Who Should Make Decisions? Public Perceptions of Democratic Inclusion in Housing Policy
Faculty Research Working Paper Series

Justin de Benedictis-Kessner
Harvard Kennedy School

Katherine Levine Einstein
Boston University

Maxwell Palmer
Boston University

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Who Should Make Decisions? Public Perceptions of Democratic Inclusion in Housing Policy

Justin de Benedictis-Kessner* Katherine Levine Einstein† Maxwell Palmer‡

June 6, 2023

Abstract

Who deserves to participate in local democracy? A wide body of research shows that property owners are deeply overrepresented in local political proceedings, especially those related to housing and land use. We know little, however, about whether such inequities conflict with the public’s norms of democratic equality. This article explores perceptions of democratic inclusion in local housing politics, and whether these views can be altered with more information about political inequalities. Using survey data from 13,619 respondents across 57 cities, we find that: (1) members of the public prefer to hear from homeowners and longtime residents in political proceedings; and (2) disseminating information about local participatory inequalities increases the likelihood of the public wanting to hear from a renter, albeit by a substantively small amount. These results show that public persuasion may not be the most fruitful avenue for reforming these inequitable local political institutions.

Keywords: democratic citizenship; participation; public opinion; housing policy; local government

Word Count: 3928

*Assistant Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. jdbk@hks.harvard.edu.
†Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Boston University. kleinstein@bu.edu.
‡Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Boston University. mbpalmer@bu.edu.
Introduction

In August 2022, members of the Milton, MA planning board met to select the town’s Master Plan Implementation Committee. The planning board in this affluent Boston suburb discussed applicants’ qualifications and general criteria for selecting committee members. One member said, “As I looked at the volunteers, at the top of my list was how long have they lived in Milton? I wanted to know what kind of property or properties they own. Is it single-family, multi-family, or commercial? Do they own a business in town?...Basically I wanted to know how much they’re financially invested in town. Because if you’re making zoning suggestions and zoning changes, I kind of feel like you should have some skin in the game.” The other planning board members concurred. They believed to participate in the policy decisions with which the Master Plan committee was tasked, applicants should own property and be longtime residents in the community to signal investment and expertise.\(^1\)

Who deserves to participate in local democracy? The Milton planning board’s view of land use politics—and local politics more generally—is one in which property owners should predominate. Urban politics research suggests that American cities reflect these preferences. Renters—along with people of color and less wealthy people—are less likely to vote in local elections, which are, in general, low turnout affairs (Hajnal, Kogan and Markarian 2022; Hall and Yoder 2022; Yoder 2020). Moreover, renters are less likely to be represented among public officials (Einstein, Ornstein and Palmer 2019). These disparities are especially prominent in housing and land use politics, the arena over which officials like those in Milton exercise control. Homeowners and longtime residents are far more likely to vote in ballot referenda related to housing (Hall and Yoder 2022), attend public meetings about housing (Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019), and to serve on public boards related to housing.\(^2\)

But what are citizens’ beliefs about the normative harm or value of these disparities in the local democratic process? Are views like those of the Milton planning board members widely shared? Understanding these perceptions is critical. Inequality in local politics may distort local

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1[https://cloud.castus.tv/vod/milton/video/62f5cb88f55e8f00089bb276?page=HOME](https://cloud.castus.tv/vod/milton/video/62f5cb88f55e8f00089bb276?page=HOME)

public policy outcomes in a number of different ways, in part because local political institutions are structured to amplify these inequalities. Indeed, a wide body of research shows that homeowners and renters hold starkly different views on housing and land use policies (Fischel 2001; Marble and Nall 2021; Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019).

Rectifying these inequalities requires: (1) public officials and their constituents recognize that disparities exist and are problematic; and (2) public will to make policy changes to the institutions that contribute to political inequalities. We seek to understand the extent to which this political status quo is publicly desirable and movable. We conduct a large cross-city survey of city residents’ views on democratic inclusion in the local political process. We ask respondents about the kinds of people they would like to hear speak at a public meeting about a housing development in their neighborhood. Additionally, we ask about their housing policy views more broadly.

In tandem with these measurements, we conduct an experiment embedded in this survey in which we compare how respondents rate participants in local politics across three groups. In the first, respondents are shown information about participatory inequalities in public meeting participation. In the second, respondents are shown information about local government revenues and spending. Finally, a third control group was shown no information. We find that all respondents strongly prefer to hear from homeowners over renters in public meetings, and they also express a preference to hear from long-term residents over more recent residents. However, the participatory inequality treatment increases the likelihood of a respondent choosing a renter to participate in the meeting. This information also decreases the likelihood of a respondent choosing a neighborhood association member to participate.

Overall, we demonstrate a widespread bias in favor of the participation of homeowners and long-term residents in local democracy. Disseminating information about inequalities in whose voices are heard does reduce support for these disparities, but by a substantively small amount. Together, these findings indicate the limited potential of informing citizens as a method to reduce participatory inequality and improve democratic inclusion.
Perceptions of Democratic Citizenship

While the prevalence of democratic norms has fluctuated over time, many Americans believe in political equality as an essential component of a functioning democracy (Almond and Verba 2015; Dahl 2007; Hochschild 1981; Tocqueville 1840). Support for democratic equality, though, has often varied according to ascriptive hierarchies of race and gender (e.g. Smith 1993, 1997). It has also become increasingly polarized along party lines (Graham and Svolik 2020; Grumbach 2022; Kalmoe and Mason 2022). Many Americans believe that, given the direct and visible payment of taxes by landowners to the government (Williamson 2017), taxpayers are more deserving of a say in how government revenue is spent. These historical exclusions stand in stark contrast to a view of American democracy rooted in equality.

Local politics may be a particular locus of inequality in democratic participation. Historically, the construction of local political institutions and voting rights has centered homeowners in the conceptualization of democratic citizenship. Einstein and Palmer (2021) find that, compared to state and federal contests, local contests in the 19th century were far more likely to be restricted to property owners. Politicians justified such restrictions on the grounds that homeowners are most affected by the policies made by local governments, or that homeowners’ longevity in a community may make them more informed and invested in local politics—and, thus “better” democratic citizens (Keyssar 2009; Fischel 2001). Other local institutions have been similarly constructed in a way that restricts the democratic franchise, albeit less explicitly. Local elections are frequently held off-cycle, leading to unrepresentative electorates (Anzia 2011; Hajnal, Kogan and Markarian 2022). Critical decisions about land use, education, and transportation are made at local public meetings, which disproportionately attract homeowner participation. At these meetings, members of the public are invited to participate and offer feedback on a range of public policies (Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019). While these meetings can, in theory, be sites of deliberation (Collins 2021; Fung and Wright 2001; Mansbridge 1980), in practice these forums are usually dominated by privileged white homeowners eager to control access to their community’s public resources (Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019). These institutionally-driven political inequalities broadly have serious consequences for local policy: for example, these political processes have contributed to a massive
housing shortage and racial and economic segregation in many cities (Hankinson 2018; Marble and Nall 2021; Trounstine 2018; Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019).

Taking these perspectives in concert, we expect members of the public to believe that homeowners are more qualified to participate in local political proceedings – based in part on perceptions that they are more informed and more invested in the success of their community. We similarly anticipate favorable perceptions of longtime residents, who share these perceived high levels of knowledge and community investment.

However, these views may be movable if members of the public are reminded of norms of democratic equality. In general, research has found that there are large partisan gaps in housing policy preferences (de Benedictis-Kessner, Warshaw and Jones 2023) and changing perspectives on land use/housing issues can be difficult (Marble and Nall 2021). But, given strong general support for democratic equality, we expect that, when members of the public are provided information about deep inequality in local political participation, they may no longer show as strong a homeowner bias when judging who should participate in local politics.

Survey and Experimental Design

To address these questions, we conducted a pre-registered survey of 13,619 respondents across 57 cities in spring and summer 2022 via the sample provider Dynata. We included the 15 largest cities in the country in addition to a random sample of cities over 75,000 to capture the perspectives of residents in mid-sized cities.

We targeted a complete rate of at least 150 respondents per city, and an overall demographic profile of the respondents that matched the census demographics of the overall population of cities in our sample on age, race/ethnicity, gender, and education. Though not a representative sample of any one city, our respondents were a diverse sample of residents in all our municipalities overall.

We asked a mix of questions about support for new housing development, support for other housing policies such as rent control, and perceptions of the political process. Our questions about political process centered on participation at public meetings. Public meetings are pivotal to the

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3Details on the recruitment and ethical treatment of human subjects are provided in Appendix A. Pre-analysis plan is available in Appendix B and at https://osf.io/bca7kz/?view_only=ae0c0414057c4b8d895dd6f60a5eda084.
housing development process (Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019). They are where boards and committees make decisions about what housing gets built, where it gets built, and which laws and regulations guide its construction. Similar processes guide other local government policy decisions, including transportation and schools, allowing us to speak to broader democratic questions about local politics.

Specifically, we asked respondents which individuals/groups they thought deserved priority in speaking at a public meeting about housing development. We then presented a randomized list of different types of community members who might have a vested interest in local housing policy:

- A long-time homeowner in the neighborhood
- A homeowner who purchased their home in the neighborhood two years ago
- A long-term renter in the neighborhood
- A renter who moved to the neighborhood two years ago
- A small business owner in the neighborhood
- A representative of the neighborhood association
- The manager of the property development company that would construct the new building
- An affordable housing advocate
- A representative of the local Chamber of Commerce
- A person who grew up in the neighborhood and would like to move back to the neighborhood
- A homeless person who would like to live in the neighborhood
- A resident of a nearby city who hopes to move to the neighborhood

We designed two experimental treatments that provided (true) information to respondents about two aspects of local policy related to housing. The first of these treatments involved information about participatory inequalities in public meetings about housing, and was designed to provide information reported in Einstein, Glick and Palmer (2019) in an attractive visual format to respondents. Our second information treatment provided details on the typical expenditures and sources of revenue for local governments in the U.S. (Airi, Dadayan and Rueben 2022), and also communicated this in an attractive visual format to respondents. Both informational stimuli are presented in Figures 1 and 2.

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4This list appears in random order to survey respondents.
In cities and towns around the country, people are invited to attend public meetings where important decisions about housing, education, and transportation are made. People can attend these meetings to voice their opinions to local elected and appointed officials.

Recent research studying participation in local government has found that certain groups participate more in these local meetings. These groups comment in meetings more than might be expected given their percent of the overall population, as the graphic here shows.

This graphic shows that the people who show up to meetings and make public comments are:
- more likely to be white rather than non-white
- more likely to be men rather than women
- more likely to be homeowners rather than renters
- more likely to be older rather than younger

When compared to voters (or the entire population of a city or town), this means that some groups may be over-represented in the policymaking process in cities and towns like [YOUR CITY].

Figure 1: Experimental manipulations: Participatory inequalities treatment
In cities and towns around the country, people are invited to attend public meetings where important decisions about housing, education, and transportation are made. People can attend these meetings to voice their opinions to local elected and appointed officials.

The decisions that are made in these meetings can affect how local governments’ spend and raise money in numerous ways. Data from the Census Bureau shows how different local governments tend to spend money and what the different sources of money they raise, or revenue, are. The graphic here shows how cities and towns across the country tend to spend and raise their money.

This graphic shows the importance of different ways that cities and towns spend and raise money, and how public meetings might affect their budgets. For instance, decisions made in public meetings might change:
- the property tax rate
- the amount of parking tickets and fines
- how much the government spends on schools

This means that the people who show up to public meetings in cities and towns like [YOUR CITY] can influence important financial decisions.

Figure 2: Experimental manipulations: Government revenue treatment
Results

Our analysis of perceptions of public meeting participation reveals that the general public prefers to hear homeowners’ perspectives in their communities’ housing and land use decisions. In Figure 3 we plot answers from respondents in our control group to the question prompting them about who they thought deserved priority speaking in a public meeting about housing development. Consistent with our predictions, respondents overwhelmingly indicated that they believed a long-term homeowner in the neighborhood should be given a speaking slot in the meeting. The second-most common answer, with about two-thirds as many selections, is long-term renter. The agreement around these two types of residents largely dwarfed interest in participation from other plausibly invested community members. Respondents seem particularly unenthusiastic about participation from potential meeting attendees who currently reside elsewhere, but want to move to the community. Indeed, they were over 50 percentage points more likely to select a long-time homeowner than a resident of a nearby city who would like to move to the neighborhood.

Figure 3: Responses in control group to participation question
We also examine the responses to the participation question by the order in which respondents choose potential participants to speak at the meeting. Table 1 lists the percent of respondents that listed each option first, and the average rank of each option among those options listed by the respondent. Long-time homeowners have the lowest average rank (where lower is the top of the list) and 31% of respondents listed then first. Managers of property development companies and long-term renters were second and third most likely to be ranked first. In contrast, short-term homeowners and renters were less likely to be listed, and when they were listed they were less likely to be ranked first, and had lower average ranks in the list of participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>% Included</th>
<th>% Listed First</th>
<th>Avg. Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A long-time homeowner in the neighborhood</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A long-term renter in the neighborhood</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small business owner in the neighborhood</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A representative of the neighborhood association</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The manager of the property development company that would construct the new building</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An affordable housing advocate</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A homeowner who purchased their home in the neighborhood two years ago</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A renter who moved to the neighborhood two years ago</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A representative of the local Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person who grew up in the neighborhood and would like to move back to the neighborhood</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A homeless person who would like to live in the neighborhood</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A resident of a nearby city who hopes to move to the neighborhood</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Responses in control group to participation question

There are also substantial differences in preferences for participation based on the respondent’s own housing situation. Figure 4 presents the same results as Figure 3 broken down by respondents’ housing type. Long-term homeowners are the most common choice for both groups, but renters are significantly more likely than homeowners to choose to hear from long-term renters (58% and 50%, respectively). Homeowners are much more likely than renters to choose to hear from short-term
homeowners. Interestingly, homeowners are also more likely than renters to choose short-term renters to participate. Renters are much more likely than homeowners to choose an affordable housing advocate; 50% of renters choose this option, compared to 35% of homeowners.

![Figure 4: Responses in control group to participation question by housing status](image)

We next examine the effects of our experimental manipulations, which were designed to influence respondents' views on democratic inequalities in the local participation process. To assess the effect of our experimental manipulations that provided either information about city revenues or information about participatory inequalities, we regressed a binary indicator for whether or not respondents picked at least one member of each meeting attendee group as a person they believed should be given a speaking slot in the public meeting. The results of our treatments on three potential speaking groups are shown in Figure 5. The left panel plots our treatment effects on the proportion of respondents picking a renter from among the potential speakers at the public meeting, while the middle panel plots the treatment effects on the proportion of respondents picking a homeowner as a speaker, and the right panel plots the effects on the proportion of respondents
picking the neighborhood association representative. The top set of points in each panel represents the treatment effect of providing information about participatory inequalities relative to the control group, while the bottom set of points represents the effect of providing the government revenue information relative to the control group.\footnote{These same results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table A1.}

Figure 5: Treatment effects in housing participation experiment. Points represent regression coefficients along with 95\% (thin lines) and 90\% (thick lines) confidence intervals. Full results presented in Table A1.

As the left panel shows, respondents to whom we provided information on participatory inequalities were 2.7 percentage points more likely to choose renters to participate in the public meeting than those respondents in the control group. Relative to the baseline level of respondents from the control group who included renters (61\% of respondents), this represents a small but distinguishable effect on inclusion of this underrepresented group.

The middle panel plots our experimental treatment effects on the likelihood that respondents picked a homeowner to participate in the public meeting. As we showed earlier, a substantial portion of respondents at baseline (in the control group) chose a homeowner to participate. When including either a long-term or new homeowner, a full 87\% of respondents in the control group chose to give a homeowner a speaking slot in the meeting. In turn, our experimental manipulations appeared to have little influence on respondents’ inclusion of this group. Neither treatment manipulation made respondents more or less likely to want to include these people as speakers at the public meeting.
This lack of treatment effects combined with a high baseline level of inclusion for this group suggests that respondents’ beliefs about the importance of homeowners in the local democratic process are quite concrete.

The right panel shows the effects of our experimental manipulations on the likelihood of respondents picking the neighborhood association representative to speak in the public meeting. Our participatory inequalities treatment decreased the proportion of respondents picking this group to participate by 3.1 percentage points relative to the control group, in which 45% of respondents selected this representative.  

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Our descriptive results give much-needed context for perceptions of local democracy, and the role they might play in fomenting the ongoing housing supply crisis. A wide body of research highlights land use regulations (Glaeser and Gyourko 2018; Gyourko and Krimmel 2021) and public meeting requirements (Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019) as key obstacles to the construction of much-needed new housing. Changing these regulations requires public buy-in. Yet work on opinion about housing suggests that such public support may not be easily forthcoming (Hankinson 2018; Marble and Nall 2021; Trounstine 2023).

Our descriptive results suggest a broader obstacle to meaningful institutional reform: prevailing local democratic norms mean that a majority of residents favor the unequal local democracy that predominates. They do not believe that all residents should have an equal say over land use decisions. Rather, they support homeowners and longtime residents – groups who are both more likely to oppose new housing (Einstein, Glick and Palmer 2019) – having more say in local policymaking within public deliberative bodies. This support for inequality places an important constraint on local governments’ ability to meaningfully address the housing crisis—and potentially limits reform in other critical areas, like transportation and education.

Our experimental results, however, suggest that these views on local democracy may be movable. Showing members of the public information about inequalities in public meetings about housing development can modestly encourage them to be more inclusive. This type of inclusivity may help

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6As we show in Appendix D, these effects are also not driven entirely by one partisan group.
ameliorate some of the existing inequalities in participation. Yet the effect sizes in our experimental analyses are fairly modest in the broader context of strong public favoritism for homeowners and longtime residents. Moving public views a few percentage points will not alter the broader structural reality that large majorities of the public in cities – including many majority-renter cities – believe that homeowners and longtime residents should have more influence in important local political proceedings.

Our results do provide some optimism for advocates of political equality in local democracy and specifically for housing policy debates. Members of the public may only be influenced a small amount by learning about existing inequalities. Policymakers, on the other hand – and specifically those in control of institutions that make decisions about housing policy – may respond more substantially to information about inequalities in democratic participation given their responsibility as delegates of the public will. Given the power that such individuals have to reform structures that give homeowners, the wealthy, and white residents of cities and towns more political power, changing their opinions may be a more fruitful route than changing the opinions of the public.
References


Supplementary Appendix for
A  Survey Recruitment and Consent

Throughout our research, we adhered fully to principles of ethical research conduct as required by federal law and as outlined in the APSA “Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research.” This involved the following steps.

- We received approval for our study through our respective academic institutions’ IRBs, which determined this study to be “exempt.”

- Subjects were recruited and paid by the survey sample provider, which has a standing panel of potential respondents who have opted into completing occasional surveys for commercial and non-commercial purposes and receive incentive rewards for completing surveys on a regular basis. The exact monetary value of these rewards is proprietary information that the survey sample provider does not share with researchers.

- Subjects provided their informed consent before entering the survey using a template provided by our IRB. This consent form language is provided in the section below. Those people who were recruited but did not give their informed consent to participate were immediately routed out of the survey and their data deleted.

- There was no deception involved in our survey, though there was incomplete disclosure of the study hypotheses (the experimental manipulations) as disclosing those hypotheses would invalidate our manipulations.

Informed Consent

Key Information This study involves reading about potential policy changes in your city and answering several short survey questions with your opinions.

Why am I being invited to take part in a research study? We invite you to take part in a research study because you live in the United States and are 18 years of age or older.

What should I know about a research study?

- Someone will explain this research study to you.
• Whether or not you take part is up to you.

• Your participation is completely voluntary.

• You can choose not to take part.

• You can agree to take part and later change your mind.

• Your decision will not be held against you.

• Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.

• You can ask all the questions you want before you decide.

Why is this research being done? This research is being done to learn more about public opinion on local issues.

How long will the research last and what will I need to do? We expect that you will be in this research study for approximately 10 minutes. You will be asked to read information about potential policy changes in your city and then answer survey questions with your own opinion. The researchers will not store information that could identify you with your survey responses. Identifying information will not be used in any presentation or publication written about this project. For scientific reasons, you may be unaware of the study hypotheses and the research questions being tested.

Is there any way being in this study could be bad for me? We don’t believe there are any risks from participating in this research.

Will being in this study help me in any way? We cannot promise any benefits to you or others from your taking part in this research.

Who can I talk to? If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or think the research has hurt you, talk to the research team at [contact info redacted]
B  Pre-analysis plan

Though our pre-analysis plan was filed at OSF prior to analysis and is available at https://osf.io/bcakz/?view_only=ae0c0414057c4b8d895ddf60a5eda084, we also provide a anonymized version of it below.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already? Data are being collected but have not yet been analyzed.

2) What’s the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study? This is an online survey study that involves both survey questions and a randomized experiment. In the experimental component of the study, we experimentally vary the (all true) information provided to respondents about public policy and public meetings. Specifically, we randomly present, in one condition, information about the relative participation of racial groups, demographic groups, and socio-economic groups in local policy decisions and their opinions; in a second condition, we present information about the sources of revenue that local governments raise their funding from and the typical ways that they spend their money; in a third (control) condition, we present respondents with no such information.

Our first hypothesis is that the participatory inequities treatment will increase the probability that the respondent chooses to include "lower status groups" (renters, bicyclists, people with shorter housing tenures, homeless people, non-residents) and decrease the probability of including "higher status groups" (home owners, long-term residents, drivers, group representatives) relative to the control condition. Our second hypothesis is that the revenue treatment will have the opposite effect, relative to the control condition.

We also expect the participation treatment to increase the rank of the lower status groups on the list of participants, and the finance condition to decrease the rank of lower status groups on the list of participants.

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured. 1. Is at least one member of each group selected on each of the two meeting participation questions. Binary. 2. The rank of each group on the participation questions. 0 if not selected, 1-5 if selected (5 is ranked first).
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to? 3: Control group; Participatory inequities condition; Revenue condition.

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis. Linear regression and logit models of our binary outcomes predicted by indicators for each condition, each of the participation questions, and group, where the DV is if the group is included. Linear regression for the rank of each group predicted by indicators for each condition and each of the participation questions. We will estimate models without controls and with demographics variables (homeownership; housing type; residence duration; car ownership; party identification, education) and city fixed effects. We will also compute treatment effects (both with and without controls) for each city subgroup of respondents.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations. We will split the sample by above/below passage of attention check questions in the survey to test for attenuation of treatment effects by respondent attentiveness, and, if there is a large degree of attenuation, we will report attentive subsample results.

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined. Survey sample of 7500 respondents (150 per city; 50 cities). Survey provider (Dynata) may have to include

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?) We will also estimate models interacting the experimental conditions with variables for homeownership, length of residence duration, party identification, education, and income to examine heterogeneity of treatment effects.
C Experimental Treatment Effects

In Table A1 below, we show the treatment effects of our two manipulations on respondents’ likelihood of choosing three groups to participate in the meeting: renters (either long-term or new), homeowners (either long-term or new), and a neighborhood association representative. The differences between the two treatment-group averages and the control group average are represented by the treatment effects shown below and in Figure 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Renter</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory inequalities</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government revenue</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1: Treatment effects on groups picked in participation question. N=8,046 for each model.
D  Experimental Treatment Effects by Respondent Partisanship

In Figure A1 and Table A2 below, we show our experimental treatment effects by the partisanship of respondents in our survey sample. Though the treatment effect of the participatory inequalities treatment appears larger for Republican respondents on the outcomes of picking a renter or a neighborhood association representative, these subset analyses do not indicate that there are broadly different results across partisan groups.

Figure A1: Treatment effects in housing participation experiment, by respondent partisanship. Points represent regression coefficients along with 95% (thin lines) and 90% (thick lines) confidence intervals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Renter</th>
<th></th>
<th>Homewner</th>
<th></th>
<th>Neighborhood Assoc.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>−0.005</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>−0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>−0.008</td>
<td>−0.079*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.871*</td>
<td>0.899*</td>
<td>0.659*</td>
<td>0.540*</td>
<td>0.444*</td>
<td>0.492*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                |        |       |          |       |                     |       |
| Observations   | 4,406  | 2,065 | 4,406    | 2,065 | 4,406               | 2,065 |
| R²             | 0.0003 | 0.0001| 0.0003   | 0.001 | 0.0001              | 0.004 |
| Adjusted R²    | −0.0002| −0.001| −0.0002  | 0.0002| −0.0004             | 0.003 |

Note: *p<0.01

Table A2: Treatment effects in housing participation experiment, by respondent partisanship.