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Faculty Research Working Paper Series
Nolan Miller
Associate Professor of Public Policy
Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations.
Miller, Nolan, John W. Pratt, Richard Zeckhauser, and Scott Johnson. "Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations." KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP06-028, July 2006.
Abstract
We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian e-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures balanced transfers exist that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful. This paper extends the analysis of KSG RWP03-020.
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