

# Measuring Populism Worldwide

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Global Party Survey, 2019

# Measuring Populism Worldwide

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[www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)

**Data:** <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/GlobalPartySurvey>.

**Synopsis:** Populism studies have rapidly burgeoned but nevertheless systematic cross-national evidence about this phenomenon has lagged far behind. How can populism be measured in ways which are consistent, valid, and reliable? To address this issue, *Part I* outlines the minimalist concept of populism used in the study. *Part II* summarizes the pros and cons of previous attempts at gauging and classifying party ideological values and issue positions in general, as well as recent studies seeking to classify populists as a distinct party family. *Part III* describes the research design employed to construct the Global Party Survey, replicating the methods of previous expert surveys but expanding coverage worldwide and including innovative measures of populist rhetoric. The new dataset, drawing upon estimates from 1,861 experts, covers 1,043 political parties in 163 countries around the globe (see [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)). *Part IV* presents key results and a series of robustness tests confirming that the new estimates of ideological values and populist parties are consistently correlated with previous measures. The conclusion in *Part V* summarizes the results and considers the potential uses of the dataset for understanding populism as a global phenomenon.

**Keywords:** populist parties, measuring populism, expert survey methods, comparative politics

The rise of populism has generated a rapidly expanding literature across diverse social science disciplines. But can parties as varied as the Sweden Democrats, Jobbik, the French National Rally, and the Italian Five Star Movement all be classified consistently as part of the same ‘populist radical right’ family? Are there shared values among ‘populist’ leaders as diverse as Donald Trump, Geert Wilders, Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duterte, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Miloš Zeman, Hugo Chavez, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, and Nigel Farage? Unfortunately, systematic, valid, and rigorous cross-national measurement of the populist phenomenon has lagged far behind scholarly research.

The Global Party Survey project aims to identify multidimensional patterns of party competition in global perspective, broadening and updating estimates from previous expert surveys used for this purpose. The study also includes innovative measures gauging how far political parties around the world use populist rhetoric.

*Part I* discusses the concept of populism employed in the study, understood as a rhetoric claiming that the only legitimate authority flows directly from ‘the people’, and by contrast ‘the establishment’ is corrupt, out of touch and self-serving, betraying the public trust, and thwarting the popular will. *Part II* describes the pros and cons of techniques used previously to measure the general ideological values and issue positions of political parties, as well as recent studies seeking to classify populist parties as a distinct family. *Part III* builds upon the methods of expert surveys to construct the Global Party Survey, designed to estimate of key ideological values, issue positions, and the degree of populist rhetoric used by contemporary political parties worldwide. The dataset draws upon 1,861 experts. It covers 1,043 political parties in 163 countries around the globe (see [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)).

*Part IV* briefly describes key results by data visualizations illustrating multidimensional patterns of party competition on Left-Right economic values and Conservative-Liberal social values, as well as in the use of populist rhetoric. A series of robustness tests provide health checks to compare the GPS estimates with several previous studies of European parties (including the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), the Parliamentary Governance project, and the Comparative Manifesto Project), as well as the list of populist parties developed by Team Populus, and the values and attitudes of party voters from the pooled World Values Survey/European Values Survey 1-7. The conclusion in *Part V* summarizes the key features of the GPS dataset and its capacity to expand the research agenda by understanding populism as a global phenomenon.

## **I: The concept of populism**

It is essential to establish clear definitions of populism prior to developing valid operational measures. A common approach in the research literature, followed by the project, regards populism as a rhetorical form or style of political discourse, implying a language and form of speech designed to persuade its audience (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Aalberg et al 2017; Bonikowski and Gidron 2016; Hawkins 2009; Hawkins et al 2019).

Building upon this perspective, populism is conceptualized in this study as a rhetoric about legitimate authority and where power should rightfully lie. At minimum, what qualifies rhetoric as specifically ‘populist’ are twin claims,

namely that: (i) the only legitimate authority flows directly from the ‘people’, and by contrast (ii) the enemy of the people are the ‘establishment’ who are corrupt, out of touch, and self-serving, false, betraying the public trust, and thwarting the popular will. The notions of ‘people’ and ‘establishment’ are fuzzy in this language rather than precise, and malleable to each context and audience rather than well-defined.

In the political sphere, the rhetoric claims that legitimacy lies with the ‘people’, a powerful claim echoing core democratic values. In practice, however, the language may often be weaponized as a façade by strongman leaders with authoritarian values who claim a direct mandate to act on behalf of ‘the people’ while they actively seek to dismantle checks and balances on executive power. This includes attacking the legitimacy of elected representatives and political opponents, as well as the courts, judges, and rule of law, state officials and mainstream media, along with the broader range of policy technocrats, professional think-tanks, academic opinion-formers, and scientific consultants.

As argued in our previous work (Norris and Inglehart 2019):

*“In this regard, populism is treated not a distinct type of leadership, or even a family of political parties, as is often assumed, but rather as a discourse about governance that can be adopted by actors across the entire ideological spectrum. We reject the notion that populism, in itself, makes other ideological claims about substantive or programmatic claims about what should be done; instead it is a rhetoric about the rightful location of governance authority in any society.*

*In Western democracies, the most common antithesis of populism is ‘Pluralism’, emphasizing the importance of tolerating multiculturalism and social diversity in society, governance through liberal democratic institutions, the role of checks and balances on executive powers, and respect for minority rights to counterbalance the majoritarian voice of the people. In non-democratic countries, however, populism may also be contested by those advocating ‘elitism’ – claiming that power should rest in the hands of a single leader, a leadership elite, or a predominant party.”* (Norris and Inglehart 2019).

Ideologies such as socialism, communism or liberalism present a set of coherent values and principles, suggesting a plan of action to achieve these goals, with policies on a wide range of issues like the economy, immigration, the environment, and international affairs. By contrast, populism does not provide a vision about the good society or present a coherent set of ideas. The chameleonic rhetoric of populism is adaptable to parties and leaders of many political persuasions. It is colored by ‘second order’ principles, including varied values and issue positions.

The European literature has conventionally categorized populists as part of the so-called ‘radical right’ or ‘extreme right’, implying unidimensional patterns of party competition (Ignazi 2003; Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Hainsworth 1992, 2000; Mudde 2007, 2016; Wodak et al. 2013). But, in fact, a broader perspective suggests that these labels, and indeed even the conventional Left-Right framework, are often inadequate to capture the varied types of populists found around the world. Many populist leaders have traditionally been regarded as economically leftwing in Central and Eastern

Europe (Pirro 2015) as well as in Latin America (Torre and Arnson 2013). In the United States, as well, President Trump advocates a *mélange* of policies including America-First nationalism, anti-immigrant nativism, and social conservatism on cultural issues like gay rights, climate change, gun control, and reproductive rights, mixed with protectionist economic policies like tariffs and farm subsidies which fly in the face of traditional GOP orthodoxy. The populist tropes can also be heard in the language of social democrats like Senator Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, railing against the billionaire class and policies benefitting the ‘few not the many’ while advocating progressive taxation and healthcare for all.

One reason for the difficulties of understanding this phenomenon is that, like an architectural façade for a movie studio lot, the rhetorical style (and thus the ideas being expressed in the speech) may be genuine or faux. The language is chameleonic and adaptable. Slogans are intended to signal shared meanings recognized by its audience as largely symbolic rather than literal (‘Build the Wall’, ‘Lock her Up’, ‘Drain the Swamp’, ‘Get Brexit Done’). Critics regard such slogans as transparent lies. By expressing shared feelings of anger, however, supporters may believe that the words reflect a deeper truth (Wodak 2015). The exaggerative hyperbole anticipates the hopes and fears of the audience, building repetitive call-and-response choruses interacting with the speaker, as predictable as familiar church rituals. Indeed, the rhetoric may say more about the audience than the speaker. President Trump, for example, uses two distinct styles of oratory, one flat and humdrum, read from the teleprompter for official occasions, the other impromptu, rambling, repetitive, and deeply emotive, tapping into the impotent rage, victimhood resentment, and frustration of his base (Kelly 2019; Rowland 2019; Lamont, Park and Ayala-Hurtado 2017). What version is real? Whether language conveys the genuine intentions of any speaker cannot be determined by analysis of the meaning of the words alone, but only by whether their actions are either consistent with the language – or contradictory. In the words of President Obama: *“Now suddenly President Trump acts like he’s a populist helping working people? Come on, man. You wanna know what somebody’s gonna do? Look at what they have been doing their whole lives.”*

[Figure 1 about here]

This understanding leads to the framework illustrated in Figure 1. The use of populist rhetoric is conceptualized as a ‘first order’ set of normative values about the rightful distribution of legitimate authority and power in decision-making processes. In liberal democracies, the most common contrast to populism is the rhetoric of ‘liberal pluralism’, emphasizing the values of multiculturalism and tolerance of social diversity, the importance of liberal democratic institutions in providing checks and balances limiting the abuse of executive powers, and respect for minority rights to counterbalance the majoritarian voice of ‘the people’. The substantive meaning of the rhetoric about governance becomes colored by the second order principles, including social and economic values and programmatic policy positions, reflecting core socioeconomic and cultural cleavages in the mass electorate.

## II: Measuring party values and rhetoric

Until relatively recently, an extensive literature on populism in Latin America has most commonly drawn upon intensive case-studies of particular leaders

seen to exemplify this phenomenon – such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Carlos Menem in Argentina, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru. In Europe, scholars have focused upon comparing specific political parties seen as ‘populist’, such as the French National Rally, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Alternative for Germany, the Lega and the Five Star Movement in Italy, and the Danish People’s Party, Norway Progress Party, and Sweden Democrats party in Scandinavia, Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary, and so on.

In general, the single in-depth case-study and small-N comparative method is invaluable for generating a rich contextual literature, for insights into elite strategies and historical processes, and for grounded theory-building (Gerring 2004). Over-reliance on these methods carries several risks, however, restricting the development of general concepts and theories applicable across diverse political parties, social conditions and institutional contexts, limiting systematic testing of propositions through cross-national empirical evidence, and hindering the Large-N comparative method in the sub-field of populism studies.

How can the concept of populist rhetoric be measured in a valid and reliable way? And, in general, what methods allow analysts to operationalize, categorize, and compare contemporary patterns of party competition around the world? Several alternative techniques have traditionally been used in studies to explore general cross-national and longitudinal patterns of party ideologies and issue positions, each with different strengths and weaknesses (Mair 2001; Laver 2001). This includes gathering data from:

- (i) Identifying ‘party families’ according to shared names;
- (ii) Classifying parties based on transnational organizational affiliations;
- (iii) Rhetorical analysis of the discourse used in leadership speeches and political communications;
- (iv) Hand and digitalized content analysis coding the texts of programmatic party platforms, exemplified by the Comparative Manifesto Project;
- (v) Expert surveys used to identify party issue positions and ideological values, like the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).

Other methods, not reviewed here for reasons of space, include analysis of roll-call votes by legislators (Poole and Rosenthal 2001), surveys of political elites (such as elected representatives, parliamentary candidates, activists and party members) (Katz and Wessels 1999; van Haute and Gauja 2015), and mass surveys gathering voters’ estimate of party issue positions and their own policy preferences and populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014).

What are the pros and cons of the main approaches for identifying patterns of party competition -- and which are potentially most useful for populism studies?

#### *(i) Party names*

Other older typologies often defined party families based on shared nomenclatures, such as ‘Social Democrats’, ‘Christian Democrats’, ‘Liberals’,

and ‘Greens’ (Ware 1996; Mair and Mudde 1998). The titles that parties adopt goes to the heart of their brand name in the political marketplace and their historical origins. It seems a straightforward approach to classify party families by their self-adopted names.

In practice, however, party labels can disguise deep ideological divisions, such as those between neo-classical laissez-faire liberals, favoring free markets and a minimal role for governments, versus social liberals, advocating cradle-to-grave welfare states, progressive taxation, and generous public services. Moreover, identical party labels have been adopted by parties with contrasting platforms and ideologies. The same party name can also mask major ideological shifts over time, exemplified by the contrasts between the Republican party under George H. Bush and Donald Trump, or the British Labour party under the leadership of Tony Blair and Jeremy Corbyn. Parties and leaders widely regarded as populists do not adopt the populist label and many, wanting to burnish their outsider credentials, also adopt *sui generis* names to avoid being associated with established parties, exemplified by the Italian Five Star Movement, Poland’s Law and Justice Party, the Greek Golden Dawn, and the Spanish Podemos.

(ii) *Transnational party affiliations*

Scholars of party politics often seek to classify distinct party families through common transnational organizational networks, such as membership in the European People’s Party, or institutional affiliations with transnational federations, exemplified by the Liberal International and the Global Greens. This approach is most useful for classifying older party families, such as members affiliated with the Socialist International. This method is relatively straightforward to apply using publicly accessible information. It also reflects the way that political parties seek to build international alliances, cooperate across borders, and share resources with sister organizations (Gomez-Reino 2017).

But these networks have proved far from stable, with populist parties shifting alliances; for example, the Italian Northern League belonged to the Rainbow Coalition in the European Parliament before moving in 1994 to join the Euro-liberals. Political parties can also be members simultaneously of different associations at transnational, national, and regional levels. For example, several parties in the European Parliament which are commonly regarded as populist are currently associated with the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group. This includes the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Flemish Vlaams Belang (FB), the French National Rally (FN), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Italian Lega Nord, and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). But the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD) provides another rival group in the European Parliament, linking UKIP (prior to Brexit), the Alternative for Germany, the Five Star Movement, the Lithuanian Order and Justice party, and the Sweden Democrats. The EFD is Eurosceptic, using populist rhetoric claiming to reflect ‘the people’s voice’ by fighting ‘big government, big banks, and big business’ which are ‘strangling national identities.’

Not all European parties commonly seen as populist belong to these two groupings, however, for example the Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party are members of the center-right European Conservatives and

Reformists. European populist parties have recently strengthened their transnational networks, but these ties are not yet consolidated (Gomez-Reino 2017). Therefore, it is far from easy to identify the common ideological principles and shared values of populist political parties based on shifting allegiances to formal transnational affiliations.

*(iii) Rhetorical and discourse analysis*

An approach common in communication studies focuses upon deconstructing the speeches, social media messages, and press releases of parties and leaders. Techniques include discourse analysis and both human and computerized content analysis of text and visual images. This perspective reflects the concept of populism used in this study, where it is viewed as a style of communication characterized by a language claiming ‘power to the people’ and a critique of the establishment, rather than a set of ideological beliefs about substantive public policies on issues like the economy (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Aalberg et al 2017). For example, this approach was used by Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) when they examined over 2000 American presidential speeches from 1952-1996. Populist language was found to be used by both Democrats and Republicans – but especially by challengers and outsiders. Similarly, Lamont et al (2017) scrutinized Trump’s campaign speeches, while Kreis (2017) deconstructing his Twitter feed as an informal, direct and provoking communication style.

The most extensive use of this approach for cross-national comparison, developed by Hawkins (2009), and expanded by the Global Populism Project (Hawkins et al 2019), has analyzed selected leadership speeches by over 200 presidents and prime ministers to understand its key features and measure populism. Discourse analysis of written texts and visual symbols can provide potentially useful insights, especially to compare successive leaders within a particular country. But the techniques face many challenges when seeking to use the method for cross-national comparisons, raising issues of equivalence when covering speeches in multiple languages. Moreover, so far the classifications developed by the Global Populism Project have not yet been subjected to robustness tests against independent evidence.

*(iv) Programmatic policy platforms and issue positions*

One of the most common practices in the comparative literature has sought to distinguish the issue location of political parties, and the similarities across party families, based on content analysis of policy manifestos. Data has been extracted from hand and automatic textual coding of party platforms, exemplified by the long-standing [Comparative Manifesto Project](#) (Budge 2000; Budge et al 2001; Klingemann et al 2006; Benoit and Laver 2007; Krouwel and Elrinkhof 2014).

The Comparative Manifesto Project provides the most extensive resources, widely used in the research literature, covering party manifestos published in more than fifty countries since 1945. These documents have been analyzed to identify issue salience (the amount of coverage or prominence) as well as issue positions (the direction of statements for or against issues) published in party election programs and related proxy documents. Directional theories of party competition assume that parties vary primarily in how much prominence or salience party manifestos devote to certain issues, such as unemployment, healthcare, or inflation (Laver and Budge 1992).



Most attempts at party classification based on this data have used the familiar 'Left-Right' dimension, including redistributive economic issues reflecting the class cleavage, such as party positions for or against taxation, welfare spending, privatization or nationalization, and so on. These were key to patterns of party competition in many European countries during the post-war era with Keynesian economic policies, pro-welfare state, and public ownership, on the center-left, and free-market policies favoring a smaller role for the state, deregulation, and low taxes on the center-right. The CMP data demonstrates that the Left-Right issue cleavage has gradually faded in importance, however, as party programs during recent decades have often given greater prominence to Liberal and Conservative social issues, like LGBTQ rights, immigration, reproductive rights, and environmental protection, reflecting contemporary culture wars (Norris and Inglehart 2019).

The CPM project has become the standard reference source for analyzing trends in the issue agenda and party competition in European democracies, where parliamentary parties publish official manifesto documents which guide their policy programs if they are elected to power. Outside of this context, however, platforms may not function as important guides to party policy, for example, in presidential contests with personalistic competition, where parties compete with clientelist appeals, or where parties and party systems are unstable and poorly institutionalized. Even more importantly, the CMP coding system was not designed to capture the core components of populism as a style of discourse -- and it is difficult to see how the data could be adapted retrospectively for this purpose

*(iv) Expert surveys*

Expert surveys have been increasingly adopted within the global scientific and policy communities to construct multiple international and domestic indicators of complex phenomena, exemplified by the World Bank Institute [Good Governance indices](#), the [Varieties of Democracy](#) project, Transparency International's [Corruption Perception Index](#), and the [Electoral Integrity Project](#) (Cooley and Snyder 2015).

The technique has been used for a long series of comparative studies seeking to classify the ideological values and issue positions of political parties based on expert estimates, including datasets produced by Castles and Mair (1984), Laver and Hunt (1992), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Ray (1999), Wiesehomier (2019), and the series of [Chapel Hill Expert Survey \(CHES\)](#) conducted every four years since 1999 (Hooghe et al 2010; Bakker et al. 2012, 2015).

The series of Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) has traditionally focused on measuring party competition in Europe towards the classic Left-Right ideological cleavage in post-war politics, monitored by party positions on policy issues such as management of the economy, social welfare, and European integration, as well as the Liberal-Conservative cleavage revolving around cultural and social values, such as positions towards issues of immigration, environmental protection, reproductive rights, and homosexuality. CHES was not designed to measure populism, however, although selected anti-elite and anti-corruption variables from the 2014 questionnaire have been adapted for this purpose (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Polk 2017; Simmons et al 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019).

Two other recent attempts have sought to fill this lacuna by identifying cross-national lists of populist parties. Team Populism worked with journalists at *The Guardian*, consulting an informal network of 30 scholars to generate a list of 127 political parties classified as populist/ non-populist in thirty Europe states (Rooduijn et al 2019). In another study, for the Tony Blair Institute, Kyle and Gultchin (2018) developed a database of 53 populist leaders in 33 countries by identifying the use of the term through searches in the academic journal literature. These classifications have not been subject to robustness tests, however, and the use of simple binary categories (populist/non-populist) makes them vulnerable to major classification errors.

### III: THE GPS RESEARCH DESIGN

To address these issues, the Global Party Survey, 2019 (GPS) has been designed as an international expert survey to compare key ideological values, issue positions, and populist rhetoric used by political parties around the world. The questionnaire includes 21 core survey items designed to estimate key ideological values, issue positions, and populist rhetoric. The dataset provides estimates for 1,052 parties in 163 countries, drawing on responses gathered from 1,861 party and election experts. There are several potential advances from the new evidence, namely the Global Party Survey:

- Expands comparisons of political parties well beyond Western democracies;
- Uses fine-grained scaled measures which can be disaggregated into categories;
- Incorporates standardized party codes for merging with related cross-national macro, mezzo and micro-level datasets; and,
- The methods maintain continuity with previous studies, facilitating robustness tests.

#### *Questionnaire design*

The questionnaire for the Global Party Survey was administered through the Qualtrics platform. It includes 21 core items measured using ten-point continuous scales (illustrated in Figure 1). These were designed to identify each party's current position and salience ideological values on Left-Right economic values and Liberal-Conservative Social Values; their position on several policy issues such as spending and taxation, immigration, nationalism, women's rights, ethnic minority rights, liberal democracy, and environmental protection; as well as several items monitoring their position and saliency concerning the use of populist rhetoric. The full GPS Questionnaire and Codebook can be downloaded from the project [website](#), along with some data visualizations illustrating the results.

[Figure 2 about here]

As well as the core items, the GPS survey also asked questions about the expert's nationality and citizenship, gender, age, party preferences, and their self-reported L-R ideology, as well as their familiarity with each of the parties, and the degree of difficulty they experienced in completing the survey. Many more items were considered but eventually dropped as the final design sought to establish a judicious trade-off which balanced the length of the questionnaire with the likely fall in the response rate from using a longer

survey. The questionnaire was professionally translated and made available in six major world languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, and Mandarin).

*Operationalizing the concept of populist rhetoric*

As discussed earlier, populism is defined as a rhetoric making claims about first order principles concerning the source of legitimate authority governing any polity, emphasizing ‘power to the people’ and presenting a critique of ‘the establishment’, rather than presenting a set of coherent ideological beliefs about substantive public policies on issues like the economy, immigration, or nationalism. This section of the questionnaire specifies to respondents that the study “seeks to understand the type of rhetoric commonly used by each party, such as in their leadership speeches, rallies, press releases, party platforms and campaign communications.” It then asks experts to place each party on a series of scale.

The core measure operationalizing the minimalist conceptualization of populist rhetoric, treated as antithetical to pluralist rhetoric, asks respondents to identify each party’s position on the 10-point scale using following question cue:

*“Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric.*

*POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail.*

*By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power.*

*Where would you place each party on the following scale?*

*0 Strongly favors pluralist rhetoric...10 Strongly favors populist rhetoric”*

Given continuing conceptual debate in the research literature, however, rather than relying upon a single measure, the questionnaire includes alternative indicators which can be used to gauge populism, with items adapted from other surveys. This includes where respondents place each party in their country of expertise on the following 10-point scales:

- The salience or importance of populist rhetoric for the party,
- Whether ordinary people or leaders should decide important issues,
- Whether politicians should lead or follow the will of the people,
- Whether most politicians are honest and trustworthy or dishonest and corrupt,
- Whether parties strongly respect or undermine liberal democratic principles, norms and practices; and
- Whether parties strongly favor or oppose checks and balances on executive power.

Details about the survey questions are specified in the GPS Codebook. This process allows users to select the variables closest to their preferred conceptual framework of populism. By combining survey measures, the dataset helps to identify the parties most likely to use populist language, along with their underlying ideological values and issue positions.

*Measurement and Party Typologies*

There remains debate about the pros and cons of using categorical or continuous measures. The survey employs 0 to 10-point scales throughout the questionnaire. This facilitates more fine-grained estimates than binary categories, such as the degree to which parties favor spending or tax cuts, nationalism or multiculturalism, and liberal or conservative social values. Often, party positions are far from black and white, and scales allow experts to take account of subtle variations among parties and shifts over time. Identifying party positions on continuous scales also avoids sharp-edged boundary issues and potential risks of misclassifications, as well as facilitating more granular analysis.

At the same time, categories may also be useful for analysis, for example to select parties as either outliers or typical cases on any dimension or issue. Scaled ideological measures are converted into categories by taking parties scoring most highly on each item. The core ideological measures in the survey -- estimating the position of parties on the Left or Right towards economic values, and as Liberal or Conservative on social values -- are therefore measured using continuous 10-point scales, but also then sub-divided into binary (0/1) categories, as well as 1-4 ordinal categories.

The survey departs from previous studies by treating the use of populist rhetoric as an appeal which can be adapted and used by parties and leaders across the political spectrum. This differs from treating 'populists' as a distinct type of party family or leadership, a standard practice in the case-study literature.

Nevertheless, for users preferring categories and typologies, the Populist rhetoric scale is also categorized to identify the parties most strongly favoring populist or pluralist rhetoric. Robustness tests, presented in the next section, suggest that the category of 'strongly populist parties' based on this survey correlates closely with Team Populus list of 'populist' parties in Europe.

The dataset offers users several alternative party typologies constructed by combining categorizing variables. The *Party Values* typology combines the types of *economic* and *social* values. These values are often closely correlated in many West European parties, but elsewhere these can often be observed to diverge. The *Populism typology* is generated by categorizing the populist rhetoric scale into four ordinal groups. This assumes that the degree of populist and pluralist rhetoric can vary among parties and leaders, rather than being a fixed and distinct type of party family. Lastly, the *Populist Values* typology combines the type of pluralist or populist rhetoric used by each party with their liberal or conservative social values.

*Party Coverage*

The survey sought to gather information about the position of parliamentary political parties represented in the lower (or single) House of Parliament/Congress in each country under comparison, thereby excluding parties which only contested presidential, supranational, and regional/local elections.

It is challenging to identify a comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date list of political parties worldwide, however, as there is no single published resource. In addition, lists can quickly become out-of-date as the names (and

acronyms) of loosely institutionalized ‘flash’ parties and unstable party coalitions can shift rapidly over time. Leadership parties, formed as loose campaigning factions around the time of an election, but with minimal organizational structure or mass membership, are common in many developing countries. Determining a reliable list of the largest ‘party blocs’ is challenging in states with formal legal bans on party organizations and many independent candidates, such as Kuwait.

The project compiled a list of parliamentary parties (and their share of seat and vote) for each country running for election to the lower house of the legislature using the [IFES Election Guide](#). The list of full party names (in English) for up to ten of the largest parties (with the highest number of legislators) was automatically merged as a field into the Qualtrics questionnaire and tailored for each country. Normally the party list reflected the legislative election closest to the starting date of the survey (Nov 2019), but in some cases the list was compiled from an earlier election (with the year of the election specified in the dataset).

In one or two cases, like Italy, the names of the main party coalitions on the Center-Left and Center-Right were used. This practice will be replaced in any future surveys by listing the names of the individual parties, not least because of the volatility of coalitions over successive contests. In total, the survey covers 1,043 parties worldwide (listed in the GPS Codebook’s Appendix).

To facilitate merging and multilevel analysis, the dataset includes party metadata, such as each party’s share of votes and seats in recent national elections. Standard party identification codes allow users to match the GPS data easily with several other party-level datasets, such as [Party Facts](#) (Doring and Regel 2019), [CHES](#), the [Political Party Database](#) (Scarrow, Webb and Pogunte 2017), and [ParlGov](#). Similarly integrated codes in the dataset also allow users to link GPS estimates of party values with party voters in cross-national surveys of the mass electorate, including the [European Social Survey](#) and [World Values Survey](#).

#### *Country Coverage*

The project sought to cover independent nation-states worldwide, excluding micro-states (with populations less than 100,000, and those without de jure popular elections for the lower house of the national parliament and/or severe party bans. Several other cases were dropped from the final dataset due to non-response. The countries in the study are listed in Table 3.

[Figure 3 about here]

The dataset includes country-level metadata, using the latest year available (usually 2018), including measures of levels of liberal and electoral democracy, the Regimes of the World typology, the type of electoral system, and several institutional party characteristics from the [Varieties of Democracy](#) project (Version 9.0), measure of democracy from Polity IV and Freedom House, as well as national-level measures from the [World Bank Development Indicators](#) of economic development (per capita GDP), area, and population size. Regional codes are included along with the [Electoral Integrity Project](#) index of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. It also includes the standard country codes from the [Correlates of War](#) (COW) project, to facilitate merging other national-level data.

### Experts

Participation in the survey was by personal invitation only. Experts were defined as scholars of parties and elections selected for each country drawing upon the global database established since 2012 by the [Electoral Integrity Project](#), checked and verified according to several criteria. Experts were defined as political scientists (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process and parties in a particular country, such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group, or university employment. This pool was supplemented in a few smaller countries, like island states in the Caribbean, by several additional scholarly party experts suggested by respondents using the ‘snowball’ technique.

Expert surveys have greatly expanded in use during the last decade (Cooley and Snyder 2015). Like other approaches, however, there are many sources of potential bias in the estimates they produce (Budge 2000; Mair 2001; Martinez i Coma and Van Ham 2015). This includes potential errors of judgments arising from assessments of complex multidimensional phenomenon, varied contexts for party competition under different regimes, and the depth of scholars’ expertise on the topic.

Ever since Almond and Verba’s *Civic Culture* (1963), one classic challenge facing cross-national surveys arises from the appropriate benchmarks which people may employ in making their assessments, for example, whether current a party position is judged relative to their past location, or compared with rival parties within a country, or else compared with parties in other societies. As discussed later, the external validity of the data can be examined most effectively by comparing the GPS estimates with similar independent studies of the same parties.

To test for internal validity, the GPS expert-level dataset allows users to analyze whether estimates of party positions were systematically influenced by the background and personal characteristics of participants, such as their nationality, Left-Right ideological leanings, gender, or age (Curini 2009). Regression analysis models using the individual-level expert dataset suggest that none of these factors were significant predictors of estimates for the position of parties on the Pluralism-Populist scale.

Two-thirds of respondents were born in their country of expertise, while three quarters are currently a citizen of that country. One quarter of the experts in the survey were female, reflecting gender disparities in the discipline. Respondents were asked to identify party positions in one country reflecting their primary area of published expertise, irrespective of their nationality or institutional location. The survey included both resident (domestic) and international experts (e.g. a scholar teaching at an American university who specializes in Egyptian or Liberian politics).

There are questions about the reliability of academic experts, in particular whether their estimates may be skewed by more liberal personal values. To test this, the position of experts on the self-reported 10-point Left-Right ideological scale can be compared. The mean was 4.75, just below the mid-point illustrated in Figure 3, suggesting a fairly balanced distribution.

[Figures 3 and 4 about here]

Overall, when asked about the difficulty or ease of completing the survey on a ten-point scale, as illustrated in Figure 4, most reported positively that it was fairly easy (Mean 7.82). There was usually greater familiarity with larger parties, however, suggesting caution is advisable when analyzing estimates for the smaller parties.

#### *Response Rate*

Personalized survey invitations were distributed by email to experts, and responses collected online, through the Qualtrics platform. Fieldwork was conducted for one month, with an initial personal invitation to individual experts followed by two reminders, from 19 November to 20 December 2019.

Responses were received from 1,891 experts in total, representing an overall response rate of 23%. On average, each country included replies from around a dozen experts, but the numbers varied a great deal.

Like V-Dem, the GPS study aimed to include replies from a minimum of five experts per Country-Party. Sometimes we received fewer replies, however, especially in smaller developing societies in Africa and the Middle East; in states governed by autocratic regimes restricting freedom of expression; and in countries where fewer political scientists specialize in the study of parties and elections, and in ‘all of the above’. For example, on average around 19 experts responded to assess parties in liberal democracies. By contrast, around five expert estimates were gathered in many closed autocracies.

There are obviously tensions between the desire for the broadest global coverage and the need for considerable caution about the reliability of the estimates for societies with few responses, generating large confidence intervals. Users can take several steps with these particular cases.

Firstly, the number of experts per country is included as a variable in the dataset (*Experts*). Users may choose to adopt any minimum threshold. For example, the V-Dem project advises users to drop country cases in their dataset with three or fewer expert estimates. The variable (*Min\_experts*) can be selected in GPS to filter out cases below 4.9 experts, removing 193 party estimates. Users may also choose to filter or weight the estimates based on several indicators. This includes a ten-point scaled measure of expert *familiarity* with each political party in each country, which was included as the first item in the questionnaire, along with a 0-10 point scaled measure of the *difficulty* which experts reported at the end of the questionnaire after completing the survey. Finally, analysts may choose to aggregate across country cases, for example to compare world regions or party families.

## **IV: KEY RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS**

The dataset contains many variables which can be explored in detail for macro-level cross-national comparisons of how multidimensional patterns of party competition vary across different world regions, types of regime, cultural areas, or levels of development. Figures 5 and 6 provide a brief illustration of some of the results comparing the key ideological scales measuring Left-Right economic values and Liberal-Conservative social values. The size of each party is shown by the size of the symbol, and only parties with more than 10% of the seats in the national parliament are shown in the graphs, excluding smaller parties. The degree to which political parties

use populist rhetoric, using the main Pluralist-Populist scale already discussed, is illustrated by the symbol color. Parties using the most pluralist rhetoric are indicated in shades of green and the most use of populist rhetoric in shades of red. The type of regime in each country is classified using the Varieties of Democracy coding of Regimes of the World.

[Figure 5 and 6 about here]

Figure 5 illustrates estimates of multidimensional party competition in liberal democracies. The scatterplot shows populist parties are concentrated in the top right quadrant, favoring free market economics with a minimal role for the state and yet traditional social values towards issues of nationalism, nativism and immigration, confirming patterns observed previously using CHES data (Norris and Inglehart 2019). The classic profile includes those such as the Spanish Vox party, the Swiss People's Party, the Alternative for Germany, Israel's Likud, -- and the US Republican party.

But despite often being labelled 'radical right', in fact populist parties are also distributed in the other quadrants, Hence the Danish People's Party and the Czech Freedom and Direct Democracy party are both estimated to be located on the center-Left in their stance towards the economy and welfare state, but still highly nativist, favoring highly restrictive immigration policies. There are also a few populist parties scattered in the other quadrants, such as President Macron who campaigned for *La République En Marche!* as an anti-establishment outsider, while advocating moderate centrist economic policies and a pro-EU stance. Equally complex to classify, Geert Wilder's Dutch Party for Freedom expresses moderately leftwing views on healthcare, social services, and care of the elderly, as well as progressive social values on issues such as gender equality, gay rights and religious freedoms, while still being resolutely anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim (Duina and Carson 2020).

If we compare party competition worldwide, the scatter across all the quadrants becomes more pronounced. Figure 7 shows the distribution of all political parties while Figure 8 presents the locates estimated for the strongly populist parties. Thus, the top right quadrant in both figures includes many populist parties which fit the conventional profile by being rightwing towards the economy and traditional towards social values, exemplified by Modi's BJP in India, the Popular Force in Peru, and the New Frontier Party in the Republic of Korea. But parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland's Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values, for example towards Christianity, homosexuality and immigrants, alongside Bulgaria's United Patriots and Hungary's Fidesz. By contrast, fewer populist parties are seen by experts as free market economically and socially liberal, but there are some, such as the Norwegian Progress party.

[Figures 7 and 8 about here]

The conventional association of populism with 'radical right' parties is therefore commonly observed in Western Europe, although there are important exceptions even within this region, and there are varied varieties of populism around the world. We can focus on comparing the strongly Populist parties identified in the global survey, defined as those scoring over 7.5 on the 10-point Pluralism-Populism scale discussed earlier. As illustrated



in Figure 9, almost half of the strongly populist parties (104/288 or 46%) were estimated to fall into the economically rightwing *and* socially conservative quadrant, fitting the standard ‘radical right’ conceptual framework. But almost as many populist parties around the world (95/288 or 42%) were estimated to be socially conservative towards issues such as gender and minority rights but located on the left towards the economy, for example favoring generous public spending on welfare state benefits and health care, and redistributive taxation. Of the rest, only a small minority of populist parties (20/288 or just 9%) were located in the progressive quadrant, like Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s Syriza, and the Bernie Sanders campaign, expressing economically socialist and socially liberal values. And finally, even fewer populist parties (9/288 or just 4%) were in the classic libertarian quadrant favoring a minimal role for the state, being economically free-market and socially liberal in their values.

[Figure 9 about here]

Clearly a substantial research agenda is needed to confirm the estimates through detailed regional and country studies, especially patterns of party competition in developing societies and electoral democracies, as well as unpacking the potential explanations behind the observed patterns of party competition. Potential explanations include the role of the formal institutional arrangements, such as the use of proportional and majoritarian electoral systems and party laws. Cultural and political legacies may also be expected to prove important, like the deep imprint of communism in Eastern and Central Europe. Other factors include contemporary levels of democratization and economic development, and the predominant societal cleavages underlying each party system. What the preliminary map of party competition suggests is that the use of populist rhetoric is not confined to parties which hold a common set of ideological values, as often assumed in the European literature.

#### *Robustness tests*

Does the GPS data provide reliable and valid measures of party ideological values, issue positions and populist rhetoric? Comparison with other datasets provides health checks of the reliability and robustness of the estimates in this survey. For example, the CHES estimates have been compared with data from party manifestos, surveys of MPs, and other expert studies (Keman 2007; Bakker et al. 2012; Hooghe et al., 2010; Marks et al., 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Whitefield et al., 2007).

At the same time, however, studies can be expected to vary in their estimates for various reasons, not least the use different question wordings, party lists, and methods. Parties are also far from static in their positions and ideological values, whether responding to leadership turnover, the shifting saliency of issues on the policy agenda, changes in their electoral fortunes, or new patterns of party competition. Where studies conducted within a few years of each other can be compared, however, this helps to assess the external validity and robustness of several key GPS estimates.

#### **CHES-2017**

Accordingly, the estimates in the GPS survey can be compared with the most recently available Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The [CHES-2017](#) dataset

contains seven identical (or functionally equivalent) items designed to measure ideological values and issue positions which are comparable to the GPS measures.

[Table 2 and Figure 10 about here]

The comparison of estimates in both studies generates remarkably strong and significant correlations in the 84 European parties contained in both studies (See Table 2 and Figure 10). Despite differences in the timing, selection of experts, and fieldwork methods, both studies produce remarkably similar estimates of party positions.

### **ParlGov**

Comparisons can also be drawn for 192 parties in this study with estimates in the [Parliaments and Government](#) (ParlGov) database (Döring and Manow 2019). The position of political parties was estimated in ParlGov by combining data from previous expert surveys conducted by Castles/Mair 1983, Huber/Inglehart 1995, Benoit/Laver 2006, and CHES 2010. The GPS estimates of the Left-Right economic position of parties was strongly correlated with the ParlGov left-right estimates ( $R=0.739^{***}$ ). Similarly, ParlGov's 10-point value scale for the position of parties on the 'libertarian/authoritarian' dimension was strongly related to the GPS's estimate on this dimension ( $R=0.828^{***}$ ). Given the differences in time periods and measures used, this is a remarkably strong correlation.

### **Comparative Manifesto Project**

The GPS measure of Left-Right economic values can also be compared with the Comparative Manifestoes Project measures of Left-Right ideological party positions, based on textual analysis of the salience of issues in party platforms. The CMP data was averaged for parliamentary election held from 2014-19. The results showed a moderately strong correlation between GPS and these CMP estimates ( $R=.569^{**}$ ,  $N. 157$ ), still statistically significant, but a weaker fit than with the CHES and PG expert surveys.

### **Popu-List**

The position of populist parties has been subject to considerable debate in recent years, not least the European tradition of classifying these using legacy concepts as part of the 'extreme right', 'far right', or 'radical right' party family. The [Popu-List](#) project (Rooduijn et al 2019) provides a test of the face-validity of the GPS estimates. The study consulted a network of thirty scholars of populism to classify the position of 127 European parties with at least 2% of the vote in a national parliamentary election since 1998. Parties were categorized using simple (0/1) binary codes into the four dimensions, namely as populist, far right, far left, and Eurosceptic (Rooduijn et al 2019). Where comparisons could be drawn, Figure 11 shows the Popu-list classification of populist parties (highlighted in red) is strongly correlated with the GPS scaled estimates of populism, using the core Pluralism-Populism scale.

[Figure 11 about here]

Moreover, to examine this further, the Popu-List classification of populist parties in Europe can be compared against several of the measures in the GPS survey. As shown in Table 3, the scaled measure of Pluralism-Populism

proved to be the estimate most strongly correlated with parties classified as populist by the Popu-List project. Several other items in the GPS survey were also strongly correlated with the Popu-List classification, however, as shown in Table 3, such as whether party rhetoric emphasized the ‘will of the people’ and the party position towards political corruption, as well as issues such as opposition to ethnic minority rights and immigration. By contrast, economic values were not significantly to the Popu-List classification of populist parties.

[Table 3 about here]

### **The World Values Survey/European Values Survey, 1981-2020.**

Finally, comparisons can also be drawn between the GPS estimates on major ideological values and the position of voters for each party, using the World Value Survey/European Values Survey ([World Values Survey](#)). This dataset was pooled over all seven waves, to maximize the number of respondents who reported voting for smaller parties, although this generates less up-to-date estimates than using only the most recent wave. The GPS dataset also includes measures of the location of party voters on functionally equivalent Left-Right and Liberal-Conservative scales, derived from the World Values Survey/European Values Survey Waves 1-7. Users can compare the GPS expert estimates of party positions with the location of their own party voters, and the position of the median voter in each country, as well as measures calculating the distance of parties on these scales from their own voters and the median voter in each country.

The *Left-Right scale* in the WVS/EVS has asked respondents to identify their ideological position based on the following question: “*In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking.*” Coded Left (1) to Right (10).

The *Liberal-Conservative social values* scale was constructed from adding responses to three items then converting to a 10-point scale: “*Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card....Abortion, Homosexuality, Divorce.*” This was coded from ‘Always justifiable’ (1) to ‘Never justifiable’ (10) for each item. This is similar but obviously not identical to the CHES/GPS measure of Liberal-Conservative social values (known as the Gal/tan scale).

Strong and significant correlation ( $R=.477^{***}$  N. 401 parties) are observed link the GPS expert estimates of party locations on the Left-Right scale (horizontal axis below) with where party voters placed themselves on the same scale in the WVS/EVS (vertical axis below). Moreover, the correlation strengthened ( $R=.632^{***}$ ) when comparing the subset of 157 parties within the liberal democracies, with more stable and institutionalized party systems (see Figure 12). Similar patterns can be observed when comparing voter’s social values with the position of parties on the liberal-conservative social values scale ( $R=.483^{***}$  N. 416 parties).

[Figure 12 about here]

Overall therefore, where comparisons could be drawn with a wide range of independent evidence, the robustness tests serve as health checks lending confidence to the external validity of the GPS estimates. The inclusion of several independent estimates in the GPS dataset allows analysts to make

their own further comparisons, for example by global region or party type. At the same time, however, as discussed earlier, there remains a health warning about the size of the margin of error of the GPS estimates in parties and countries with few respondents. Replication of the survey in future years would help to provide further cross-checks on the robustness of the estimates.

## V: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

A wealth of popular commentary has sought to understand the rise of populist parties and the consequences of this development. Unfortunately to date cross-national measures of populist parties capable of throwing light on these issues has been limited in a number of ways.

Firstly, comparative studies have devoted most attention to examining parties and leaders in established democracies, especially in Western Europe, where populist actors have conventionally been categorized as part of the ‘radical right’, or the ‘extreme right’, implying a unidimensional form of party competition. The use of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ to categorize parties is deeply ingrained but it may serve to disguise important contrasts. As demonstrated in this study, deeply conservative cultural values are indeed expressed on issues like immigration, gay rights, and gender equality by many populist parties, like the Polish Justice and Development party, Spain’s Vox, and the Swiss People’s Party. Yet a global perspective suggests that populist leaders like Chavez and Sanders, and parties like Fidesz, the Slovak National Party, and Jobbik, endorse leftwing economic policies. And other populist parties, like Syriza and Unidos Podemos, endorse progressive or liberal social values (Duina and Carson 2019). In this regard, scholars need to identify varieties of populists distributed across a multidimensional issue space, such as distinguishing Progressives, the Nativist Left, Laissez faire Libertarians, as well as the Authoritarian Right, rather than assuming that all can be neatly categorized by their ‘extreme’ rightwing position along a single Left-Right dimension (Norris 2019).

The new dataset still needs much further refinement in future iterations, particularly by improving the accuracy of the list of political parties in several countries, especially where there is rapid change in unstable party systems. It is also important to gather more expert assessments in the most challenging cases where few responses were received, including in smaller developing societies and in countries with autocratic regimes. The basic approach could also be replicated to gather new data to compare political leaders, as well as political parties. Subsequent surveys can be used as further checks on the reliability of the estimates.

Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, the new dataset has many potential advantages for users. In particular:

- To improve measurement, the GPS questionnaire incorporates six alternative indicators of populist rhetoric, measured by standardized 0-10 point continuous scales. The more granular measure provides greater precision than simple binary classifications.
- By gauging the use of populist rhetoric by parties, as well as their adherence to key ideological values, and a range of issue positions, analysts can develop systematic typologies identifying varieties of populism.

- By expanding the geographic scope, the Global Party Survey allows cross-national comparisons of party competition well beyond the traditional focus on established democracies in Europe. This is important, not least because programmatic parties, mass-branch party organizations, and party systems reflecting the predominant social cleavages in established European democracies and postindustrial societies may well be atypical of many other parts of the developing world.
- By retaining sufficient continuity on key indices with several previous party datasets, the new GPS survey facilitates replication for the estimates of Left-Right economic values and Conservative-Liberal social values, as well as with lists categorizing populist parties. The series of robustness tests lends confidence about the external validity of the new estimates of party positions.
- Lastly, by including party codes derived from many other related studies, facilitating merger across projects, the new study also expands the capacity for multilevel analysis in related subfields. The dataset. The GPS evidence can be compared, for example, with the national or macro-level context of constitutional arrangements, like electoral systems, party systems, and levels of democracy; with the meso-level characteristics of political parties, like their resources, organizational structure, membership, and size; as well as with the attitudes and values of voters monitored in cross-national surveys of the electorate, at micro-level.

For all these reasons, the new dataset generates many opportunities to expand the research agenda and improve measurement in party politics, electoral analysis, and populism studies.

**Table 1: Country coverage**

	#	Definition and source
Total number of independent nation-states	194	Membership of the United Nations (plus Taiwan)
<b>Excluded categories</b>		
Micro-states (pop less than 100,000)	16	Andorra, Dominica, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Lucia, St Vincent & Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Tonga, and Tuvalu.
Without de jure direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature and/or severe legal bans on parties	7	Brunei Darussalam, China, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Saudi Arabia
Lack of response	8	Cape Verde, CAR, Honduras, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka
Covered in the 2019 GPS dataset	<b>163</b>	84% of all nation-states

**Source:** [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)

**Table 2: Comparing GPS and CHES estimates**

	R	Sig
V4 Values: The party is left (0) or right (10) on economic issues	0.848	0.000
V5 Saliency: The importance of economic issues	0.822	0.000
V6 Values: The party is liberal (0) or conservative (10) in their social values	0.939	0.000
V7: Saliency: The importance of social values	0.788	0.000
V10 Issues: Party favors liberal (0) or restrictive (10) immigration policies	0.936	0.000
V15 Issues: Party favors (0) or opposes (10) ethnic minority rights	0.885	0.000
V19 Rhetoric: The people should decide important issues (0) or leaders should decide (10)	0.598	0.000

**Sources:** [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org) [CHES-2017](#)

**Table 3: Correlations of GPS and the Popu-List classification of populist parties.**

		R	Sig
V8	Party favors pluralist or populist rhetoric	0.542	***
V13	Party favors multilateralism or nationalism	0.509	***
V18	Party rhetoric strongly emphasizes that politicians should follow the will of the people	0.496	***
V16	Party respects or undermines liberal democratic principles	0.436	***
V20	Party rhetoric emphasizes that most politicians are dishonest and corrupt	0.457	***
V15	Party opposes ethnic minority rights	0.425	***
V19	Party rhetoric emphasizes that the people should decide important issues	0.380	***
V21	Party rhetoric opposes checks and balances on executive power	0.369	***
V10	Party favors liberal or restrictive immigration policies	0.366	***
V14	Party opposes women's rights	0.333	***
V12	Party opposes environmental protection	0.330	***
V17	Party favors distribution of public goods mainly to their own supporters (clientelism)	0.296	***
V3	Party presents detailed plans or more general slogans and vague promises	0.258	***
V6	Party is conservative in their social values	0.256	***
V11	Party favors increased public spending or reduced taxation	0.052	N/s
V4	Party is leftwing or rightwing in their economic values	0.004	N/s

Source: <https://popu-list.org/> [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)



**Figure 1: The conceptual framework of multidimensional party competition**

<b>MAJOR CLEAVAGES IN PARTY COMPETITION</b>	
<b>Legitimate authority and decision-making processes:</b> Who should decide policy issues. The role & powers of leaders, elected representative and authorities, and the people.	
<b>Left-right economic values</b> What should be done and the role of state v. markets in managing the economy, welfare, and redistribution.	<b>Conservative-liberal social values</b> What should be done and the role of the state in managing social order, foreign relations, and moral issues
<b>Socio-economic cleavages:</b> Linked to socioeconomic class, income, wealth, poverty, local community and human development	<b>Cultural cleavages:</b> Linked to generation, education, race/ethnicity, religiosity, urban-rural, nation/region/localities

Figure 2: Illustrating the question format for the scaled measures

Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state.

Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government.


Where would you place each party on the following scale?

	0: Extreme Economic Left	1	2	3	4	x 5	x 6	7	8	9	10: Extreme Economic Right	Don't Know/Not applicable
» \${e://Field/P1Name}	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
» \${e://Field/P2Name}	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>


Source: [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)

**Figure 3: The distribution of left-right ideological values by experts**

Below is a 10 point scale on which your general political views can be arranged from LEFT to RIGHT.  
Where would you place your views on this scale? - Very left:Very right




Source: [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)

**Figure 4: Assessments of the difficulties of completion by experts**

Source: [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)


Figure 5: Party competition in liberal democracies



**KEY:** Left-Right values on the horizontal axis are measured by: "Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?" **Social values** on the vertical axis are measured by: "Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?" **Populism**, coloring the categorized bubbles, is measured by: "Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?" Red=high, green=low. The bubble size reflects the % seat for each party in recent elections.

www.GlobalPartySurvey.org


Figure 6: Party competition worldwide



**KEY: Left-Right values** on the horizontal axis are measured by: “Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” **Social values** on the vertical axis are measured by: “Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” **Populism**, coloring the categorized bubbles, is measured by: “Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Red=high, green=low. The bubble size reflects the % seat for each party in recent elections.

www.GlobalPartySurvey.org

Figure 7: Varieties of strongly populist parties



**KEY: Left-Right values** on the horizontal axis are measured by: "Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?" **Social values** on the vertical axis are measured by: "Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?" **Populism**, coloring the categorized bubbles, is measured by: "Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?" *Only strongly [populist parties (scoring 7.5 or above)]* The bubble **size** reflects the % seat for each party in recent elections.


**Figure 8: The distribution of the varieties of populist parties**

	Leftwing economic values	Rightwing economic values
Conservative social values	<p>E.g. Hungary's Fidesz, Polish Law and Justice Party, Danish People's Party</p> <p><b>42% (95)</b></p>	<p>E.g. Swiss People's Party, Likud, India's BJP, Greek Golden Dawn, US Republicans</p> <p><b>46% (104)</b></p>
Liberal social values	<p>E.g. Spain's Podemos, Greece's SYRIZA, Italy's Five Star Movement</p> <p><b>9% (20)</b></p>	<p>E.g. Bangladesh Jatiya Party, Norway Progress Party</p> <p><b>5% (9)</b></p>



Figure 9: Comparing the GPS and CHES expert estimates of Liberal-Conservative social values


Correlations of the GPS-2019 and CHES-2017 estimates



Notes: Q: “Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following scale?”

Sources: [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org) CHES-2017


Figure 10: Comparing the GPS expert estimates of populism with the Popu-List classification



**Notes:** “We seek to understand the type of rhetoric commonly used by each party, such as in their leadership speeches, rallies, press releases, party platforms, and campaign communications. Vertical Axis: Parties can be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scales? And how important is populist rhetoric for each of these parties?” Parties in RED are identified as populist by the Popu-List project.

Source: <https://popu-list.org/> [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org)

Figure 11. Comparing the GPS expert estimates of Left-Right party positions with the mean Left-Right position of each party's voters in Liberal Democracies



**KEY: Left-Right values of parties** on the horizontal axis are measured in the GPS by: *“Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?”* **LR position of each party’s voters** on the vertical axis are measured in the WVS/EVS 1-7 by: *“In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking.”* Coded Left (1) to Right (10). **Populism**, coloring the categorized bubbles, is measured by: *“Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?”* **Red=high, green=low.** The bubble **size** reflects the % seat for each party in recent elections. Liberal democracies only. [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org) and [www.WorldValuesSurvey.org](http://www.WorldValuesSurvey.org)

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The *Global Party Survey dataset* (Version 1, Spring 2020) is available in Excel, SPSS, Stata and .csv formats at the level of experts and parties, along with the Codebook and Questionnaire. Details are available from the project website [www.GlobalPartySurvey.org](http://www.GlobalPartySurvey.org) and the data files can be downloaded from: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/GlobalPartySurvey>

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