members of that group with whom the respondent is "involved"; frequency of socializing with co-workers; a factor score indicating *non-religious social participation* combining membership with frequency and breadth of involvement in activities (see notes for Table 2); and a similarly constructed index of *faith-based participation*.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE – SEE CODING NOTES BELOW TABLE]

Among the predictor variables available in the SCCBS data, then, *ascriptive traits* (race, gender, age) and *achieved traits* (education, income, labor participation, marital status, parenthood) may exert direct and indirect effects on friendship choices.¹⁵ The same is true for population size, spatial segregation by race, urbanicity (urban, suburban, or non-metro residence), proportion homeowners (a stability proxy), and other *ecological traits*. For its part, associational participation may exert effects over and above those path effects. Figure 2 depicts the hypothesized relationships, which suggest a structural equation model. Each dimension of *social participation* (formal associations, informal socializing, network size) may be analyzed as lying on a path affecting race bridging, and effects of those elements may also be estimated, in reduced form, as having direct effects not originating in the respondent or ecological traits.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Path analysis including discrete data presents unique conceptual and statistical challenges, particularly where discrete variables number among the endogenous factors modeled (Winship and Mare 1983). The paths in Figure 2 capture relationships at the broadest levels, allowing a much needed exploration of indirect effects. They do not elaborate causality. Actual effects of associational participation, for example, probably reflect effects of participation *per se* as well as selection effects. Both of those, in turn, are associated with tangible behavior patterns that influence friendship choices, as well as attitudes and underlying dispositions – all of which matter for race bridging and other patterns that we care about. It is not a simple picture. On the other hand, having *a* picture is crucial, particularly for those who would change social outcomes.

¹⁴ The instrument is viewable on-line at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/dataacq/scc_bench.html. The data include indicators of simple membership, as well as holding leadership positions, frequency of civic and political activity, volunteering specifically, and much more. Traditional associations as well as internet groups are included.

¹⁵ Respondent's occupation is not available. Previous research shows it to be an important channel for homophily, for example by education, as well as for some degree of race bridging. I use the education and income variables as indicators of socio-economic status, along with workplace socializing to pick up work-based influences on friendship ties.

Models and Results

Descriptive Results: The Incidence of Race Bridging

The frequency of interracial friendships in the 29-community sample is varied and reflects important asymmetries between whites and minorities. For direct consistency with the multivariate results to come, Table 3 describes bridging in terms of the probability that a respondent of race A reports having a personal friend of race A (co-ethnics), or of race B, C, or D (out groups). My purpose at this point is not to attribute these effects but merely to explore the overall incidence of race bridging and isolation.

Having said that, consistent with the opportunity-for-contact principle, and given that whites predominate in the general as well as general-organizational populations in America, members of any given racial minority group are much more likely to report having a personal friend who is white than whites are to report having a friend of that other race; the degree of this asymmetry is inversely related to the size of the racial minority group. For blacks, for example, this asymmetry is 74% versus 61%, but for Asians, it is much sharper: 74% versus 38%. These bridging traits extend to non-religious associational involvements as well. Minorities are much more likely than whites to report that the membership of their "most important group" is racially mixed or mostly persons of other races (54.4% vs. 30.4%, data not shown). This bridging figure is highest for Asians (72.8%), followed by Hispanics (56.1%) and blacks (47.4%, all Chi-square $p < .001$).

The boldface diagonal in Table 3 shows within-group or co-ethnic friendships. Predictably, these are higher than any cross-group probabilities shown, but it is noteworthy that 12% of Asians and 16% of Hispanics reported no personal friends who are co-ethnics. This isolation appears to be a function, at least in part, of an overall isolation from friendship ties, and it may reflect dynamics and strains of immigration. Consistent with the General Social Survey and other studies, minorities were more likely than whites to report having no close friends at all (7.7% vs. 2.6%); the same is true for foreign-born non-citizens when compared to citizens on this question (9.7% vs. 3.7%).

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The two right-most columns count across racial categories; these indicate that racial minorities are more likely than whites to have at least one personal friend of *some* other race (any out-group). One-quarter (25%) of whites reported no interracial friendships at all, and this measure of racial isolation ranges from a low of 8% in Los Angeles to 55% in Bismarck, North Dakota. In addition, Asians and Hispanics report more varied race bridges. These groups are more likely than either blacks or whites to report having personal friends of *every* other major racial-ethnic group; almost 40% of Asians in the sample report this, for example.

[ADD ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS OF VARIATION BY LOCALITY,
CONTROLLING ON POOL SIZES]

Predictors of Race Bridging: Groups, Activism, and Friendships

[NOTE TO THE READER: THIS DRAFT PRESENTS RESULTS OF SEQUENCED SINGLE-EQUATION RESULTS, NOT THE MORE COMPLEX TWO-EQUATION MODEL TO COME. The latter is to test for correlations among the disturbance terms, since the path posits that the dependent variables estimated separately here are not independent.]

Groups and Activism. Regression analyses were run for each of the five (5) key measures of social participation in Figure 2 for each of the four ethnic groups, beginning with full models (co-variates in Table 2) and reducing according to sample size by group and inter-item correlations.¹⁶ These analyses highlighted three overall patterns: (a) structural positions dominate for all racial groups (age group and education most of all but also gender for some groups); (b) selection effects of neighborhoods are strongly supported for all groups in the case of participation in a bridging group, as expected, and effects are strongest for the groups with large proportions of immigrant non-citizens in the sample (Asian Americans and Hispanics) – i.e., the less educated and more language isolated live in less racially diverse neighborhoods; and (c) strong regional effects (living in the Bible Belt, e.g.) remain for whites and African Americans, even after more micro-level ecological traits are controlled. The first and third essentially corroborate Putnam’s (2000) empirical findings and review of prior research. In general, educated, older, married people are the participators. They have more friends, are more involved in groups both religious and not. In addition, women outdo men in the case of religious participation. For Hispanics and Asian Americans, citizenship and language access are also associated with higher participation, as expected.

Two dimensions, both relevant to interracial contact, are partial outliers: socializing with co-workers and reporting membership in a interracial bridging group that is particularly important to the respondent. For all groups, those who reported socializing frequently with co-workers are young (age 18 to 34), male, and single. Notably, these are also the most likely to rent and to live in mixed-race neighborhoods (Ellen 2000). For whites, living in a racially diverse *metro area* is, sure enough, positively associated with belonging to a bridging group, and living in a racially diverse *neighborhood* is significant over and above that ($P < .001$). The same is true for Hispanics ($P < .01$) but notably, not for African Americans, who show no effect for metro diversity, once education and other individual predictors are controlled, but a strong one for neighborhood diversity. This is at least suggestive of the class divide reported within the black community, with higher status blacks somewhat more integrated at the neighborhood level (across metros) and lower-status ones quite segregated from white neighborhoods and bridging groups even where the metro as a whole offers many potential white contacts. Greater educational attainment (some college or a college degree) shows significant positive effects only for whites ($P < .001$) and Hispanics ($P < .01$), being male for African Americans ($P < .001$). Models for Asian Americans were not significant.

¹⁶ Three of these (number of friends, racial diversity of most important group, frequency of socializing with co-workers) are ordinal variables, each with 5 categories. Because ordered logit results closely matched those of OLS, the latter were used for consistency with analyses of the remaining two social participation indicators (religious participation index, non-religious participation factor score), both continuous variables.

In general, Hispanics and Asian Americans are more likely than the larger groups to bridge racially through their self-reported most important group, and African Americans are more likely than whites (Table 6). This pattern that parallels national rates of neighborhood-level interracial exposure (P^*) (Lewis Mumford Center 2001) and is consistent with findings on baseline homophily for smaller racial groups in local studies as well.

Friendships. Table 7 shows odds ratios for a model predicting the presence of a race bridge among white respondents' ties, and Table 8 reports race bridges to whites for minority respondents (no minority-minority friendships are analyzed here). Model 1 in Table 7 shows the predictive effects of white individual ascriptive and achieved traits on having a black friend. Significantly, the long civic generation highlighted in Putnam's research and the popular media in recent years is, at least in the case of white Americans, also the most racially insular. Whites over age 65 are significantly less likely to report a single friendship with a black person as compared to the age 18-34 group. Education and being currently in the labor force or in school are also associated with bridging. Model 2 shows the effects of social participation and ecological traits. Both religious and non-religious involvement are positively associated with bridging. So too is *frequent* socializing with co-workers—a sign that the workplace is comparatively important in a respondent's social world. As expected, those with larger friendship networks overall are more likely to report having race bridges within them. The correlation between socio-economic status and place is evident in many of these models and in Model 2 most of all. The education coefficients in Model 1 become non-significant when racial make-up of the census tract is added. The racial diversity of both the metro area and immediate neighborhood are significant, both positively associated with having a black friend, but residential stability is inversely associated with it, consistent with Yancey et al's findings for Philadelphia.¹⁷ This may capture a more generalized, multi-city effect of historically white, homeowner-dominated neighborhoods with limited residential turnover. Finally, consistent with national studies of racial diversity in networks, suburban residence is associated with a lower probability of a race bridge holding all else equal.

Models 3 and 4 show that the generational effect holds for whites' friendship ties to the two rapidly growing minority groups; seniors over age 65 are less likely to have friends who are Asian or Hispanic, net of education and other factors. Having a college degree is a robust predictor of white friendships with Asians; for Hispanics, there is some positive association until place of residence variables are added (as for blacks above). Greater non-religious involvement and frequent socializing with co-workers likewise connects whites to friends in these racial groups. Pool effects support these bridges, too, right down to the neighborhood level in the case of bridges to Hispanics.¹⁸

The models in Table 8 are reduced somewhat to accommodate the smaller sample sizes for minority respondents. The aim here is not exhaustive prediction but significant

¹⁷ Note that the census variables are percentages, so the odds ratios show the effect of a mere 1% change in the independent variable. Effects of categorical variables with few categories, such as 3-level educational attainment, *seem* large in comparison.

¹⁸ Tract-level percentage Asian American was not available in the ICPSR census extract for 1990.

models with relatively robust effects (or non-effects) for the key variables of interest. For all three major minority groups, educational attainment is robustly associated with bridges to white friends. This is clearest in the case of the college educated but even some college, net of other factors, supports bridging. There are no generational effects on bridging analogous to those for whites, except in the case of Asian seniors, who are less likely to report having a white friend. Only Hispanics enjoy some positive bridging effect via religious involvement, but non-religious involvement and socializing with co-workers predicts bridging for all three groups.

Effects of network size and pool diversity (metro, neighborhood) generally match those for white respondents: more is better for bridging. Several of these effects are weak, however, once education and social participation are controlled.¹⁹ Blacks, in particular, do not register benefits of more diverse neighborhoods once these are controlled. A reduced model with individual traits and diversity alone show positive effects of neighborhood diversity ($P < .001$) even after the presence of whites in the metro area is controlled, suggesting that “ecological” effects indeed capture both selection effects of residential choice and *perhaps* direct effects of residential environment on social participation. This is not a world of simple, direct effects but of co-determined choices of social relations, place of residence, and organizational involvements, fitting Laumann’s (1973) classic description of how ethnic identities are expressed and ethnic boundaries maintained, whether consciously or unconsciously.

Consolidation of Race and Status. Previous research indicates that one of the most significant features of social relations in America, and thus of the contributions of social structure to inequality, is the consolidation of race differences with those of status, as measured by education, occupation, income, and more (Blau and Schwartz 1984). While the survey data do not include occupational status or parent’s education, as a final test, I controlled for educational attainment and income level to see whether race bridging makes it more likely that racial minorities in the sample have ties to friends with comparatively high social status and influence, such as those who own a businesses or who are identified as “community leaders.” Note that the data do not allow us to test for bridging race and status in the *same* social ties but, more simply, to test whether low-income, less educated African-Americans, say, who report having a close friend who is white also tend to have a friend with those education and ownership status traits. In Table 9, illustratively, I show results for the business ownership tie for racial minority group respondents. In general, for African-Americans and Hispanics, net of respondent’s own education and income level, having a

¹⁹ I handled the collinearity among metro and neighborhood measures of racial diversity using the following logic: where neighborhood showed significant effects net of metro diversity, this was plausible evidence of a “true” additional association, albeit not necessarily a causal one, between friendship patterns and neighborhood composition; where sample sizes warranted a reduced model (as for Asians) in order to detect any effects, I checked metro and neighborhood separately. That the latter capture more powerful effects when entered alone is no surprise; neighborhood diversity automatically taps metro diversity (the larger pool that enables a city to have racially diverse

race bridge is strongly associated with having a tie to someone who owns their own business, someone who owns a vacation home, someone who is (from the respondent's perspective) a community leader, and someone of another religious orientation. These effects hold when equations are estimated separately for low-income, less educated groups alone and for minorities living in neighborhoods that are majority white (tables available from the author).²⁰ Models for Asian Americans were not significant for business ownership but tracked those of Hispanics and African Americans on the other variables.

Discussion

In recent years, even the popular media has shown an interest in the largely invisible but powerful social consequences of bridging ties – in particular, in the value of inter-cultural and interracial ties. Covering the story of an American-born Jew shot by Palestinian gunmen in Israel in the latest *intifadah*, for example, the *Boston Globe* focused not on the man's American-ness but on the fact that his best friend of 34 years was a Palestinian. For the latter's children, the American had become a second father, wrote the reporter, and the families often vacationed together. The story concluded:

The death of Avi Boaz is more than just another entry on the list of victims in this latest uprising; it represents the loss of a friendship that provided a bridge between peoples whose knowledge of and empathy for each other are declining by the day. (Hardin 2002, p.A7)

The changes re-shaping American society are slowly but surely shifting certain aspects of race relations as well. As many observers have noted, these changes are neither simple nor consistent in direction. Putnam and Goss (2002, p.12) remind us, "a nation could simultaneously see growth in ethnically based social clubs, rainbow coalitions, and government-hating militias." I have focused on whites' friendship ties to minorities and vice-versa, motivated primarily by the powerful ways in which race and status consolidate in American society, both deepening inequality and confounding political response. For all groups, education and non-religious involvement are robustly associated with bridging. Those are in fact essential for whites, whose majority presence makes it easy to maintain insular ties. Those with less education and lower income are doubly disadvantaged in the market for bridges. They are less organizationally active and have smaller friendship networks, both factors truncating the diversity of personal ties, and in addition, the lower status minorities are more likely to live in segregated neighborhoods and belong to more segregated associations. Conversely, those lower status minorities who do report white friends are those whose social worlds also include people of comparatively higher status and community influence.

neighborhoods) and also capture status, social preference for neighbors, and other traits along which neighborhoods sort.

²⁰ Note that the aim here is not to control on all possible predictors of the dependent variables, only to eliminate the obvious class correlates which, if missing, might lead us to rely on a spurious association between friendships with whites and friendships with people of status and influence.

Additional research is needed on likely causal mechanisms – the ecology of contact, underlying sorting by dispositions, both? – as well as proximate social phenomena. The latter would include the character of organizational involvement by race in these communities and regions, for example how ethnic identity driven key dimensions of involvement tend to be. While efficient, the factors and indexes employed here obscure such ethnic patterning. Another key domain for analysis is that of minority-to-minority network bridges. Evidence on the latter would, for one thing, help sort out the issue of how distinctive, and how class segmented, the African American experience is relative to Hispanics and Asians. Likewise, additional comparative analyses might determine how regional these patterns are. The Bible Belt effect on religious participation of blacks and whites is once again evident here, but there is also some evidence that the West is a better place for bridging by Hispanics to whites, controlling for education and other factors.

Finally, personal networks and social participation are but two dimensions of social identity and of a community's capacity for collective action to solve important problems. More work is needed on the relationships among networks, associational involvement, trust, attitudes, experiences of discrimination, and other phenomena in these varied communities. Using these survey data, Putnam and his research team have found, for example, that social trust and socializing are lower – for all racial/ethnic groups – in ethnically diverse urban communities (Saguaro Seminar 2001). Minorities living in such communities, when compared to counterparts living in more homogeneous settings, even appear to be less likely to trust members of their own ethnic group. On one hand, this is consistent with decades of empirical research and theoretical work on cities as diverse environments (Ross, Mirowsky and Pribesh 2002). Urbanites are generally less trusting than counterparts living in more socially homogeneous suburbs and rural towns. But partly through wider exposure, city dwellers are also more likely to have diverse social ties and, through those ties, to extend trust to and engage in rich exchanges with *particular* members of out-groups. One might say that diversity makes us less likely to believe in the integrity of *all* others – “people in general” – but more likely to connect to particular individuals unlike ourselves – in ways that are important for each of us and for society.

References

- Adams, Terry K. 2000. Census of Population and Housing, 1990 [United States]: Extract Data [Computer File]. ICPSR Version. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center [producer], 1998. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Program for Social and Political Research [distributor].
- Blau, Peter. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
- Blau, Peter M. and J.E. Schwartz. 1984. Cross-Cutting Social Circles: Testing a Macrostructural Theory of Intergroup Relations. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press.
- Briggs, Xavier de Souza. “Social Capital and the Cities: Advice to Change Agents.” National Civic Review 86(2):111-117.

- _____. 1998. "Brown Kids in White Suburbs." Housing Policy Debate 9(1):177-221.
- _____. (Forthcoming) "Social Capital and Segregation in the United States," In Segregation and the City: Global Perspectives, edited by David Varady. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Crain, Robert L. and Amy S. Wells. 1994. "Perpetuation Theory and the Long-term Effects of School Desegregation." Review of Educational Research 64(4): 531-553.
- Dickens, William T. 1999. "Rebuilding Urban Labor Markets: What Community Development Can Accomplish." Pp.381-436 in Urban Problems and Community Development, edited by Ronald F. Ferguson and William T. Dickens. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Ellen, Ingrid Gould. 2000. Sharing America's Neighborhoods: Prospects for Stable Racial Integration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Estlund, Cynthia. (Forthcoming) Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Etzioni, Amitai. 1959. "The Ghetto: A Re-evaluation." Social Forces 39:255-262.
- Farley, Reynolds and William H. Frey. 1994. "Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society." American Sociological Review 59(1):23-45.
- Fernandez, Marilyn and Laura Nichols. 2002. "Bridging and Bonding Capital: Pluralist Ethnic Relations in the Silicon Valley." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 22(9/10):104-122.
- Fernandez, Roberto M. and David Harris. 1992. "Social Isolation and the Underclass." Pp.56-76 in Drugs, Crime and Social Isolation: Barriers to Urban Opportunity, edited by Adele V. Harrell and George E. Peterson. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press.
- Fischer, Claude. 1982. To Dwell Among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gans, Herbert. 1967. The Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban Community. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gittell, Ross and Avis Vidal. 1998. Community Organizing: Social Capital as a Development Strategy. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Granovetter, Mark. "The Strength of Weak Ties Hypothesis." American Journal of Sociology 78(6): 1360-1380.
- _____. 1974. Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

- Greenbaum, Susan and Paul Greenbaum. 1985. "The Ecology of Social Networks in Four Urban Neighborhoods." Social Networks 7:47-76.
- Harrison, Bennett and Marcus Weiss. 1998. Workforce Development Networks: Community-based Organizations and Regional Alliances. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Horton, John. 1995. The Politics of Diversity: Immigration, Resistance, and Change in Monterey Park, California. Philadelphia: Temple.
- Jackson, Robert Max. 1977. "Social Structure and Process in Friendship Choice." Pp.59-78 in Networks and Places: Social Relations in the Urban Setting, edited by Claude S. Fischer. New York: Free Press.
- Johnson, James H., Jr., Elysa Jayne Bienenstock. 2000. "Bridging Social Networks and Female Labor Force Participation in a Multi-ethnic Metropolis." Pp.101-134 in Prismatic Metropolis: Analyzing Inequality in Los Angeles, edited by Lawrence D. Bobo, Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson, Jr., and Abel Valenzuela. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kalleberg, A.L., D. Knoke, P. Marsden, and J.L. Spaeth. 1996. Organizations in America: Analyzing Their Structures and Human Resource Practices. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Keyes, Langley. 2001. "Housing, Social Capital and Poor Communities," Pp.136-164 in Social Capital and Poor Communities, edited by Susan Saegert, J. Philip Thompson, and Mark R. Warren. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Laumann, Edward O. 1973. Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Robert K. Merton. 1954. "Friendship as a Social Process: A substantive and methodological analysis." Pp.18-66 in Freedom and Control in Modern Society, edited by M. Berger. New York: Van Nostrand.
- Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research. 2001. "Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration is at a Standstill." University at Albany, April. World Wide Web page <http://www.albany.edu/mumford/census/> .
- Lin, Nan. 1999. "Social Networks and Status Attainment." Annual Review of Sociology 25:467-87.
- _____. 2001. "Toward a Network Theory of Social Capital." Pp. 3-29 in Social Capital: Theory and Research, edited by Nan Lin, Karen Cook, and Ronald S. Burt. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." American Sociological Review 59(February):1-22.

- Loury, Glenn. 2002. The Anatomy of Racial Inequality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Marsden, Peter V. 1987. "Core Discussion Networks of Americans." American Sociological Review 52:122-313.
- _____. 1988. "Homogeneity in Confiding Relations." Social Networks 10:57-76.
- _____. 1990. "Network Diversity, Substructures and Opportunities for Contact." Pp.397-410 in Structures of Power and Constraint: Papers in Honor of Peter Blau, edited by C. Calhoun, M. Meyer, and R.S. Scott. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Massey, Douglas S. 2001. "Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Conditions." Pp. 391-434 in America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, Volume I, edited by Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." Annual Review of Sociology 27:415-444.
- Most, David. 2002. "Divided We Stand." Boston Magazine, November:105-107,120,122,124,128,130,132-133.
- Pedder, Sophie. 1991. "Social Isolation and the Labor Market: Black Americans in Chicago." Paper presented at the Urban Poverty and Family Life Conference, Chicago, Illinois, October 10-12.
- Portes, Alejandro and Julia Sensenbrenner. 1993. "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action." American Journal of Sociology 98(6):1320-1350.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Putnam, Robert D. and Kristin A. Goss. 2002. "Introduction." Pp.1-19 in Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society, edited by Robert D. Putnam. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Radin, Charles A. 2002. "Mourning Runs Deep for Friendship Lost: Slain Israeli Kept Palestinian Ties Through Turmoil." Boston Globe (January 28):A7.
- Rieder, Jonathan. 1985. Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Ross, Catherine E., John Mirowsky, and Shana Pribesh. 2002. "Disadvantage, Disorder, and Urban Mistrust." City and Community 1(1):59-82.
- Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement in America. 2001. Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey: Executive Summary. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March. World Wide Web page <http://www.cfsv.org/communitysurvey/results.html>
- Schofeld, J.W. 1995. "Review of Research on School desegregation's Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students." Pp.597-616 in Handbook of Research on Multicultural Education, edited by J.A. Banks and C.A. McGee. New York: Macmillan.
- Simmel, Georg. 1955 [1923]. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, translated by Kurt H. Worf and Reinhard Bendix. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Traub, James. 2001. "Return to Segregation." New York Times, December 9 (Magazine):96.
- Waldinger, Roger. Waldinger, Roger. 1986. Through the Eye of the Needle: Immigrants and Enterprise in New York's Garment Trade. New York: New York University.
- _____. 1996. "Ethnicity and Opportunity in the Plural City," Pp. 445-470 in Ethnic Los Angeles, edited by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Warren, Mark R., J. Philip Thompson, and Susan Saegert. 2001. "The Role of Social Capital in Combating Poverty," Pp.1-28 in Social Capital and Poor Communities, edited by Susan Saegert, J. Philip Thompson, and Mark R. Warren. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Welch, Susan, Lee Sigelman, Timothy Beldsoe, and Michael Combs. 2001. Race and Place: Race Relations in an American City. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wellman, Barry. 1971. "Crossing Social Boundaries: Cosmopolitanism Among Black and White Adolescents." Social Science Quarterly (December):602-624.
- _____. 1996. "Are Personal Communities Local? A Dumptarian Reconsideration." Social Networks 18:347-354.
- _____. 2001. "Physical Place and Cyberplace: The Rise of Personalized Networking." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(2):227-252.
- Wellman, Barry and Barry Leighton. 1979. "Networks, Neighborhoods and Communities." Urban Affairs Quarterly 14: 363-90.
- Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- _____. 1999. The Bridge Over the Racial Divide: Rising Inequality and Coalition Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Winship, Christopher and Robert D. Mare. 1983. "Structural Equations and Path Analysis for Discrete Data." American Journal of Sociology 89(1):55-110.
- Yancey, William, Eugene P. Ericksen, and George H. Leon. 1985. "The Structure of Pluralism: 'We're All Italian Around Here, Aren't We Mrs. O'Brien?'" Ethnic and Racial Studies 8:94-116.
- Zhou, Min. 2001. "Contemporary Immigration and the Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity." Pp.200-242 in America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, Volume I, edited by Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

TABLE 1
COMMUNITIES IN THE SOCIAL CAPITAL COMMUNITY BENCHMARK SURVEY, IN RANK ORDER OF WHITE-BLACK SEGREGATION LEVEL:
Population, Racial Diversity, and White-Minority Segregation (Dissimilarity, Exposure) Rates

Metro area (or City)	Population		Racial/Ethnic Diversity				Dissimilarity (D)			Exposure (P*)		
	2000	% Change 1980- 2000	% non- Hispanic white	% non- Hispanic black	% Hispanic	% Asian	White- black	White- Hispanic	White- Asian	Black- White	Hispanic- White	Asian- White
Detroit, MI PMSA	4,441,551	1	69.7	23.4	2.9	2.7	84.7	45.7	45.9	16.9	61.9	75.7
Chicago, IL PMSA	8,272,768	16	58.0	19.0	17.1	5.0	80.8	62.1	44.4	16.4	37.5	62.9
Cleveland-Lorain- Elyria, OH PMSA	2,250,871	-1	75.42	18.9	3.3	1.6	77.3	58.1	37.8	25.2	64.5	80.1
Cincinnati, OH-KY- IN PMSA	1,646,395	17	83.53	13.4	1.1	1.4	74.8	29.8	41.7	39.1	80.8	81.5
Birmingham, AL MSA	921,106	13	66.4	30.2	1.8	1.0	72.9	48.4	46.9	25.8	66.8	73.4
Syracuse, NY MSA	732,117	14	88.0	7.0	2.1	1.7	69.3	45.6	45.6	49.9	68.3	80.5
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA	9,519,338	27	31.1	10.0	44.6	13.0	67.5	63.2	48.3	16.7	17.0	30.8
Houston, TX PMSA	4,177,646	51	46.1	17.6	29.9	5.7	67.5	55.7	49.4	21.6	30.6	44.8
York, PA MSA	381,751	22	91.5	4.0	3.0	1.1	67.0	58.3	31.1	61.1	64.8	88.1
Baton Rouge, LA MSA	602,894	22	63.9	32.1	1.8	1.7	66.9	32.4	51.4	30.6	67.2	63.3
Boston, MA (city)	869,045	4.0	56.2	20.3	13.2	8.2	66.4	51.1	38.7	25.1	41.7	55.7
Rochester, NY MSA	1,098,201	13	82.2	10.6	4.3	2.1	66.3	54.0	41.9	42.9	53.9	78.6
Atlanta, GA MSA	4,112,198	98	59.8	29.2	6.5	3.6	65.6	52.5	45.2	28.4	48.5	59.0
Denver, CO PMSA	2,109,282	48	70.4	5.9	18.8	3.6	61.8	50.2	30.0	46.8	50.2	69.7
San Francisco, CA PMSA	1,731,183	17	51.2	5.7	16.8	24.9	60.9	53.9	48.7	31.3	35.7	38.4
Greensboro- Winston-Salem- High Point, NC MSA	1,251,509	35	72.3	20.4	5.0	1.6	59.0	51.1	46.0	41.4	57.5	66.5
Knoxville, TN MSA	687,249	44	90.6	6.0	1.3	1.2	58.0	26.8	41.4	61.3	88.6	88.8
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA	2,968,806	39	84.7	6.1	3.3	4.7	57.8	46.6	42.7	57.6	67.4	68.1

27 BRIDGING NETWORKS

Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA	1,499,293	61	71.2	20.7	5.1	2.1	55.2	50.4	43.3	44.3	54.8	65.1
Seattle, WA (city)	764,431	19.6	69.7	7.9	5.5	14.9	54.9	32.9	40.2	49.0	62.1	54.8
Grand Rapids, MI (city)	272,953	6.6	62.8	20.6	13.2	2.0	54.3	50.3	33.0	42.2	45.1	66.1
San Diego, CA MSA	2,813,833	51	55.0	6.2	26.7	10.5	54.1	51.0	47.0	37.8	37.6	44.5
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA	452,851	8	83.3	10.1	3.6	1.6	53.0	38.9	40.3	59.8	76.3	83.6
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA	3,251,876	103	65.8	3.9	25.1	2.6	43.7	52.5	28.1	51.3	43.9	69.5
Yakima, WA MSA	222,581	29	56.5	1.1	35.9	1.3	40.6	52.0	26.5	54.4	38.8	60.2
Manchester, NH PMSA	198,378	23	92.7	1.5	3.01	2.0	39.7	40.5	28.8	87.3	85.7	89.3
Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA	90,830	0	96.2	1.0	1.0	0.9	27.6	27.5	21.3	94.9	95.0	95.8
Bismarck, ND MSA	94,719	18	94.9	0.4	0.7	0.6	24.0	21.4	23.6	93.4	93.3	94.8
Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA	291,288	54	83.6	1.1	10.5	3.7	23.2	37.6	25.1	82.2	75.7	83.0

TABLE 2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF KEY VARIABLES, BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP
Personal, household, associational, and network variables (29 communities)


	All Groups		White		Black		Hispanic		Asian	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<i>Individual-level traits</i>										
Gender (1=female)	.52	.49	.53	.49	.55	.50	.50	.50	.50	.50
Age group (4-level)	2.18	1.06	2.32	1.08	2.06	1.02	1.72	.88	1.64	.82
Language of interview (1=Spanish)	.04	.20	.01	.09	.01	.00	.37	.40	.00	.00
U.S. Citizen	.94	.24	.99	.11	.98	.14	.65	.48	.69	.46
<i>Household-level traits</i>										
Married or with partner (1=yes)	.65	.48	.68	.47	.52	.50	.68	.47	.58	.49
Child 17 or under in home (3-level)	.48	.65	.40	.61	.63	.71	.80	.74	.50	.61
Educational attainment (3-level)	.90	.79	.96	.80	.75	.72	.42	.67	1.25	.75
In labor force or school (1=yes)	.73	.60	.71	.57	.75	.64	.76	.52	.84	.60
<i>Social participation and network size</i>										
Religious participation (index)	-.08	.75	-.07	.76	.10	.72	-.27	.65	-.29	.71
Non-religious organizational and civic participation (factor score)	.06	1.03	.09	1.02	.11	1.11	-.30	.88	-.17	.87
Degree of race bridging through "important" group (5-level)	2.40	1.08	2.22	.98	2.50	1.21	2.85	1.89	3.21	1.21
Frequency socializes with co-workers (5-level)	1.22	1.28	1.28	1.28	1.09	1.22	.95	1.22	1.22	1.26
Number of close friends (5-level)	3.32	1.09	3.44	1.04	2.91	1.09	3.01	1.20	3.22	1.06
Has friend who owns a business (1=yes)	.63	.48	.66	.47	.59	.49	.43	.50	.51	.50
Has friend of a different religious orientation (1=yes)	.78	.42	.82	.38	.68	.47	.62	.48	.72	.45
<i>Ecological traits</i>										
Place status	1.48	.57	1.54	.59	1.27	.50	1.38	.51	1.41	.50
<i>Neighborhood (1990)</i>										
Mean percent white, non-Hispanic	77.6	26.4	86.1	17.6	47.7	34.4	57.8	29.0	64.7	24.6
Mean percent black, non-Hispanic	11.2	21.6	5.8	12.0	43.8	35.4	11.4	18.8	6.2	11.8
Mean percent Hispanic (all races)	6.9	13.1	4.6	9.5	5.1	10.0	23.9	23.3	12.6	14.0

29 BRIDGING NETWORKS

Mean percent households in same house 5 years ago	50.9	13.1	51.4	13.0	52.6	13.2	46.7	12.7	46.05	13.7
Mean percent renter households	37.6	22.9	34.0	21.8	46.5	22.6	49.0	22.3	45.2	25.0
Mean poverty rate	11.1	11.1	9.2	8.8	19.6	15.4	17.3	13.0	10.0	9.9
Mean percent foreign born	8.1	10.5	6.5	8.4	6.5	9.4	17.2	15.4	21.0	15.2
Metro (2000)										
White-black dissimilarity			58.5	15.4	66.2	9.6				
White-Hispanic dissimilarity			45.9	10.8			52.7	7.0		
White-Asian dissimilarity			39.2	8.1					45.7	4.9
Black-White Exposure					34.2	12.2				
Hispanic-White Exposure							42.4	15.4		
Asian-White Exposure									47.4	14.1
Total (N)	(20,025)		(13,602)		(2,409)		(1,917)		(885)	

Variable coding for non-dummy variables: *Age group in years* (18-34, 35-49, 50-64, 65 up); Number of children age 17 or under in home (none, 1-2, 3 or more); *Educational attainment* (High school or less, Some college, college degree or higher); *Religious participation* factor score (continuous) combines membership in religious institution, worship attendance, participation in other activities, volunteering; *Non-religious organizational activism* factor index (Low, Medium, High) combines membership in associations, serving as an officer, frequency of recent participation in group activities, participation in community civic events (public meeting, etc.); *Degree of race bridging via "important" group* (Membership of respondent's most important group is: all same race as respondent, mostly same, some same, only a few same, none same race); *Frequency respondent socialized with co-workers in past 12 months* (Never, Once, 2-4 times, 5-9 times, 10 or more times); *Number of close friends* (none, 1-2, 3-5, 6-10, more than 10). Some respondents chose not to provide racial/ethnic identity to the interviewer; *Place status* (central city, suburb or second city, non-metro). See codebook, Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. Interracial *exposure* measures (P*) indicate mean tract-level exposure for the MSA. All neighborhood (tract-level) composition measures are for the 1990 census; metro-level segregation measures are for the 2000 census.

FIGURE 1
WHITE SEGREGATION FROM MINORITY GROUPS
Indexes of Dissimilarity (D), Year 2000, 325 U.S. Metropolitan Areas (boxplots)



Source: Author's calculations using Lewis Mumford Center (2001) census datafile. The boxplots show the maximum and minimum, median, and 50% of distribution for each pairwise grouping. Dissimilarity (D) measures unevenness in two population distributions (whites versus blacks, say), on a 100-point scale, with higher scores reflecting greater unevenness. Segregation measures could not be calculated for all 331 designated metro areas due to missing data.

FIGURE 2
PATH MODEL OF RACE BRIDGING (HEURISTIC)




TABLE 5
RACE BRIDGES AND BONDS, BY RACE
Within and Across-Group Friendships (Frequencies), 29 Communities

$P(A_j)$	P(white)	P(black)	P(Hispanic)	P(Asian)	P(any other)	P(all other)
R's race/ethnicity	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)
White, non-Hispanic	.98 (13,922)	.62 (13,908)	.45 (13,884)	.40 (13,888)	.75 (13,857)	.26 (13,857)
Black, non-Hispanic	.73 (2,394)	.94 (2,395)	.44 (2,388)	.27 (2,393)	.95 (2,387)	.20 (2,387)
Hispanic (all races)	.69 (1,863)	.51 (1,863)	.84 (1,867)	.34 (1,863)	.88 (1,860)	.29 (1,860)
Asian	.77 (579)	.51 (579)	.47 (577)	.89 (578)	.95 (575)	.40 (575)

$P(A_j)$ = Probability(respondent of race A has a "personal friend" of race j).

TABLE 6
RACE BRIDGING THROUGH RESPONDENT'S "MOST IMPORTANT" GROUP
SELF-REPORTED MEMBERSHIP AND INVOLVEMENT WITH OTHER RACES, 29 Communities

R's race/ethnicity	Group diversity	All same race	Most same race	Some same race	Only a few	None	(N)
White, non-Hispanic		21.2	48.4	21.4	4.2	4.4	(11,936)
Black, non-Hispanic		25.3	27.4	26.1	14.2	7.1	(2,071)
Hispanic (all races)		14.0	27.6	27.8	20.1	10.5	(1,270)
Asian		9.6	19.4	27.8	27.0	16.3	(449)

Chi-square measure of association $P > .00$. *Question*: "Of all the groups that you are involved with (IF NECESSARY: including both religious and non-religious ones), please think of the one that is most important to you about the members of this group you are involved with. (IF UNSURE ABOUT GROUP: Think of the group that you spend the most time on.) ... About how many would you say are the same race as you—all, most, some, only a few, or none?"

TABLE 7
THE RACE BRIDGES OF WHITE RESPONDENTS
Binomial Logits of Selected Variables on Odds of Having a Minority Friend, by Race of Friend (odds ratios)

<i>Independent Variable</i>	Exp (B) and 95% Confidence Intervals			
	Has black friend		Has Hispanic friend	Has Asian friend
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Woman	.95 (.87 - 1.04)	1.03 (.93 - 1.15)	.92 (.83 - 1.02)	.87 (.79 - .97)
Age 35-49 years	.87 (.78 - .97)	.88 (.77 - .99)	.97 (.86 - 1.09)	.83 (.74 - .94)
Age 50-64 years	.91 (.80 - 1.02)	.92 (.79 - 1.07)	.93 (.80 - 1.07)	.81 (.69 - .93)
Age 65 years or older	.62 (.53 - .72)	.61 (.45 - .82)	.66 (.48 - .90)	.63 (.47 - .84)
Married or living with partner	.99 (.92 - 1.09)	.93 (.83 - 1.05)	.93 (.83 - 1.04)	.93 (.83 - 1.03)
Children under 18 in household (1-2)	1.05 (.95 - 1.16)	1.08 (.96 - 1.22)	1.03 (.92 - 1.17)	.88 (.78 - .99)
Children under 18 in household (3+)	1.04 (.87 - 1.23)	1.00 (.81 - 1.23)	.93 (.77 - 1.13)	.88 (.72 - 1.09)
Education – some college	1.33 (1.20 - 1.47)	1.12 (.98 - 1.28)	1.12 (.98 - 1.29)	1.28 (1.12 - 1.48)
Education – college degree or higher	1.31 (1.18 - 1.44)	.91 (.80 - 1.04)	.98 (.85 - 1.12)	1.70 (1.48 - 1.94)
In labor force or school	1.40 (1.25 - 1.56)	1.92 (1.25 - 2.96)	1.95 (1.25 - 3.03)	1.44 (.86 - 2.41)
Religious involvement (index)		1.08 (1.01 - 1.17)	1.06 (.99 - 1.14)	1.07 (1.00 - 1.15)

35 BRIDGING NETWORKS

Non-religious involvement (factor score)	1.26 (1.19 – 1.35)	1.21 (1.14 – 1.27)	1.32 (1.24 – 1.39)
Socialized with co-workers in past 12 months – once	.82 (.62 – 1.08)	1.06 (.79 – 1.43)	1.14 (.84 – 1.53)
Socialized – 2-4 times	1.12 (.95 – 1.32)	1.30 (1.09 – 1.55)	1.16 (.97 – 1.39)
Socialized – 5-9 times	1.34 (1.12 – 1.60)	1.24 (1.04 – 1.49)	1.17 (.98 – 1.40)
Socialized – 10 or more times	1.51 (1.29 – 1.75)	1.59 (1.36 – 1.87)	1.40 (1.19 – 1.64)
Number of close friends	1.31 (1.24 – 1.38)	1.22 (1.16 – 1.29)	1.23 (1.17 – 1.30)
Percent out-group, metro area	1.03 (1.03-1.04)	1.07 (1.06 – 1.09)	1.09 (1.08 – 1.11)
Percent out-group, neighborhood (n)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.01)	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02)	Data not available
Percent lived same house 5 years ago (n)	.99 (.98 - .99)	.99 (.99 – 1.00)	.98 (.98 - .99)
Reside in suburb	.79 (.69 - .91)	.95 (.83 – 1.08)	.80 (.69 - .91)
<i>Log pseudo-likelihood</i>	-8884.8	-5654.8	-5849.9
<i>Wald chi-square</i>	268.3***	470.6***	714.1***
<i>(N)</i>	(9,350)	(9,337)	(9,334)

* P<.05, ** P<.01, *** P<.001 (all two-tailed tests). All odds ratios significantly different from 1 show P|z|>.01 or higher.

TABLE 8
THE RACE BRIDGES OF MINORITY RESPONDENTS
Binomial Logits of Selected Variables on Odds of Having a White Friend, by Respondent's Race (odds ratios)

<i>Independent Variable</i>	Exp (B) and 95% Confidence Intervals		
	Black Respondents	Hispanic Respondents	Asian Respondents
Woman	.70 (.52 - .94)	1.19 (.83 - 1.71)	1.51 (.76 - 2.98)
Age 35-49 years	.94 (.69 - 1.28)	.94 (.63 - 1.40)	.50 (.24 - 1.05)
Age 50-64 years	1.72 (1.07 - 2.77)	.97 (.54 - 1.73)	1.04 (.30 - 3.60)
Age 65 years or older	.88 (.31 - 2.52)	2.09 (.26 - 16.7)	.03 (.00 - .16)
Married or living with partner	1.21 (.90 - 1.63)	1.35 (.91 - 2.00)	.51 (.23 - 1.11)
Children under 18 in household (1-2)	.85 (.61 - 1.17)	1.10 (.71 - 1.70)	1.25 (.60 - 2.61)
Children under 18 in household (3+)	.65 (.42 - .99)	.99 (.60 - 1.63)	1.30 (.41 - 4.13)
Education – some college	1.59 (1.20 - 2.19)	2.92 (1.81 - 4.71)	2.51 (.90 - 7.03)
Education – college degree or higher	1.54 (1.00 - 2.36)	3.51 (1.86 - 6.63)	2.76 (1.09 - 7.01)
In labor force or school	1.02 (.32 - 3.28)	1.35 (.41 - 4.52)	--
Religious involvement (index)	1.11 (.88 - 1.40)	1.50 (1.06-2.10)	1.51 (.86 - 2.67)

37 BRIDGING NETWORKS

Non-religious involvement (factor score)	1.45 (1.21 – 1.75)	1.46 (1.03 – 2.08)	2.04 (1.09 – 3.83)
Socialized with co-workers in past 12 months – once	1.16 (.66 – 2.06)	2.60 (.98 – 6.87)	6.02 (1.13 – 32.0)
Socialized – 2-4 times	1.88 (1.27 – 2.79)	1.71 (1.04 – 2.8)	1.98 (.78 – 5.04)
Socialized – 5-9 times	1.73 (1.08 – 2.74)	1.97 (1.08 – 3.58)	2.12 (.70 – 6.39)
Socialized – 10 or more times	2.64 (1.77 – 3.92)	3.58 (2.21 – 5.57)	1.70 (.67 – 4.32)
Number of close friends	1.16 (1.00 – 1.33)	1.38 (1.17 – 1.63)	1.47 (1.02 – 2.13)
Percent white, metro area	1.01 (.99 – 1.02)	1.00 (1.00 – 1.01) ^a	--
Percent white, neighborhood	1.00 (.99 – 1.00)	1.00 (1.00 – 1.01) ^a	1.01 (1.00 – 1.02) ^a
Reside in suburb	1.04 (.63 – 1.71)	1.22 (.59 – 2.51)	--
Percent lived same house 5 years ago (n)	.99 (.98 – 1.00)	1.00 (.99 – 1.02)	--
U.S. citizen	--	--	See text
Preferred interview in Spanish language	--	See text	--
<i>Log pseudo-likelihood</i>	-783.2	-579.9	-167.9
<i>Wald chi-square</i>	131.8***	140.2***	49.62***
(N)	(1,596)	(1,229)	(435)

* P<.05, ** P<.01, *** P<.001 (all two-tailed tests). All odds ratios significantly different from 1 show P|z|<.01 or higher.

^a Rounded (greater than zero).

TABLE 9
CONSOLIDATION OF RACE AND STATUS IN FRIENDSHIPS
Binomial Logistic Regressions of Selected Variables on Odds of Having a Friend who Owns a Business, by Respondent's Race

<i>Independent Variable</i>	Exp (B) and 95% Confidence Intervals		
	Black Respondents	Hispanic Respondents	Asian Respondents
Low income (<\$20K per year)	.87 (.65 - 1.15)	.70 (.52 - .95)	--
Less than high school education or equivalent	.52 (.39 - .69)	.71 (.50 - .99)	--
Has a white friend	3.00 (2.21 - 4.07)	4.68 (3.32 - 6.58)	---
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-554.6	-488.2	-57.82
<i>Chi-square</i>	82.29***	115.70***	Not significant
<i>(N)</i>	(860)	(833)	(91)

* P<.05, ** P<.01, *** P<.001 (all two-tailed tests). All odds ratios significantly different from 1 show $P|z|<.05$ or higher.